nature two univerfal infinite spaces, or two eternities, both before and after the prefent moment. But because we are incapable of judging what must have been in this cafe, we are content to argue from what is; and upon this ground we have reafon enough to conclude that God is one.

Since the divine power and wisdom are fo amazingly great, that we cannot conceive any effect to which they are not equal; nay, fince we are able to comprehend but a very small part of the actual effects of the power and wifdom of God, and new views are continually opening to us, which are continually exciting greater admiration, there can be no danger of our exceeding the truth, if we endeavour to conceive of thefe perfections of God as infinite. Indeed we have fufficient reason to believe that, ftrictly fpeaking, they are fo; though we are not able directly to demonftrate it: becaufe we, being finite, cannot comprehend any thing that is infinite; and not being able to comprehend an infinite effect, we cannot fully demonftrate infinity in the cause. The extent, and other properties of the divine goodness, I fhall confider more at large.

SEC

I

SECTION V.

Of the properties of the divine goodness.

F goodness, or benevolence, be the great governing principle, or fpring of action in the divine being, happiness muft prevail amongst thofe of his creatures that are capable of it. If it were poffible that there fhould be, upon the whole, more mifery than happiness in the creation, it would be an argument that the fupreme being was malevolent. For fince all the tendencies and iffues of things were, from the firft, perfectly known to him, he would, fuppofing him to be benevolent, have produced no fyftem at all, rather than one in which mifery might prevail. No fcheme, therefore, which fuppofes the greater number of the creatures of God to be miserable upon the whole, can be confiftent with the fuppofition of the divine benevolence. The means, or the manner by which the creatures of God are involved in mifery makes no difference in this cafe; for if it arife even from themfelves, it arifes from the nature that God has given them. If he had foreseen that the conftitution which he gave them would, in the circumftances in which he placed them, iffue in their final ruin, he would not have given them that conftitution, or have disposed of them

in that manner; unless he had intended that they fhould be finally miferable; that is, unless he himself had taken pleasure in mifery, in confequence of his being of a malevolent difpofi

tion.

It must be impoffible, for the fame reason, that the divine being should be capable of facrificing the interests of a greater number, to that of a few of his creatures; though it may, perhaps, be neceffary, that the interests of a few give place to that of a greater number. For if he had a defire to produce happinefs at all, it seems to be an evident confequence, that he must prefer a greater degree. of happiness to a lefs; and a greater fum of happinefs can exift in a greater number, than in a fmaller.

For the fame reafon, alfo, the goodness of God must be impartial. Since the fupreme being ftands in an equal relation to all his creatures and offspring, he must be incapable of that kind of partiality, by which we often give the preference to one perfon above another. There must be a good reafon for every thing that looks like preference in the conduct and government of God; and no reason can be a good one, with refpect to a benevolent being, but what is founded upon benevolence. If, therefore, fome creatures enjoy more happiness than others, it must be because the happiness of the creation in general requires that they

fhould

fhould have that preference, and because a less. fum of good would have been produced upon any other difpofition of things.

Thus it is probable that a variety in the ranks of creatures, whereby fome have a much greater capacity of happiness than others, and are therefore more favoured by divine providence than others, makes a better fyftem, and one more favourable to general happiness, than any other, in which there fhould have been a perfect equality in all advantages and enjoyments. We are not, therefore, to say that God is partial to men, because they have greater powers, and enjoy more happiness than worms; but muft fuppofe, that the system in which there was provifion for the greatest sum of happiness required that there fhould be fome creatures in the rank of men, and others in the rank of worins; and that each has reafon to rejoice in the divine goodness, though they partake of it in different degrees. Indeed, it were abfurd to fuppofe, that, properly fpeaking, there was any thing like preference in the divine being chufing to make this a man, and the other a worm; because they had no being before they were created; and there 'fore it could not be any thing like afection to the one more than the other that determined his conduct. In reality it is improper to fay that God chose to make this a man, and that a worm; for the proper

C. 5

proper expreffion is, that he chofe to make a man, and a worm.

Among creatures of the fame general clafs or rank, there may be differences in advantages and in happiness; but they must be founded on the fame confiderations with the differences in the Tanks themselves; that is, it must be favourable to the happiness of the whole that there fhould be thofe differences; and it cannot arife from any arbitrary or partial preference of one to another, independent of a regard to the happiness of the whole; which is what we mean by an arbitrary and partial affection.

There is a variety of cafes in which we may plainly fee, that the happiness of one has a reference to, and is productive of the happiness of others; as in the principle of benevolence, whereby we are naturally disposed to rejoice in the happiness of others. For we cannot procure ourselves these sympathetic pleasures, at least, in any confiderable degree, without contributing to the happinefs of those around us. This, being a fource of pleasure to ourselves, is a conftant motive to benevolent actions.

Laftly, if God be benevolent at all, he must be infinitely fo; at least we can fee no reason why he should wish to make his creation happy at all, and not wish to make it as happy as poffible. If this be the cafe, the reason why all his creatures are not,

at