just as they have always been the leaders of anti-dynastic and other rebellions. Numerically, however, they represent but a small proportion of the nation; to form an estimate of the country as a whole on the characteristics of the Cantonese is therefore no more justifiable than it would be to draw conclusions about the British Empire based on observation of the Irish.

The influence of the Cantonese faction and the effects of their well-organized propaganda are two of the most powerful facts of the "Nationalist " movement with which the representatives of the Powers at Peking have to reckon. It must not be forgotten that no sooner had the Cantonese succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, than the leaders made it perfectly clear that their next object would be to agitate for the abolition of. the foreigners' extra-territorial privileges and for the recovery of tariff autonomy. Despite civil wars, private feuds and general anarchy in the Kuang provinces, this policy has since been steadily pursued and with markedly successful results, especially in America. The press of that country, and our own, not to mention the utterances of politicians, bear witness to the prevalence of a general belief that the Nationalist agitation represents a rapid and real development of national consciousness and the genuine political aspirations of the Chinese people. As a matter of sober fact, it merely represents the increased numbers and activity of the westernised intellectuals who, thanks to the support which they have received in England and America, now aspire to rule-or, rather, to exploit-the country. The true consciousness of the great body of the Chinese people remains, as it has always been, essentially non-political and philosophically indifferent to the origins of established authority, so long as reasonable security for life and property is provided. If the masses were in a position to express their views, they would assuredly beg to be relieved of the burden of a "national consciousness" which, while promoting the interests of a semi-alien class of politician, is obviously indifferent to the pitiful condition of the people. It is, indeed, a strange thing that the voices from China, which fill our political idealists with righteous zeal or indignation, are always those of the modern mandarins, clamouring for racial equality and lucrative concessions, while "the voice of Rachel weeping for her children," the sufferings of the hungry and homeless victims of misrule, leave these idealists unmoved.

Another feature, frequently observable in the Nationalist propaganda for foreign consumption, is that which seeks to justify the demand for an immediate revision of the existing treaties by citing the example of the recovery of sovereign rights by Japan and Siam. China's moral right to object to the extraterritorial privileges of foreigners is as incontestable as her moral right to claim the admission of her emigrants to the United States and Canada on a footing of equality with European nations. Unfortunately, the world-of-things-as-they-are has never yet been governed by abstract moral principles, and the fact remains undeniable (as an American authority has stated it) that “extraterritoriality is a necessity of the case if foreigners are to remain in the country." ."* This necessity will continue to exist until such time as the Chinese Government is able and willing to provide for the administration of justice by civilised and equitable methods of procedure. Japan succeeded in recovering her sovereign rights and her pride of place among the nations because her government and her people possessed the political consciousness, self-discipline and sustained energy to educate and adapt themselves to a changed environment and to do it without destroying the traditions and foundations of their own civilisation. The theorists who cite the history of modern Japan to justify belief in China's ability, by virtue of a machine-made constitution, to pass from a state of medievalism to that of a modern democracy, forget the all-important truth that the changes which Japan has been able to effect in her political and economic life were all initiated, directed and accomplished from within, and not from without. It was a native, not an alien growth; and its various stages were approved by the collective patriotic intelligence of the Japanese people. Twenty-three years have elapsed since England, America and Japan recorded by treaties their sympathy with China's professed desire to reform her judicial system in accordance with Western ideas, and expressed their readiness to relinquish extra-territorial rights "when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws and their administration " justify them in so doing. The record of the Chinese Government, its executive, parliaments and officialdom during these twenty-three years speaks for itself it precludes any serious comparison with the

*H. B. Morse, "International Relations of the Chinese Empire."

systematic policy of national education and discipline, deliberately adopted and steadily pursued by Japan. The only law which has established itself in China since the Revolution of 1911 is the law of armed force, while the be-all and end-all of policies at Peking is money. This is a hard saying, but it is true.

If I have dwelt at some length on the nature and causes of American policy in China, it is because there seems to be good ground for the apprehension that in the present Conferences at Peking our own Far Eastern policy is likely to be subordinated to American ends, as at Versailles in 1919, and at Washington in 1921. The utterances of prominent financiers, always significant at such junctures, certainly point in this direction. If we admit that the ultimate aim of American policy, like that of every well-governed State, is to make far-sighted provision for national security and the protection of national interests, the question naturally arises, should British policy continue to follow the American lead, to hitch its wagon to the American star, throughout the present negotiations? No doubt but that the preservation of the united front and self-denying ordinances prescribed by the Washington agreements would be worth some sacrifices, but no good purpose is to be gained by denying that so far, in practice, the result of loyal adherence to the spirit of these agreements has been that Great Britain has got all the kicks while our trade rivals (notably America) have secured the ha'pence. The Colonial Secretary's speech at the China Association dinner (November 19, 1925) would seem to imply that the policy of patient, docile waiting on events is to be maintained, even though it entail the risk of sacrificing great and pressing" British interests and this for fear of "encouraging the break-up of China and precipitating a scramble among conflicting Powers for predominance in this or that part of the country."

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Now, if there is one fact more obvious than another in the present situation, it is that pursuance of the policy advocated by American idealists must inevitably increase and encourage the forces of disruption in China, and finally put an end to the hope of preserving the unity of her people and her independence as a sovereign State. The mercantile community throughout China— American as well as British-is well aware that this is so, and when all is said and done, the vested interests of our trade, a matter of vital concern to the British nation, deserve to be recognised at

least by a dignified and independent national policy. Co-operation with the Governments of other Treaty Powers is evidently desirable, provided always that the measures to be adopted in common are resolutely directed towards objects advantageous to legitimate commerce, and calculated in the end to be practically helpful to China.

Everything that has so far transpired of the proceedings of the Tariff Conference at Peking would appear to indicate a desire, on the part of the Powers chiefly concerned, to mark time and manœuvre for positions, and in the meanwhile to endeavour to conciliate Young China's "nationalism" by a number of graceful concessions, none of which are to be immediately applicable; only in the field of what may be called bondholders' finance is there any sign of constructive purpose. Beneath a surface glistening with pious intentions and benevolent platitudes, the truth appears to be tacitly recognised that to grant tariff autonomy to the Chinese Government, under existing conditions, would simply mean filling the pockets of a number of Tuchuns and metropolitan officials, to the increase of civil strife and the detriment of trade. As The Times correspondent at Peking observed (November 10): "In principle, the Powers can concede tariff autonomy; but, in practice, their trade and vested interests would speedily be ruined if they did not make stipulations with regard to internal taxation on foreign goods." As the party in power at Peking is manifestly not in a position to give any satisfactory guarantees on this subject, tariff autonomy is conceded in principle, to come into effect three years hence. Many things may happen in three years and meanwhile several faces are saved.

Similarly, with regard to extra-territoriality. In principle, everyone is agreed that so soon as China shows signs of putting her house in order, the foreigners' "unequal" privileges must be abolished. Everyone agrees, in principle, that their continued existence is incompatible with China's dignity as a sovereign. Power. But everyone knows full well-and none better than the Chinese themselves-that if China were given full jurisdiction over foreigners to-morrow-or three years hence the position would rapidly become impossible for all concerned. It needs but little imagination to perceive, for example, what the results of a students' riot or a Bolshevist-led strike at one of the Treaty Ports would be, if the persons and property of British subjects were

liable to seizure by Chinese officials. In that event, one of two things must speedily happen: either every reputable foreign merchant would be compelled to leave the country, or extraterritoriality would be speedily re-imposed.

It is fair to assume that the principal results of the present Conferences, as of their predecessors, will be to give China one more breathing-space, during which all concerned may continue to hope for the best. The inherent problems of the situation will be postponed to a more convenient season. This result was to be foreseen, simply because there is not, and never has been, any real possibility of united, disinterested action by the great Powers, wholeheartedly directed towards helping China to recover her financial and political equilibrium. The trouble lies not so much in the difficulty of the problems to be solved (great though it be) as in the international rivalries and jealousies which apparently make it hopeless to expect any concerted international measures for the introduction of genuine fiscal and administrative reforms. If Great Britain, America and Japan could but sink their differences and unite in a determination to render real assistance to China, something might be done. The most urgently-needed reform, viz., that of the country's finances, might well be initiated, in the first place, by utilising and amplifying the means already to hand in the Maritime Customs Service. As matters stand, the central government possesses no reliable sources of revenue sufficient to maintain its authority and prestige, to meet its obligations abroad, and to defray the expenses of such public services as it still controls, and it is evident that the additional revenue to be derived from a 2 per cent. tariff surtax will not materially modify its insolvency.

The whole history of the country since the Revolution affords conclusive proof that, without a radical reorganization of the country's finances, the hope of establishing a stable government at Peking is futile. Half-measures, such as tariff revision, new loans, paper agreements for lekin abolition-all these are unavailing expedients. Nothing will meet the needs of the case but a complete reform of the whole system of Government revenue and expenditure by trustworthy accountants and auditors. During a necessary period of reconstruction, and the re-organization of the civil service on a system of regular salaries, the process would involve a certain amount of expert foreign assistance, but