before. In the first case their wages are raised; in the second, the articles on which their wages are spent are cheapened, whereby with the same wages they are able to purchase more of them.

May there, then, be no case in which the workman shall resent by a strike an attempt reckoned to be unjust, to damage his position as a workman? Employers are unquestionably not all alike, and some may act with comparative illiberality or occasional caprice toward their workmen, the result being perhaps an inadequate remuneration. But such employers will not be able to retain the services of the best men, for these will gravitate to the best positions. That is a natural mode of rectification that must always be in operation. But generally the question comes to be, how the workman arrives at the conclusion that the attempt of the employer is unjust. Lord Moncrieff, in his late adjudication, or, as he called it, friendly advice, given to the carpenters locked out on the Clyde, said that from his knowledge of the state of the ship-building trade, as the result of his study of the circumstances in which it had been placed for some years, he was certain an advance in wages could not be given, and, moreover, that if the carpenters had been able to know what the circumstances of the trade were, he was equally certain they would never have made the demand, and never have incurred the loss and the suffering entailed upon them by the strike and lock-out. Now it may be asked, how can the workmen ever know that the reduction of wages proposed, or the rise denied, is unjust and unnecessary? The employers feel the pinch of bad trade, but the workmen cannot feel it except by a reduction in wages. But when a reduction is proposed they are apt to think it proceeds from some other cause, for they cannot, as the employer does, feel the necessity for it.

Now, employers are, of all others engaged in business

transactions, apt to be jealous of each other, and to seize from each other an advantage when the opportunity presents itself, and in no other way can they do this better than in tempting, legitimately it may be, the best hands from their neighbours' works. In face of this constant jealousy, it is impossible that employers will concert together successfully to reduce wages unless they feel it to be an absolute necessity, and even then sometimes the reduction is delayed as long as possible. Besides, there must always exist a strong dislike upon the part of an employer to take the initiative in a measure so extremely unpopular as that of the reduction of wages. If, however, the workpeople themselves unite together to resist a reduction of wages, they may long maintain a rate only applicable to a prosperous and sometimes to an inflated condition of trade. The capitalist must then suffer loss, relative or absolute, which he will, of course, endeavour, by increasing the price of his productions, to share with the public. But the public will limit their applications for such productions as become higher in price. therefore follows there will be a restriction in the amount of business done. There being then less work, fewer workmen will be required. Some of the workmen will now be paid off, and those will be the most inefficient, and therefore the least able to obtain suitable work elsewhere. The burden of their support will now fall either upon their friends or upon the community. But the community have more to pay for the goods of that business, and, therefore, they will be in a less favourable position to support those who are thrown out of its employment, and from an equitable point of view there could be no claim either upon public support or sympathy.

It

The artificial maintenance of wages, therefore, at rates which are not justified by the condition of trade is an

evil which must be felt pre-eminently by the workpeople themselves, for if the system were to be generally adopted, the workpeople, who form the greatest portion of the public in every country, would be called upon to support all their fellows thrown out of employment at a time when they would have to pay an increased price for most of the articles of daily consumption.

The result would therefore be, first, that the poorest part of the workmen would become impoverished, and possibly become paupers; second, the remainder would be placed in disadvantageous pecuniary circumstances, for while their wages were relatively high at the one end, they would not go so far from the increased prices of articles at the other; and, third, an increased contribution would be demanded for the support of the poor.

These evils would be avoided by leaving the rise and fall of wages to the operation of natural law, and natural law is as powerful in human society as it is in physical nature. There frequently exists, however, an idea in the minds of workmen, that the large employer is continually striving to gain ends that are inimical to their prosperity. I conceive there is no greater fallacy, and none more competent to produce evil and disastrous results. Men, indeed, everywhere work upon the lines of self-interest, and the more they do so without trenching on their neighbours' rights, the better for all. That self-interest may indeed change into selfishness, but that will be chiefly when restrictions and monopolies exist; for where there is perfect freedom, the aggregate action of selfinterest produces the maximum of public good, and reduces individual selfishness. The greater number of free and equal transactions there are between men, the more will individual self-assertion and offensiveness of all kinds disappear, because their owners will find out soonest their real nature and their unprofitableness.

We are therefore perfectly able to judge from a priori considerations what will happen in particular cases; whether or not, for instance, employers will carry their works on as fully in times of adversity as in times of prosperity, thereby losing wealth as rapidly as making it.

While, therefore, the great law of self-interest acts in the world of human society as that of gravitation in the natural world, there are modes of action that can be prognosticated as certainly in human affairs as in the phenomena of terrestrial motion. The great operating forces in human affairs are nowise more irregular or capricious in their action than are the material forces. The possibility of interruption in the result of the action. of these two forces is, however, always to be kept in mind. There may be minor forces that would be more apt to escape our notice than the major ones, but for the fact that they act so as to produce aberrations in the movements we look for from the operation of the first purely. It is just as if a disturbing force was detected in the solar system producing aberrations in the movements caused by the bodies which are already known, and such indications of disturbance lead to the discovery of smaller planets.

In describing some of the great influences which affect the prosperity of the people, we must endeavour as far as possible to ascertain how these influences are set in motion. There can, we conceive, be no considerable force at work to disturb in any material degree the operation of that all-prevailing force, self-interest. We therefore compare it to that of the gravitation of the planets towards the sun; and as astronomy can predicate the movements of the planets, so can political economy predicate the movements of men in their dealings with each other. It is the duty of wise men to acquaint themselves with the action of natural law,

whether it be in material or moral nature, for then only may the great masses of men be guided so as to frame their course in harmony with it. If natural forces are defied or neglected, there can be no doubt of the result being equally disastrous; otherwise, if understood and consulted, they may be utilised.

As to the standard of wages, it must be ultimately regulated at all times by the operation of the natural laws working within human society. Whether the market falls or rises, the operation of the law of selfinterest operating in the minds of the employer, the employed and the public will inevitably bring about, when there is no artificial action, a constant close approximation to the natural rate.

It is said, however, for instance, that when there is a sudden stream of prosperity, the employer for a time enjoys higher profits in relation to his expenditure upon wages than before, and that therefore, by a sharp and combined action on the part of the employed, the divergence that would for a time take place from the natural rate to the prejudice of the workpeople, might be corrected. This is an exceptional occurrence. Shall we correct this temporary rise in profits by demanding immediately a higher rate of pay than would take place otherwise? If we could always be perfectly certain of the character of the occasion we might do so; but it must be acknowledged that it is impossible for the employed to know exactly when the market prices rise sufficiently to afford a disproportionately high rate of profit.

The workpeople, however, it may be said, might advantageously act upon the advice of others who profess to know. The chance of error, however, in following such guidance must always be serious. Good news is always too eagerly welcomed, and therefore there is a likelihood of a multitude of advisers who