ART. X.-LETTERS TO A SOUTHERNER.

LETTER X.

That the peculiar Theology of the New Haven School is a System of Licentious and Infidel Philosophy.

That system of philosophy which necessarily leads to the conclusions that actions differ not in nature, but only in tendency; that man is bound to seek the gratification of his innocent desires in promoting the happiness of others, rather than at the expense of it, that is, that he is bound to seek this gratification in loving God and choosing his glory and the temporal and spiritual welfare of others, rather than in vice and the blackest villainies, only because the first give more gratification to these desires than the last;—that this obligation exists independent of the will and authority of God, and that his law is only a declaration which informs us more certainly that our true welfare lies in virtue, such a system must necessarily deserve examination.

You are aware, that it is the doctrine of Calvinists, that there is in man a will which possesses a permanent sinful bias; or, in other words, sinful moral dispositions, which constitute the moral character of the impenitent; that it is in virtue of these moral dispositions, that the impenitent always choose sinful objects; that is, such objects as it is sinful to choose. You are aware also, that Pelagians deny the existence of any such innate depravity, sinful dispositions or sinful bias in the will; that they teach that man comes into the world, with no dispositions at all towards moral objects that he possesses a self-determining power in the will by which, when different objects are before him, he can incline himself to either; especially that when holy or sinful objects (i. e. such objects as it is a duty or a sin to choose) are before him, that it is by this self-determining power, and not through any bias inherent in his will, that he chooses the one or the other.

The early Pelagians did not confound moral distinctions, in order to give this innocent being power to choose between moral objects, or to choose them at all. But the Pelagians

of the present time, have introduced the doctrine of innocent desires, which however fasten on moral objects, and give them their whole power to affect us, (by which, as we shall see they confound the distinction of virtue and vice) and after all, have found themselves under the necessity of calling in to their aid, the old ally of Pelagianism, the selfdetermining power of the will. The old Pelagianism of New England was purity itself compared to the present.

You must be aware, that those who deny any inherent moral dispositions towards moral objects, and also pretend to deny a self-determining power in the will, by which it can put itself out of a state of indifference towards either of several moral objects; i. e. can choose either as it pleasesthat they need some means by which man shall become otherwise than indifferent towards these objects: This is accomplished by means of innocent constitutional desires, which fasten on the objects to be chosen, and put the mind out of a state of indifference towards them or make them desirable before they are chosen.

Within a few years, the new metaphysicians have changed the meaning of the three principal terms used by Edwards, viz. the will, motive and volition, and by this means, charge that great man with absurdity and fatalism, as if a person were to change Euclid's definitions, and then boast of refuting him. This I will now attempt to shew.

First, Edwards defines motive to be "something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding," the Ch. Spec. says that desires are motives; that the desire of happiness, is the motive of all voluntary action, and a writer in the last Oct. No. of Bib. Rep. uses it in this sense; he says, "How then is the fatalist to prove that motive or desire is the producing cause?"

Edwards makes desire and volition so far synonymous that desire is a volition for an absent object; volition the choice of one either present or absent; these writers deny that desires are volitions; they make them the motives only of volition, as was just observed, while at the same time, they teach, that they fix on the same object as volition. Every one knows he never chooses an object without first desiring it." Ch. Spec. Vol. 7. p. 565. The writer just quoted in the Bib. Rep. p. 402., "and yet it leaves to man full power to choose either the one or the other of the objects of desire, which God presents," thus making the object of de

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sire and of choice the same: he also says, p. 392. "If there are any acts of mind clearly distinct and different, they are desires and volitions."

But they also teach, that these desires are necessary to put the mind out of a state of indifference towards moral objects before such objects can be chosen. "Every one knows," says a writer just quoted, "he never chooses an object without first desiring it; for to choose without desiring it, would be to choose either from indifference or from aversion, which we know we never do. Ch. Spec. Vol. 7. p. 565. You see why these innocent desires towards moral objects are introduced; they are necessary to make the mind otherwise than indifferent towards moral objects before choice, which state of mind has heretofore been called choice. But the doctrine too is, that choice itself is an act of the mind, in which we are indifferent towards the object of choice; "for" says this writer "to choose without desiring it would be to choose from indifference;" that is, the act of choice does not signify a state of mind in which we are otherwise than indifferent towards the objects; if we did not first desire the object, we should be indifferent towards it in the act of choice; "and we know" he adds "we never could choose that to which we are perfectly indifferent ;" therefore as choice implies not a state of mind in which we delight in the object or prefer it, or are otherwise than indifferent towards it, we must first desire it. The necessity of these innocent desires is caused, then, by denying any such thing as we have been accustomed to understand by the word choice or preference.

These men deny that choice is a moral pleasure or delight in such objects, as it is duty or sin to choose; and this is absolutely necessary to their system. For, if volition should mean an act of inward moral delight in the objects of choice, then as volition is an act of the will, which is a part of our nature, this will would be nothing more nor less than an inherent moral disposition towards moral objects. Volition too, being an act of the will, it would follow that without such an inherent disposition towards moral objects as we understand by the will, there could be no moral delight whatever in such objects. And as this must be a disposition to delight in either such objects as it is duty or such as it is sin to delight in, it must be a holy or sinful heart, or a will with an inherent holy or sinful bias.

By desire, the writers on this scheme do not mean merely an emotion towards an absent object, but an inward affection towards every object about to be chosen, whether present or absent. If, then, by desire they mean an inward affection towards the objects chosen, as volition is regarded by them as distinct from desire, this can mean no such affection towards the object chosen. Choice, then, cannot mean a moral delight in any moral quality or excellence of an object, which, to our view, renders it worthy of choice: an object must be chosen simply as a means of gratifying the innocent constitutional desires. These innocent desires, the writer in the Bib. Rep. just quoted, and those of the Ch. Spec. assure us, are the invariable antecedents and motives, of all acts of choice.

If when I speak of choosing an object, I mean not an act of moral delight in some moral quality of the object, which, to my mind makes it appear worthy of choice and which we generally express by the word desire, then, in this act, I may be wholly indifferent towards the objects chosen ; I choose it solely as a means of gratifying some innocent constitutional desire. But this is absurd. When I say I choose the injury rather than the good of an enemy, if I mean, that, in this act of choosing his injury, I do not in the least desire it, I am really indifferent towards it. On this scheme, where desire is distinct from volition, when I deliberate between the good or evil of an enemy, I only decide by the act of choice which constitutional desire shall be gratified, whether that which fixes on the injury of this enemy or that which fixes on his welfare. This is the sense in which the writer in the Bib. Repository uses the word volition. He defines the will, to be "the power which the mind has to choose which of several co-existing desires shall be gratified." This is evidently giving the term "the will," a different signification from what it has in the writings of Edwards. Choice, in this writer's scheme, means nothing more than choosing which of several innocent but worthless desires, shall be gratified.

As there are no moral dispositions in a moral agent towards either holy or sinful objects, (I mean objects which it is a duty or sin to choose); which dispositions constitute the agent either a holy or a sinful being; and as there are no moral qualities in the objects to be chosen, which make either class of them appear worthy of choice to the agent,

according as he is holy or sinful: and as these moral objects must nevertheless be chosen, these writers have taught us that the agent has certain constitutional innocent desires, which fix on either class of objects; that this makes them to appear desirable; then, after these desires have given the person some inward innocent affection for the object to be chosen, after they have put the mind out of a state of indifference towards it, then forsooth the man is able to choose it.

The writers in the Ch. Spec. class all the desires under the term constitutional desire of happiness and teach that we can choose objects only as they gratify this desire: the writer in the Bib. Rep. just quoted is obliged to keep up the distinction between specific desires and the general desire of happiness in order to maintain the particular position which he attempts to establish, namely that we can choose in opposition to the strongest specific desire. But, he says, p. 387 and 388. "But there are cases when the mind is excited by a strong desire for some specific good either present or future, which reason perceives to involve more evil and less good than another course. In such cases, there is a conflict between the generic desire for happiness, and the specific desire for some particular good." In all other cases, where the strongest desire coincides with what is regarded as duty, he tell us, that the person always chooses to gratify the strongest desire; but in those above mentioned, he informs us, that he can choose to gratify either the strongest specific desire or the general desire of happiness, which is also constitutional, but which cannot properly be called strong or weak. This is the position that he means to support as evidence that man is a free agent; but in either case, the mind chooses that which seems best calculated, in view of the agent, to gratify the constitutional desire of happiness, whether it be called generic or specific: it chooses that, and only that, which seems best calculated to gratify either a generic or a specific innocent constitutional desire which has no moral nature, more than the sensual appetites. He coincides with the New Haven School in the position, that we choose moral objects, only as they seem adapted to gratify specific constitutional desires or the constitutional desire of happiness; we can only choose which of these worthless desires we will gratify.

On this scheme, desires, which are not merely emotions in view of future or absent objects, but inward affections for