The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental ActionPhilosophers working on the ontology of mind have highlighted various distinctions that can be drawn between the ways in which different aspects of our minds fill time. For example, they note that whereas some elements of our mental lives obtain over time, others unfold over time, and some continue to occur throughout intervals of time. Matthew Soteriou explores ways in which such distinctions can be put to work in helping to inform philosophical accounts of both sensory and cognitive aspects of consciousness. Part One of The Mind's Construction argues that work in the ontology of mind that focuses on distinctions of temporal character has much to contribute to philosophical accounts of the phenomenology of various elements of sensory consciousness—e.g. the phenomenology of perceptual experience, bodily sensation, and perceptual imagination. Part Two argues that these ontological considerations can inform our understanding of conscious thinking, and the form of self-conscious consciousness that we have as subjects capable of engaging in such activity, by helping to account for and explain the respect in which agency is exercised in conscious thinking. This in turn, it is argued, can illuminate the more general issue of the place and role of mental action in an account of the metaphysics of mind. |
Other editions - View all
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action Matthew Soteriou Limited preview - 2013 |
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action Matthew Soteriou No preview available - 2015 |
Common terms and phrases
act of judging activity agent argued aspects of mind assumption bodily action chapter claim commitment conscious character conscious event conscious experience conscious mental act conscious perceptual conscious sensory experience conscious thinking constraint Descartes doesn’t engage entities episode of perceptual episodic recollection epistemic epistemic perspective epistemology event/process fact form of self-knowledge Geach hallucination intention-in-action intentional content interval involves isn’t judgement kind located bodily sensation manifest image mental action mental agency mental events mind-dependent notion O’Shaughnessy object occurrent mental one’s belief one’s experience one’s knowledge oneself ontology of conscious pain perceive perceptual experience perceptual imagination perceptually aware phenomenal character phenomenal properties phenomenology practical self-knowledge proposal propositional content propositional knowledge psychological relation question red square region of space relationalist relevant rience role scious seems self-critical reflection sense simply sort sory spatial specified in terms stream of conscious subject’s suggested temporal extension temporal location thereby tion undergoing visual experience