Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. HandelRichard K. Betts, Thomas G. Mahnken Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives. Written by a distinguished group of scholars and practitioners of intelligence from the United States, Canada and Israel, the volume's essays reflect the topics that Handel explored throughout his professional career. Richard K. Betts explores the politicization of intelligence, a theme that Handel examined in his essay "The Politics of Intelligence," which is also reprinted in the volume. Woodrow J. Kuhns examines the contribution of epistemology to intelligence analysis. James J. Wirtz uses Handel's theoretical work on intelligence failure as the starting point to derive a theory of surprise. John Ferris explores perhaps the premier case of deception in wartime: Britain's development of deception operations during World War II. Uri Bar-Joseph examines why Israel was surprised by the outbreak of the 1973 October War. Mark M. Lowenthal's essay looks at how changes in technology might influence surprise and deception in the future. |
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Abwehr achieve adversary Agranat Agranat Commission Allied AMAN's Army assessment Bandman believe Betts Britain British deception British intelligence campaign capabilities Chief of Staff Churchill Clausewitz cognitive command coordination Dayan decision defense Division doctrine effect Egypt Egyptian Eli Zeira enemy enemy's example forces gence German Handel Hitler Ibid induction initiative intelligence analysts intelligence community intelligence failure intelligence officers intelligence organizations intelligence process intentions Israel Israeli ISSB Japanese Joint Vision 2010 Joint Vision 2020 judgment leaders London Michael Handel Middle East Military Intelligence mobilization Moshe Dayan National Intelligence Estimates National Security Naval October offensive one's operational deception Pacific War paradox Pearl Harbor Perception plans policymakers political politicization prediction problem professional R.V. Jones reports risk Sherman Kent signals Soviet strategic deception strategic surprise success surprise attack Syrian tion University Press warning Wavell World XX Committee Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira