Sundry objections to the system of piece-work, however, have been frequently raised. It is said, for instance, that men are apt to overtask themselves, and to ruin their constitutions when working for themselves. But that objection may be as well made to the manner in which all men work when they have a great object in view, whether it be to benefit themselves or others; but what does it amount to? It says that when men in their eagerness are foolish enough to forget the fact that they possess only a limited strength, they will cause damage to that strength of a temporary or permanent kind. But men in general will not act thus foolishly, and some experience of the effects of overwork will soon produce a sufficient carefulness in the future. Men do not, as a matter of fact, unless exceptionally, act so as to break down their strength at piece-work; and, as a rule, they are very much more likely gradually to fortify that strength. It is also said that men will give way to intemperance when they receive high wages as the payment of piece-work. Probably this objection is a more valid one than the other; but it presupposes that men as a rule will betake themselves to gross and immoral enjoyments, instead of refined ones, whenever their material condition rapidly improves. That, however, depends upon the natural inclinations of the individuals concerned; if the men, to start with, have been totally untutored, no doubt the possibility of indulgence may verge into a probability. The very reason, however, that they have been so totally untutored lies in the fact that their parents have, mayhap, lived in hovels, sent their children to no school, and brought them up in an atmosphere of improvidence and recklessness. But these conditions are the result of poverty-stricken and depressing circumstances, out of which probably their children may enjoy the best opportunities of rising, by obtaining the remuneration of piece

Y

work, and they would otherwise presumably perpetuate their untutored condition. Mr. Brassey says, in his 'Work and Wages,' that these objections of over-exertion and drunkenness have not, at any rate, been felt on railways; and, so far as my own experience goes, the most self-respecting, energetic, and powerful navvies are those who generally combine to work together in piece-work gangs successfully.

Then, again, it is objected that those who labour by the piece perform so much more work than they would do otherwise, that there must consequently be so much less work left for others to do, and that, therefore, these others will be in a measure deprived of employment. But when such an objection is made, it is forgotten that the effect of doing more work is to multiply or improve the articles on which the work is bestowed, so that they become cheaper. The community is, therefore, able to purchase more of them than formerly, and thus a greater demand arises for the articles made by piece-work. If this system were then to become universal, or even very general, no one would be a greater gainer than the workman himself; for, first, he would receive the enhanced wages due to piece-work, and, second, he would receive for the same sum of money a greater value of commodities (being the production of piece-work) than before. There can be no objection to piece-work on the ground that the remuneration due to it cannot be easily determined, and that therefore the workman is likely to suffer from the payment of too low a rate; for there must be less difficulty in determining a standard of payment for a piece of work at which generally many men of varying abilities will be engaged, than in determining the day wages of such differently qualified labourers. A council of conciliation would therefore find its business simplified by the general adoption of the system of piece-work, as

there would not then exist the same difficulty in arranging a fixed scale of payment for different individuals, who have such varied capacities.

It should, for these reasons, be the policy of trades unions to encourage piece-work, wherever it is found to be practicable. But, as Mr. William Thomas Thornton remarks, with regard to both overtime and piece-work, the great unionist error consists in interfering paternally with individual liberty in matters which chiefly concern individual interests, and in insisting on things being done which, unless done cheerfully, had better not be done at all. The error is one of a sort to which leading unionists, and working class leaders generally, are peculiarly prone. A favourite notion of theirs is that whatever seems to them right to be done people ought to be made to do; and a most pestilent notion it is to be entertained by the foremost men of a class who have just been formally invested with the power of making people do whatever they please.' 1

We have thus very cursorily reviewed the chief means by which the working classes may escape from the very unsettled and unsatisfactory conditions that exist in consequence of the antagonistic relations of capital and labour, and we have endeavoured to estimate these means fairly, with the view of ascertaining which of them should afford the most permanent and important benefits. We have come to the conclusion that courts of conciliation of a permanent character are most likely, of all means, to reduce the present disagreements between capitalist and labourer to a minimum; and, on the other hand, that of all forms of remuneration, first, that by piece-work, and, second, that by payment of part profits in supplement of wages, should be the most advantageous to everyone, but to the workman in particular. The various systems of 1 On Labour, p. 338.

co-operation we have shown to arise from exceptional circumstances, and to be to some extent indications of abnormal conditions.

Although, however, the most approved systems were to be fully adopted immediately, the condition of the workman everywhere would be, on account of the constantly alternating extension and depression of trade, still liable to considerable vicissitudes. At one period there is an immense demand for all sorts of commodities, and, therefore, for all kinds of labour to produce them; again, a few years thereafter, the demand appears to be paralysed, stocks accumulate, and workmen are paid off. Such alternations, doubtless, proceed, as before stated, from two causes principally-first, unhealthy trading; and, second, too lavish spending. The first proceeds from the doing business, more or less, upon the principle of staking little of one's own, and a good deal of other people's, capital on the chances of good fortune. As this sort of trading grows, which in good times it has a tendency to do, credit takes the place of capital, a large castle of business is built up upon a small foundation, and the least adverse wind may overthrow the whole fabric, and not only the one man's fortune, but that of all who had been leaning upon each other for mutual support. This condition of unstable equilibrium ought not to be permitted; for these castles of business, in tumbling, cannot but seriously injure large numbers of innocent individuals. He who speculates and risks all-it may be sometimes very little-and fails, should be, in the general interest, more summarily dealt with than he is at present. No action surely can be more reprehensible than that of deliberately risking the capital and prospects of others in the pursuit of one's own profit. It may be objected that everyone is competent to take charge of his own interests, and if he does not, that he may fairly suffer for the neglect

of them. But this is not a full statement of the case. Hundreds of honest traders may be brought down by the collapse of the resources of one or two dishonest ones; a panic spreads the disaster far and wide, everyone looks on every other with suspicion, no one knows the moment in which his own doom may be sealed; and from a condition of exuberant commercial prosperity and complete confidence, a few days may produce general collapse, distrust, and stagnation. The workman then feels the pinch, and he knows not from whence the ill-fortune comes, nor if anyone is to blame for it.

In the second case referred to, capital is expended too rapidly and indiscreetly upon, it may be, the execution of public works such as railways-that perhaps for years cannot yield an adequate return. While the capital thus being sunk is so rapidly expended, a great demand for the necessary materials and labour is created. Men's wages rise rapidly everywhere, and a great prosperity appears. When, however, it has been discovered by the investors that their capital will yield little or no return, a panic arises, all further expenditure is as far as possible stopped, and the labourers who are employed in the various departments of the work, are thrown out of employment. In consequence of such unproductive expenditure of capital, trade will decline and wages should generally fall. But should wages be artificially maintained, as they frequently are at such times, by the concerted action and the pardonable expectations of the workmen, bad trade must continue, and the suffering caused by it also.

These fluctuations, then, that thus take place periodically produce the most serious effect upon those who are paid by wages; and it ought therefore to be one of the first concerns of such, if possible, to discover their causes, so as to ascertain and apply the appropriate remedies. In