fition of providence; whereas virtue and integrity is generally rewarded with peace of mind, the approbation of our fellow creatures, and a reasonable fhare of fecurity and fuccefs.

Could we fee all the causes of the rife and fall of empires, and in what manner the happiness of mankind is connected with the great events in the history of the world, it is not to be doubted, but that we should fee as much wifdom in the conduct of divine providence with refpect to them; fo as not to doubt (though we should not have been informed of it by revelation) that the Lord God ruleth in the kingdoms of men, giving them to whomsoever be pleafes, and promoting his own wife and benevolent purposes by the difpofition of them.

Laftly, it is an argument of the wisdom of God, that he has given wisdom to man and other crea tures, for he could not give a power of which he was not himself poffeffed in a much more eminent degree.

These attributes of power, wifdom, and goodness, are all that we can directly demonftrate from the confideration of the works of God. Every other of his attributes is deduced from thefe; and fince the divine being has been proved to be powerful, wife, and good, he must likewise be whatever a powerful, wife, and good being cannot but be. Thefe, therefore, together with the attributes of self-existence, eternity, and unchangeableness, may be called VOL. I.

C

the

the primary attributes of God; and all others may be called fecondary ones, or fuch as depend upon, and flow from thofe that are primary.

SECTION IV.

Of those attributes of God which are deduced from the confideration of his power, wisdom, and goodness jointly.

A

S the matter of which the world confifts can

only be moved and acted upon, and is altogether incapable of moving itself, or of acting; fo all the powers of nature, or the tendencies of things to their different motions and operations, can only be the effect of the divine energy, perpetually acting upon them, and caufing them to have certain tendencies and effects. A ftone, for inftance, can no more move, or tend downwards, that is, towards the earth, of itself, than it can. move or tend upwards, that is, from the earth. That it does tend downwards, or towards the earth, muft, therefore, be owing to the divine energy, an energy without which the power of gravitation would ceafe, and the whole frame of the earth be diffolved.

It follows from these principles, that no powers of nature can take place, and that no creature

whatever

whatever can exift, without the divine agency; fo that we can no more continue, than we could begin to exift without the divine will.

God, having made all things, and exerted his influence over all things, muft know all things, and confequently be omnifcient. Alfo, fince he not only ordained, but conftantly supports all the laws of nature, he must be able to foresee what will be the refult of them, at any distance of time; juft as a man who makes a clock can tell when it will ftrike. All future events, therefore, must be as perfectly known to the divine mind as thofe that are prefent; and as we cannot conceive that he should be liable to forgetfulness, we may conclude that all things, paft, prefent, and to come, are equally known to him; so that his knowledge is infinite.

The divine being, knowing all things, and exerting his influence on all the works of his hands, whereby he fupports the exiftence of every thing that he has made, and maintains the laws which he has established in nature, muft be, in a proper sense of the term, omniprefent.

Since God made all things to answer an impor tant end, namely, the happiness of his creatures; fince his power is fo great, that nothing can be too difficult for him; fince his knowledge is so extenfive, that nothing can pafs unnoticed by him; and fince the minuteft things in the creation, and

the moft inconfiderable events, may affect the end that he has in view, his providence muft neceffarily extend to all his works; and we may conclude that the conftantly attends to every individual of his creatures, and out of every evil that befals any of them produces good to themselves or others.

Since God is omniprefent without being the object of any of our fenfes, he comes under the defcription of what we call a fpirit, or fomething that is immaterial. It muft, however, be in his power to make his prefence manifeft to the human fenfes, if the purposes of his providence should require it.

We cannot help conceiving that any being muft be happy when he accomplishes all his defigns. The divine being, therefore, having power and wisdom to execute all his defigns, we infer that he must be happy, and perfectly fo. Alfo, though we cannot say that the confequence is demonftrable, we cannot but think that he who makes us happy, and whofe fole end in creating us was to make us happy, must be happy himself, and in a greater degree than we are capable of being.

In all the preceding courfe of reafoning, we have only argued from what we fee, and have fupposed nothing more than is neceffary to account for what we see; and as a cause is neceffary, but not more causes than one, we cannot conclude that there

there are more Gods than one, unlefs fome other kind of proof can be brought for it.

Befides, there is fuch a perfect harmony and uniformity in the works of nature, and one part fo exactly fits and correfponds to another, that there must have been a perfect uniformity of defign in the whole, which hardly admits of more than one being as the former of it, and prefiding over it. It was only the mixture of evil in the world that was the reason why fome of the heathens fuppofed that there are two principles in nature, the one the fource of good, and the other of evil, the one benevolent, and the other malevolent.

Thefe two principles, they supposed to be at present continually struggling against one another, though it was their opinion that the good would finally prevail. But we have feen that all the evil that there is in the world is a neceffary part of the whole scheme, and infeparable from it; fo that the good and the evil must have had the fame author. Befides, they both confpire to the fame end, the happiness of the creation.

Upon the whole, we may remain perfectly fatisfied, that there is but one God, poffeffed of all the perfections that have been defcribed; and were our minds equal to this fubject, I doubt not but that we should be able to fee, that there could have been but one, and that two Gods would have been impoffible; as much fo, as that there fhould be in