under the Masculine and Feminine as well as the Neuter and Common Genders. Such is the caprice of some languages, that the German word "Weib," which signifies woman, is of the Neuter, and not of the Feminine Gender. Further, in almost all languages which admit the distinction of Genders, there is no rule but custom for distinguishing the words which belong to each Gender.

[Even languages which admit the distinction of Genders, make use of the three different methods, of which we have spoken above, to distinguish the sexes.

Each sex of those animals which are nearest connected with the necessities of man and with his employments is almost always characterized by a particular word, which is absolutely independent of that which represents the opposite sex. Thus in English, we say, 66 a horse" and " a mare,' a bull" and " a cow," a ram" and " a ewe," "a cock" In French, however, masculine nouns of this description often undergo only a slight variation in order to form the feminine, as "chien," "chienne " "chatte."

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and "a hen."

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chat,"

As to those animals whose use is less common, or who on account of the places which they inhabit, fall less under our observation, as fishes and birds, or whom their diminutive size removes still further from our observation, we generally, in English, employ a single Noun to designate both Genders, Masculine and Feminine, so that when we wish to distinguish the sexes, we are obliged to connect with it the word "male," or "female." Thus we say, "an elephant," "a bee," etc. Do we wish to distinguish the sexes? we say, "a female elephant,” “a male elephant;" " a female bee," "a male bee,”

etc.

In some languages, the distinction of Genders is denoted less by the form or the termination of Nouns, than by the Articles and other words, which, as we have before observed,

determine the Number. The French, for example, employ for the Masculine, the Articles, "le," "ce," or "cet," and for the Feminine, the Articles "la," and "cette." In the plural, the Articles "les" and "ces" and the word "des" are common to both Genders.]

As Pronouns designate beings, they are, like the Nouns, susceptible of the distinction of Gender. *

Genders of Pro

As Adjectives and Verbs do not designate benouns, Adjec- ings, they are not themselves susceptible of the tives,and Verbs. distinction of Genders. They may, nevertheless, and in many languages, do admit of different Genders, as they admit different numbers. This difference of Gender in Adjectives and Verbs helps us to discover more readily the Nouns to which they are related.

[In some languages, Adjectives are susceptible of different Genders and Verbs are not; in others, this diversity of Genders occurs in Verbs as well as in Adjectives. Some languages admit it neither in Verbs nor Adjectives, although the Nouns receive it.

In French, for example, as in Latin and Greek, Adjectives have different Genders, Verbs have not. The French say, "cet homme est laid," " cette femme est laide." In English, in Persian, in Turkish, in Chinese, etc. neither the Adjectives nor the Verbs are susceptible of this distinction.

* In all languages with which I am acquainted, the Pronoun of the first person is of the common gender; and that of the second person is of the same gender in by far the greatest number of languages. But most admit two or even three distinct genders for the Pronoun of the third person.

CHAPTER III.

OF CASES.

WE have already seen above that a Noun may be in relation with another Noun, with a Verb or with an Adjective. We have seen also that the nature of this relation may be determined in several ways. Sometimes it is determined by a Preposition, as in these examples, "the love of country," "to come to Rome," "faithful to God." Sometimes it is determined by the respective places which the two words in relation occupy in a proposition, as in these, "Charlotte loves Sophia ;""Sophia loves Charlotte." Lastly, sometimes this relation is determined by a variation in the termination of the Noun which serves as consequent term to the relation, or of that which serves as antecedent, or even of both. Sometimes, moreover, several of these modes are employed at once.

Declension.

Take, for example, these two nouns, "the book," and "God." I wish to express a relation, the antecedent term of which is "the book," and the consequent "God," and the nature of which is a relation of property. I express it in English by employing the Preposition "of," which I place between the two terms of the relation and say "the book of God." In Latin, "book" is " liber," and "God" "-Deus;" but to express this relation, I must change the termination of the word "Deus," and say "Dei ;" I say then, "liber Dei," or "Dei liber," as I choose, for as the termination is sufficient to distinguish the antecedent from the consequent in the two terms of the relation, I am free to dispose them either way, without causing any difference of sense.

If instead of a relation of property, expressed in English by the Preposition "of," I wished to express a relation which should indicate the end of an action, I should employ in English the Preposition "to," as in the following phrases, "to be faithful to his friends," "to give alms to a poor man." In Latin "faithful," is "fidelis," and "friends,” “amici.” To denote that the word "friends" is here the consequent term of a relation of which "faithful" is the antecedent, and at the same time to point out the nature of this relation, I must change the termination i of "amici" into is and say, "fidelis amicis." In the other example, "to give alms to a poor man," the Verb "to give" is the antecedent of two relations, the first of which has for its consequent, "alms," and the second, “ a poor man. mosyna," and "poor man” is “

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Alms," in Latin is eleë.

egenus;" but to denote that the word "alms" is here the consequent term of a relation of which "to give" is the antecedent, I must change the termination a of " eleëmosyna" into am; and to denote that

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a poor man" is the consequent term of another relation of which also "to give" is the antecedent, I must change the final us of "egenus" into o and say, “dare eleëmosynam egeno." These terminations express at the same time the nature of the relation, and in Latin, where the terminations prevent our confounding consequents with antecedents, instead of being obliged, as in English, to place the two consequent terms after the antecedent, we may, if we choose, place one or both of them before the antecedent. We may say,}" eleëmosynam egeno dare," or "egeno dare eleëmosynam.”

These variations in the terminations of Nouns are called Cases, from a Latin word which signifies "end" or "conclusion," because that in Latin it is at the end of Nouns that these variations occur.*

I am aware that Latin writers appear to have understood by the

The employment of Cases is not absolutely necessary. Indeed, there need be no such thing, as we may observe in the English, the French, and many other languages, in which Prepositions, or some other means, such as the disposition of words in a sentence, are employed to indicate and determine relations. Those languages which admit cases have not all the same number. The Romans had six, the Greeks but five, and the Arabians have but three. In the Swedish, on the contrary, in the Lappish, in the Hungarian, in the Greenlandish, and in the Basque languages, there is a much greater number.

[If the number of Cases were equal to that of the relations which may exist between Nouns and the different parts of speech to which Nouns may serve as Complements, Prepositions would be of no use, and doubtless languages, which admitted such an abundance of Cases would have no Prepositions. Each Case would then, at the same time that it pointed out the consequent term of a relation, perform the function of an exponent, and determine precisely the nature of that relation. Every Case would then comprise the import of a word "Cases" rather the circumstances which accompany an action and the relations which exist between the ideas expressed by words, than inflexions or variations designed to characterize and represent these circumstances and these relations. If we adopt this signification of the word "Case," we must of necessity admit with Sanctius that there are Cases in all languages, or rather we must say that Cases do not belong to languages, but to the nature of things and to the mutual relation of things and ideas. I do not think, however, that even in this case we should be obliged to say, with this Grammarian, that the natural Cases are six in number. But further, I believe that we ought to take the word "Case" in the sense which the greater part of our Grammarians give to it, and which seems to be authorized by the word лTOS, which the Greek Grammarians employed to express the same idea. In this sense we may say that some languages have Cases, while others have none. If we were

to confine ourselves to the most rigorous signification of the word Case," we should say that in some languages Nouns admit of inflexions or variations, designed to express Cases, while these signs or Exponents of Cases are entirely wanting in others.