agricultural districts, especially where the winter is long and dark, the people may generally be without full means of employment, and indeed in many European countries, while they may possess full work during summer upon their farms, there is little remunerative work to be had in the winter. In these circumstances credit co-operative societies do good, for they enable the people to procure tools, machinery, and appliances that assist them to work most profitably in the winter time; and even in the summer their field occupations are conducted much more successfully on account of the fuller employment of capital that is so obtained. In England there appears to be no appreciable space or occasion for such societies, for large works, the productions of large capital, exist at frequent points over the most part of the country except in the outlying rural districts, and otherwise the poorer classes do not possess any lands of their own upon which they may apply capital.

Thus, then, there does not appear to be any prospect of a permanent and regular advantage derivable from the adoption of the principle of co-operation by the working classes, unless when the circumstances are exceptional; and when they are so, it is often, if not always, on account of an unhealthy, or at any rate a not very robust, condition of the industrial community. Where capital is made, it will tend to reproduce itself more easily in the future, for it facilitates labour, and the labourer must therefore, in preferring his own interest, prefer to work by its unstinted aid. The system of co-operation in a degree prefers a combination amongst labourers to the most profitable kind of combination between capital and labour; in the first case a distinct sacrifice is made, but with the view that what remains shall be securely divided amongst the labourer recipients, who have therefore a greater inducement to work hard and spare penuriously. From another

point of view, it may be seen that the principle of cooperation can never be generally adopted, for should it tend to do so, capital would become so very cheap, that the disadvantages of working without the largest practicable application of it, would become too severe to allow the working co-operators to survive in the competition.

Without, however, it being necessary for the labourer to dissociate himself thus far from the advantages which capital when fully employed must always present, he may benefit by its employment most amply, receiving, at the same time, full remuneration for his daily labour. That is to say, he may receive in addition to his nominal wages -which may be the current rate-a sum in the form of part-profits of the business in which he is engaged, for the effect of his knowing that he shall receive such will cause him naturally to apply himself more regularly and earnestly to his work than he would otherwise do, and it will also cause his interest to lie in detecting and reporting any idling in others engaged in the same business. By these means the position of the employer would be improved, for his capital would undoubtedly be rendered more productive, and therefore he would be enabled to grant such a bonus to his labourers, not only without loss but with additional profit to himself. It is, however, not easy generally to carry out such a system in practice, and in many businesses it is impracticable. With some, however, an adequate measure of success depends very largely upon such a mode of payment being adopted. Thus in the case of whale-fishing, there are rates paid to each class of men engaged according to the produce of the fishing additional to a fixed though low rate of wages, and these in a successful year represent a hundred per cent. of additional remuneration. But though the whaling vessels may return home 'clean'-that is to say, when the fishing has proved a failure-the men do not lose any portion of

agricultural districts, especially where the winter is long and dark, the people may generally be without full means of employment, and indeed in many European countries, while they may possess full work during summer upon their farms, there is little remunerative work to be had in the winter. In these circumstances credit co-operative societies do good, for they enable the people to procure tools, machinery, and appliances that assist them to work most profitably in the winter time; and even in the summer their field occupations are conducted much more successfully on account of the fuller employment of capital that is so obtained. In England there appears to be no appreciable space or occasion for such societies, for large works, the productions of large capital, exist at frequent points over the most part of the country except in the outlying rural districts, and otherwise the poorer classes do not possess any lands of their own upon which they may apply capital.

Thus, then, there does not appear to be any prospect of a permanent and regular advantage derivable from the adoption of the principle of co-operation by the working classes, unless when the circumstances are exceptional; and when they are so, it is often, if not always, on account of an unhealthy, or at any rate a not very robust, condition of the industrial community. Where capital is made, it will tend to reproduce itself more easily in the future, for it facilitates labour, and the labourer must therefore, in preferring his own interest, prefer to work by its unstinted aid. The system of co-operation in a degree prefers a combination amongst labourers to the most profitable kind of combination between capital and labour; in the first case a distinct sacrifice is made, but with the view that what remains shall be securely divided amongst the labourer recipients, who have therefore a greater inducement to work hard and spare penuriously. From another

point of view, it may be seen that the principle of cooperation can never be generally adopted, for should it tend to do so, capital would become so very cheap, that the disadvantages of working without the largest practicable application of it, would become too severe to allow the working co-operators to survive in the competition.

Without, however, it being necessary for the labourer to dissociate himself thus far from the advantages which capital when fully employed must always present, he may benefit by its employment most amply, receiving, at the same time, full remuneration for his daily labour. That is to say, he may receive in addition to his nominal wages -which may be the current rate-a sum in the form of part-profits of the business in which he is engaged, for the effect of his knowing that he shall receive such will cause him naturally to apply himself more regularly and earnestly to his work than he would otherwise do, and it will also cause his interest to lie in detecting and reporting any idling in others engaged in the same business. By these means the position of the employer would be improved, for his capital would undoubtedly be rendered more productive, and therefore he would be enabled to grant such a bonus to his labourers, not only without loss but with additional profit to himself. It is, however, not easy generally to carry out such a system in practice, and in many businesses it is impracticable. With some, however, an adequate measure of success depends very largely upon such a mode of payment being adopted. Thus in the case of whale-fishing, there are rates paid to each class of men engaged according to the produce of the fishing additional to a fixed though low rate of wages, and these in a successful year represent a hundred per cent. of additional remuneration. But though the whaling vessels may return home 'clean '-that is to say, when the fishing has proved a failure-the men do not lose any portion of

their wages, they simply do not gain their percentages. In this way, there is created a very great inducement to the exercise of watchfulness, diligence, and enterprise.

In many businesses, however, this mode of remuneration cannot be practised, for the profits may, in periods of bad trade, or in cases of contracts where contractors miscalculate, be converted into losses, when it would be found impossible to deduct anything from the wages of the labourer, so as to make up the deficit caused by these losses. Where, however, this system of dividing part-profits can be practically carried out, its influence upon the interests of both employer and employed must be beneficial. A modification of the same principle as that embraced in the distribution of a proportion of the profits amongst the employed, is that of piece-work, which is more extensively adopted and better known than the other. It differs in its action from that of payment of part-profits in two particulars-namely, that the capitalist cannot have the same reliance on the quality of work performed by his workmen, wherefore its operation cannot be so beneficial to him, and that the workman may altogether disregard the performances of his neighbour, when he is remunerated strictly according to his own only; in these respects, as compared with the other system, the employer is not so much, and the employed is more, benefited.

A manufacturer, employer of a thousand men, in various parts of England, thus testifies regarding his experience of piece-work:- I have never known a change from day work to piece-work where the workman has not done 50 per cent. more work in the same time, and increased his wages in the same proportion. In the great majority of cases, the skilful and industrious workman has doubled his wages.' In some trades, indeed, such as that of jewellers for instance, the adoption of this em seems indispensable.

1 See Times, January 16, 1876.