gathering of the elect, all find repeated mention in Paul's writings, especially in 1 Cor. xv. and 1 Thess. iv. I have left myself too little space to dwell at length on what is perhaps the most valuable piece of work in the whole volume. I refer to Dr Resch's treatment of the trinitarian baptismal formula in Matthew xxviii. 19: "Baptising them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." It seems to be regarded as an axiom in some theological circles that these cannot be the literal words of the Lord Jesus, but are "a comparatively late product of the dogmatic development of the Church." In rebutting this position, Dr Resch gives us fourteen pages of quotations from very early Christian literature, orthodox and heretical, showing the universal use of this formula. The arguments which our author then adduces in favour of the genuineness of the Logion are in brief these: (1) In the ministry of John the Baptist the trinitarian conception is discernible. "God (ó cós) is able from these stones," &c. "He that cometh after me is mightier than I.” "He shall baptise you in the Holy Spirit." (2) The trinitarian parallels in Apostolic writings. The examination of these is reserved for a prospective work, Canonische Evangelienparallelen in den apostolischen Lehrschriften. (3) Quotations from the oldest patristic literature, beginning with Clement of Rome, who has three palpably trinitarian passages, of which one is, "We have one God and one Christ and one Spirit of Grace who was shed upon us." Ignatius has four passages equally explicit. Then comes the Didache, which gives us the earliest citation of the baptismal formula outside the Canon, "Baptise ye into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, in running water (ev üdari (@VTI)." Aristides and Justin are then quoted, and many others. Dr Resch is particularly impressed by the unique formula contained in the Constitutions, v. 7 · · βαπτίσαι λαβόντες ἐντολὴν ἐπὶ αὐθεντίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅλων ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πατήρ Our author is of opinion that the words εἰς τὸν τοῦ κυρίου θάvaτov go back to an utterance of Jesus Himself. (4) The most striking proof of the veritable authenticity of the words is the prevalence of the trinitarian baptismal formula amongst all heretical sectseven amongst sects whose tenets were not in accord with its implied teaching. This, Dr Resch rightly thinks, shows am allerfrappantesten how deeply the trinitarian confession of faith is rooted in primitive Christianity. For example, among the Jewish Christians, where a unitarian rather than a trinitarian conception of God is discernible, as in the so-called Clementine Homilies, the trinitarian baptismal formula nevertheless was in constant use. The tendency of doctrine among them was foreign, nay hostile, to Trinitarianism, but the "trina invocatio" was too venerable to be dispensed with. Similarly, in the Gnostic systems, the Triad of Matthew xxviii. 19 plays an important part; and even the perverse Gnostics used the trinitarian baptismal formula for their sacrament of initiation, "manifestly only in order that they might not altogether lose connection with the common consciousness of the Church and the right to the Christian name." Monarchianism, Montanism, Manichæism, however hostile they were to the trinitarian conception of God, never repudiated the baptismal formula; and this could only be because it had existed from the beginning. No one could assign a moment in the development of the Church when this tradition did not exist. It was the bond of union between all who claimed the Christian name; the one thing which, amid a thousand divergences of creed and practice, never changed; the one thing common among all so-called Christians, orthodox and heretics alike. Having passed the work thoroughly in review, it will be seen that it has its strong points as well as its weaker ones. Notwithstanding one or two very precarious theories, of constant recurrence, and some doubtful arguments, it is a book which will long be indispensable to the student of Textual Criticism and Ecclesiastical History. J. T. MARSHALL. Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology. By Wilhelm Wundt. Translated from the second German edition and E. B. Titchener. London: Swan, 8vo, pp. x. 434. Price, 158. by J. E. Creighton THE appearance of an English translation of Wundt's "Lectures on Psychology" may be read both as a sign and as a result of the increased attention which, of late years, has been given to psychological enquiry. In our own country and in America, there has been a most strenuous attempt to define the sphere of psychology, and to solve its problems. We need refer only to such works as those of Professors James, Ladd, and Bowne, published in America; to the works of Sully, Bain, and Ward, at home; and to the numerous articles in Mind, and in the various publications of societies, to show that psychology was never more keenly studied than at the present moment. Without further reference to psychological study as a whole, let us look at Wundt's book, for it is a book with which we have to reckon. Wundt's aim is to derive every mental process from some other mental process; to derive the most complex from the less complex, and the less complex from the simpler, and to discover the mental laws of this interconnection. He starts with the simplest elements of mental life, and from these he seeks to build up the whole structure. It may be, in fact, Wundt thinks, that the simplest elements are themselves complex, and that sensations are really compounds built up out of unconscious elements. These, however, so far, elude analysis, and he begins with sensations which manifest themselves in consciousness. The first step is the explanation and defence of Weber's law as modified and extended by Fechner, and this may be regarded as the basis of Wundt's psychological theory. Having shown Weber's law, as he contends, " to be a mathematical expression of the principle of relativity of mental states," he proceeds to refer the "ideational connection in sense perception and spatial connection of memorial images" (in other words, space and time) "to the laws of association." The laws of association are connection by likeness and connection by contiguity, and by the application of these two principles Wundt says he has built up out of sensation the various processes and products of our mental life. The feelings, too, take their place, under the guidance of the same laws, " as terms in a developmental series, extending from the simplest forms of impulse to the most complicated expressions of self-initiated, voluntary activity." Thus Wundt claims to explain the process by which thoughts, feelings, volitions, in their most complex and highlydeveloped articulation, have been built up out of simple sensations. As we read these thirty lectures, and turn from problem to problem, each of which has occupied the thought of successive generations of thinkers, we are struck with the seeming simplicity of each problem as stated by Wundt, and the fascinating ease with which the solution is set forth. It was a difficulty with many thinkers to conceive of the connection between physical processes in the brain and mental processes. How is this to be expressed? The answer of Wundt is easy if only we can understand it. "The connection can only be regarded as a parallelism of two causal series existing side by side, but never directly interfering with each other in virtue of the incomparability of their terms." The two processes are somehow co-ordinated with one another, but we are not to think, says our author, of the one as the cause of the other. Thus we are left by Wundt in the presence of a hopeless dualism. Again, some philosophers have stated that it is hopeless to conceive of a mental life without a subject whose life and experience it is. We have strong statements to this effect from the Hegelians; and others than Hegelians have seen that without reference to a self experience is not possible. We are familiar with the phrase "self-consciousness is the highest category," and it is really difficult to see how we are to get on without it in our psychological enquiries. We are familiar, also, with the attempts which have been made in order to explain the genesis of a "self," and to show how this illusion has grown up. But every such attempt is wrecked on the fact that we cannot even state a possible process without presupposing the activity of the self, and the reference to the self, the existence of which we profess to explain. In this respect Wundt is no more successful than some of our English psychologists have been. Some of his statements are indeed amusing. "The self," he tells us, "is nothing more than the way in which ideas and other mental states are connected together, since, further, the manner of this connection at any particular moment is conditioned by preceding mental events, we tend to include under the term 'self' the whole circle of effects which have their causes in former experiences. The 'self' is regarded as a total force, which determines particular events as they happen, unless, of course, they are occasioned by the action of external impressions, or of those internal processes which we experience just as passively as we do the external. And, since the principal effect of the preconditions of consciousness is the determination of the appearance and degree of clearness of ideas, we further bring the 'self' into the very closest connection with the process of apperception. The self is the subject which we supply for the apperceptive activity," pp. 230-31. "The self is nothing more than the way in which ideas and other mental processes are connected together." There is, at least, this more, that we are aware of the fact that our mental processes hold together. The process is aware of itself as a process. We notice, also, that in the foregoing quotation, the word "we" is used more than once. What is the " we" in the sentence "the self is the subject which we supply for the apperceptive activity?" Wundt seems to restore by the use of "we" those characteristics which he denies to the "self." Something ought to be said on Weber's law, but instead of criticising the law and the use of it made by Wundt, we shall give the estimate of it formed by Professors Bowne and James. Professor Bowne says:-" Fechner's formula taken absolutely leads to psychological nonsense. Mathematically expressed it would read-S= K, log E when k is a constant and E is the stimulus. Hence for E = 1 we should have SK log E: =0 and for EL1 we should have Sa minus quantity; and finally, for E = o we should have S That is, for the unit of sensation we should have no sensation; for anything less than this we should have negative sensations; and finally, for zero stimulus we should have an infinite negative sensation. That is, in the name of a mathematical formula psychology = - ∞. is weighed down with a meaningless absurdity."-" Bowne's Introduction to Psychological Theory," New York, pp. 52-3. Professor James having shown that Weber's law is probably purely physiological, thus proceeds-" It is surely in some such way as this that Weber's law ought to be interpreted, if it ever is. The Fechnerian Maasformel and the conception of it as an ultimate 'psychophysic law will remain 'an idol of the den,' if ever there was one. Fechner himself indeed was a German Gelehrter of the ideal type, at once simple and shrewd, a mystic and an experimentalist, homely and daring, and as loyal to facts as to his theories. But it would be terrible if even such a dear old man as this could saddle our science for ever with his patient whimsies, and, in a world so full of more nutritious objects of attention, compel all future students to plough through the difficulties not only of his own works, but of the still drier ones written in his refutation. Those who desire this dreadful literature can find it; it has a 'disciplinary value,' but I will not even enumerate it in a footnote. The only amusing part of it is that Fechner's critics should always feel bound, after smiting his theories hip and thigh, and leaving not a stick of them standing, to wind up by saying that nevertheless to him belongs the imperishable glory of first formulating them, and thereby turning psychology into an exact science."-The Principles of Psychology, by William James, Vol. I. p. 549. JAMES IVERACH. The Theory of Inference. By the Rev. Henry Hughes, M.A. London Kegan Paul, Trench, Price, 10s. 6d. MR HUGHES has already written two volumes on "Natural and Supernatural Morals," which have been received with favour and approval. In pursuing his investigations into religion and morals, and into Nature and the supernatural, Mr Hughes has been led to think of the "theory of inference" as it has been expounded by writers on logical method. He has come to the conclusion that this "exposition has grave defects." He has written this volume to set forth these defects, and to show what the true theory of inference is. In addition to what is known as the methods of Induction and Deduction, he proposes the method which he calls "delation and illation." As the former method proceeds on the principle of the uniformity of nature, the latter proceeds on the principle of the continuity of nature. The former deals mainly with nature, the latter with history. "Delation is a recognition of the fact that there is continuity in nature. It consists in |