Time and IdentityJoseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein Original essays on the metaphysics of time, identity, and the self, written by distinguished scholars and important rising philosophers.The concepts of time and identity seem at once unproblematic and frustratingly difficult. Time is an intricate part of our experience—it would seem that the passage of time is a prerequisite for having any experience at all—and yet recalcitrant questions about time remain. Is time real? Does time flow? Do past and future moments exist? Philosophers face similarly stubborn questions about identity, particularly about the persistence of identical entities through change. Indeed, questions about the metaphysics of persistence take on many of the complexities inherent in philosophical considerations of time. This volume of original essays brings together these two essentially related concepts in a way not reflected in the available literature, making it required reading for philosophers working in metaphysics and students interested in these topics. The contributors, distinguished authors and rising scholars, first consider the nature of time and then turn to the relation of identity, focusing on the metaphysical connections between the two, with a special emphasis on personal identity. The volume concludes with essays on the metaphysics of death, issues in which time and identity play a significant role. This groundbreaking collection offers both cutting-edge epistemological analysis and historical perspectives on contemporary topics.ContributorsHarriet Baber, Lynne Rudder Baker, Ben Bradley, John W. Carroll, Reinaldo Elugardo, Geoffrey Gorham, Mark Hinchliff, Jenann Ismael, Barbara Levenbook, Andrew Light, Lawrence B. Lombard, Ned Markosian, Harold Noonan, John Perry, Harry S. Silverstein, Matthew H. Slater, Robert J. Stainton, Neil A. Tognazzini |
Other editions - View all
Time and Identity Joseph Keim Campbell,Michael O'Rourke,Harry S. Silverstein Limited preview - 2010 |
Time and Identity Joseph Keim Campbell,Michael O'Rourke,Harry S. Silverstein No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
3D framework 3Der A-series Ann's argued argument Aristotle B-theory benefit biological theorist brain donor claim common ground concept context criteria of identity CSMK Descartes desire distinct Domain entities episodic characterization essay essence eternalism eternalist evolved into Toronto example existential exists simpliciter fact false four-dimensional object future idea individual instantiations intersubstitution Inwagen kill Grandfather Master class metaphysical mixed view modal moral responsibility Muddy York nonexistent nontemporal Olson Olson’s characterization ontological opaque contexts Oxford University Press past perdurance perdurantist persistence personal identity Peter van Inwagen Philosophical polysemy posthumous harm predicate presentist presentists and eternalists problem of personal property actualism property presentism proposition psychological approach psychological continuity puzzle question refer relation seems self-concept self-informative sense sentence Shady Ship of Theseus Sider Silverstein Socrates sortal soul spatial substance Suppose Ted Sider temporal tensed tenseless theory things that exist thought tion Toronto true truth well-being