at all times, as happy as their natures can bear, must be because variety and a gradual advance are, in the nature of things, neceffary to their complete and final happiness.

Befides, as there is reafon to believe that the other perfections of God, his wifdom, power, &c. are infinite, it seems to follow, by analogy, that his goodness must be so too, though we may not be able to prove it demonftrably and confequentially.

It must be owned to be impoffible completely to anfwer every objection that may be made to the fuppofition of the infinite benevolence of God; for, fuppofing all his creatures to be constantly happy, ftill, as there are degrees of happiness, it may be asked, why, if their maker be infinitely benevolent, do not his creatures enjoy a higher degeee of it. But this queftion may always be afked, fo long as the happiness of any creature is only finite, that is lefs than infinite, or lefs than the happiness of God himself, which, in its own nature it must neceffarily be. It must be confiftent, therefore, even with the infinite benevolence of God, that his creatures, which are neceffarily finite, be finitely, that is imperfectly happy. And when all the circumftances relating to any being are confidered at once, as they are by the divine mind, pofitive evils have only the fame effect as a diminution of pofitive good, being baC 6 lanced

lanced, as it were, against a degree of good to which it was equivalent; fo that the overplus of happiness which falls to the fhare of any being, after allowance has been made for the evils which he fuffers, is to be confidered as his fhare of unmixed happiness.

It is only owing to our imperfection, or the want of comprehenfion of mind (in which, however, we advance every day) that we are not able to make all our pleasures and pains perfectly to coalesce, so as that we fhall be affected by the difference only. And whenever we fhall be arrived at this ftate; whenever, by long experience, we shall be able to connect in our minds the ideas of all the things which are caufes and effects to one another, all partial evils will abfolutely vanish in the contemplation of the greater good with which they are connected. This will be perfectly the cafe with refpect to all intellectual pleasures and pains, and even painful fenfations, will be much moderated, and more tolerable under the lively perfuafion of their contributing to our happinefs on the whole. However, in the light in which the divine being, who has this perfect comprehenfion, views his. works (and this must be the true light in which they ought to be confidered) there is this perfect coincidence of all things that are connected with, and fubfervient to one another; fo that, fince all evils are neceffarily connected with fome good, and generally

generally are directly productive of it, all the works of God, appear to him at all times very good, happiness greatly abounding upon the whole. And fince the works of God are infinite, he contemplates an infinity of happiness, of his own production, and, in his eye, happiness unmixed with evil.

This conclufion, however, is hardly confiftent with the fuppofition that any of the creatures of God are neceffarily miferable in the whole of their existence. In the ideas of fuch creatures, even when they have arrived at the most perfect comprehenfion of mind, their being must feem a curfe to them, and the author of it will be confidered as malevolent with refpect to them, though not fo to others.

It feems, likewife, to be a reflection upon the wifdem of God, that he fhould not be able to produce the happiness of some, without the final misery of others; and fo incapable are we of conceiving how the latter of these can be neceffary to the former; that, if we retain the idea of the divine benevolence, together with that of his power and wisdom in any high degree, we cannot but reject the suppofition. That any of the creatures of God fhould be finally, and upon the whole, miserable, cannot be a pleasing circumflance to their benevolent author. Nay, it must, in its own nature, be the laft means that he would

have recourfe to, to gain his end; becaufe, as far as it prevails, it is directly oppofed to his end. We may, therefore, rest satisfied, that there is no fuch blot in the creation as this; but that all the creatures of God are intended by him to be happy upon the whole. He stands in an equal relation to them all, a relation in which they muft all have reafon to rejoice. He is their common father, protector, and friend,

SECTION VI.

Of the moral perfections of God deduced from his goodness.

HE power and wifdom of God, together

THE

with those attributes which are derived from them, and alfo thofe which are deduced from his being confidered as an uncaused being, may be termed his natural perfections; whereas his benevolence, and those other attributes which are deduced from it, are more properly termed his moral perfections; because they lead to fuch conduct as determines what we commonly call moral character in men.

The fource of all the moral perfections of God feems to be his benevolence; and indeed there is no occafion to fuppofe him to be influenced by any other

other principle, in order to account for all that we fee. Every other truly venerable or amiable attribute can be nothing but a modification of this. A perfectly good, or benevolent being, must be, in every other refpect, whatever can be the object of our reverence, or our love. Indeed the connection of all the moral virtues, and the derivation of them from the fingle principle of benevolence are easily traced, even in human characters.

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1. If a magiftrate be benevolent, that is, if he really confult the happiness of his subjects, he must be just, or take notice of crimes, and punish the criminals. Otherwife, he would be cruel to the whole, and especially to the innocent, who would be continually liable to oppreffion, if there were no restraint of this kind.

2. But whenever an offence can be overlooked, and no injury accrue from it, either to the offender himself, or to others, the benevolence of God, as well as that of a human magiftrate, will require him to be merciful; fo that implacability, or a defire of revenging an affront, without any regard to the prevention of farther evil, must be carefully excluded from the character of the divine being. He must delight in mercy, because he wishes to promote happiness, though he may be under the neceffity of punishing obftinate offenders, in order to restrain vice and misery.

There