Price, and lord Monboddo, were among the most eminent; while the system of the Nominalists was espoused and defended with great ingenuity by Leibnitz, bishop Berkeley, Mr. Hume, Dr. Campbell, professor Stewart, and many others. Mr. Locke, Dr. Reid, and a few more under the name of Conceptualists, adopted a kind of middle course between these far-famed disputants.

From a review of the whole of this chapter it appears, that the principal improvements which have been made in metaphysical science, during the last age, may be summarily presented in the following particulars.

1. The Inductive Method of inquiry has been introduced into this branch of science, more fully, and with greater success, than ever before. In other words, some philosophers of the last age have taught us, for the first time, to study the human mind by ascertaining facts, and carefully observing and arranging its phenomena, without endeavouring to explain these phenomena by hypotheses and conjectures.

2. The theory of Perception, which had for so many centuries perplexed and deluded philosophers, was, for the first time, during this period, denied and disproved, and a more rational doctrine introduced in its stead.

3. The enumeration and arrangement of the intellectual powers have been delivered, by metaphysicians of this age, from the false, inadequate, and mischievous simplicity, which were so long and obstinately adhered to by their predecessors. The original powers of the mind have been

shown to be more numerous than they were before supposed; and the plan of studying them in detail, rather than through the medium of a set of deceptive systematic rules, exhibited and recommended.

4. The metaphysical writings of the eighteenth century are, in general, more clear, popular, and intelligible, than those of any former age. To this some of the most erroneous writers of the age have, by their acuteness, contributed. Even Berkeley and Hume have thus indirectly subserved the interests of metaphysical science.

Beside the writers on the general philosophy of mind, or on particular parts of this science, whose names have been mentioned in the foregoing pages, a number of others are entitled to notice in the metaphysical history of the last age, as having either written professedly on the subject, or interwoven much matter relating to the philosophy of mind in the discussion of theological, moral, and literary subjects. Among these bishop Butler, Dr. Hutcheson, Mr. Grove, Dr. Campbell, Dr. A. Smith, Mr. Toplady, Mr. Tucker*, and Mr. Allison, of Great Britain; Beausobre, Condillac,

*See The Light of Nature Pursued, by Edward Search, esq. 7 vols. 8vo, 1768, 1778. The real author of this work was Abraham Tucker, esq. It contains much new, curious, and highly interesting discussion on metaphysical and moral subjects. Of Mr. Tucker Dr. Paley, in the preface to his Moral and Political Philosophy, speaks in the following terms: "I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say, than in all others put together. His talent for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused through a long, various, and irregular work."

and many more, of France; Hollmann, Lossius, Tetens, Feder, Kruger, and Mendelssohn, of Germany; Crousaz, le Clerc, Bonnet, and several others, of Switzerland; and a much longer list which might be selected from different parts of Europe, are entitled to respectful distinction*. Indeed, the connection is so close between the philosophy of mind and moral science, that every systematic writer on the latter subject has, in a greater or less degree, treated of the former. This will more fully appear when we come, in a future division of the present work, to take a view of the various moral systems which have obtained currency, or excited attention, in the last age,

*Of the writings of the greater part of the metaphysicians above-mentioned, which belong to the continent of Europe, especially those of Germany, the author knows little but by report; it will not, therefore, be expected that he should deliver any formal statements or opinions concerning their doctrines.

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CHAPTER XIII.

CLASSIC LITERATURE.

AT the revival of learning in the fifteenth century, Classic Literature, or the study of the best ancient writers of Greece and Rome, was an ob ject of primary and enthusiastic attention among the literati of Europe. The remains of those writers were sought with avidity, and studied with persevering diligence. Criticisms and commentaries upon them abounded. To gain possession of a classic manuscript; to remove an obscurity in an ancient text; or to propose a new reading, was then considered among the most honourable and useful of all literary achievements. At that time he who could lay claim to the character of an adept in the Greek and Latin tongues was, of course, a great and learned man; while, without this, however solid, extensive, and valuable, his knowledge of other subjects, no one could be rescued from the charge of barbarous and contemptible ignorance. In a word, instead of considering classic literature as a means of obtaining more important knowledge, the directors of public taste, at that periód, unwisely erected it into an ultimate end, and taught their followers to consider it as the most worthy object of pursuit, to all who were ambitious of becoming learned. This was an improper extreme. The more judicious had just cause to lament that such a disproportionate share of regard was bestowed on language,

to the neglect of studies more important and immediately practical.

This errour began to be corrected about the beginning of the seventeeth century. At this period brilliant discoveries in natural philosophy began to arrest the attention of the learned world, and the physical sciences in general became more objects of regard. But this decline of classic literature was gradual. One errour was not immediately exchanged for its opposite. The Latin language was now generally employed as a medium of publication in science; and although it had come to be generally considered in its proper light, as a means rather than an end; yet both this and the Greek were generally and deeply studied by all who had a taste for letters, or aspired to distinction in knowledge.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the study of the ancient languages was still esteemed an essential part of liberal education. It was then the habit of the learned not only to write and speak the Latin tongue with the greatest facility, but they also still employed it as a medium for cơnveying the result of their philosophical labours throughout the literary world; and most of those who laid claim to the character of scholars had an extensive and accurate acquaintance with Grecian literature. In both these respects the eighteenth century produced a singular revolution. The Latin language has in a great measure ceased to be that familar medium of conversation and of writing among the learned that it once was; and the Greek, though nominally retained as a branch of study in modern seminaries of learning, has be