This was the common opinion of Catholic doctors all through the Middle Ages, and it prevailed until the end of the sixteenth century and indeed beyond that time, as Alfred Vanderpol, of happy memory, attests with many citations. 82 Near the close of the sixteenth century and at the beginning of the seventeenth, on account of the controversies over the probable conscience, a different opinion was held by many but not by all theologians, as Vanderpol proves; it was admitted that even a probable opinion was sufficient for waging war. Consequently they went so far as to declare that a war might be just for both belligerents, of which we shall speak later. They conceded that a war which was carried on for no other reason than for redress of a culpable injury was not only licit, which was the common doctrine in the Middle Ages, but that such a war might be a sort of means of solving difficulties of a juridico-political nature arising between different kingdoms.83 Victoria teaches expressly what is also clearly stated in the article of St. Thomas mentioned above, namely, that for concluding a just war successfully mere defense is not always sufficient, but that sometimes alien enemies should be coerced and punished by an offensive war. Luther teaches, on the contrary, as Victoria notes, that Christians are not permitted to bear arms even against the Turks, since if the Turks invaded the Christians, this would be the will of God which no one may lawfully resist." 84 B) The second question which Victoria asks is this: whom does the authority of waging or of declaring war belong? In the beginning our author declares that even a private person has a right to defend himself and his property since he may repell force with force. 82 VANDERPOL, v. gr., pp. 211-214, 250-254. VANDERPOL repeats this briefly in his work: Droit de guerre d'après les théologiens et canonistes du moyen-âge. Paris, 1911. 83 VANDERPOL, 250-276. 84 What Victoria holds thus far on the liceity of war: ING., 272-275; WASH., 271-275.-For the opinion of Luther regarding wars against the Turks see, e. gr., GRISAR, S. J., Luther, vol. II, Fribourg, i. B. 1911, 60-75. Moreover each state has authority to declare or to carry on war. A private person has the right to defend himself in the moment of peril, but that is all. The state, however, since it should not be wanting in whatever is necessary, has the additional right to recover anything which has been carried away and to avenge injuries, that is, to punish evildoers, even alien. Whether principalities or states, which operate partly on their own law and partly on that of some superior ruler, have the right to wage war, depends on the ius gentium, on human law and to a great extent on custom.8 85 C) The third question, which according to Victoria is more necessary for solving the questions relating to the savages, is: what can and ought to be causes of a just war? a) First proposition: Difference of religion is not a cause of a just war. This Victoria proves at sufficient length in his treaties on the right of the Indians, where he treats of the fourth unjust title for occupation of the Indies. Victoria adds here that this opinion is the common sentiment of the doctors and that he knows of no one who holds the contrary. b) Second proposition: Neither personal glory nor the convenience of a ruler can be a cause of a just war. For a ruler should ordain both war and peace to the common good, otherwise he acts as an unlawful tyrant and by an abuse of power makes the citizens slaves. d) Fourth proposition: (*) The one and only cause of a just war is injury received. This opinion of the ancient doctors is set forth in Art. 1, Q. XL of the IIa IIae of the Summa Theologica. For there can be no vindication where injury has not preceded. e) Fifth proposition: Not every injury or injury of any sort, suffices for waging war, but only one that is proportionately grave. 86 D) What kind and degree of stress is lawful in a just war? This question occupies by far the greater part of the dissertation on the law of war. 85 ING., 275-279; WASH., 275-278. Translator's Note: No Third proposition is given in the manuscript. 86 ING., 279-281; WASH., 278-279. a) 1. At the outset Victoria lays down certain propositions: In war whatever is necessary for the defense of the public good may be done. The reason for this is that the purpose of war is to defend and preserve the state. Even a private citizen may take these measures, as was mentioned before. Therefore, it is much more lawful for a state and a ruler. 2. It is lawful to recover whatever has been lost or their value." 3. It is lawful to recoup from the treasury of the enemy for the expenses of the war and for all damage caused by the enemy. This is the judicial act of a prince, who may take such measures against an enemy, if his subjects are affected by any injury of which the enemy has been guilty and has not repaired. (*) 88 There are two modern pontifical pronouncements of the greatest moment regarding the question of indemnities of war: edict XV, on August 1, 1917, exhorted the rulers of the belligerent powers to be mutually considerate when dealing with reparations and indemnities: and when there are particular causes of enmity, these should be weighed with justice and fair-dealing.9 Pius XI, in his apostolic letters of June 23, 1923, to His Eminence Card. Gasparri, writes that if the debtor seriously wishes to repair the damage he has caused, and invokes an impartial tribunal, then justice and social charity as well as the welfare of the creditor nation and of all nations seem to demand that no more be exacted from the debtor than that which he is able to offer without completely exhausting his resources and ruining his power of production.90 4. Since the purpose of war is to secure tranquility and peace, if these cannot be obtained in any other way, rulers involved in a just war have the right to take more aggressive measures, for instance, to destroy a fort of the enemy, or to set up fortifications in hostile territory, just as these things may be done against their own citizens if they be malevolent. 87 In place of the word "value" some editions have the word "portion" which is less clear. Cf. WASH., 280. Translator's Note: It seems impossible to translate this sentence without supplying some three or four words. The translation given has been made in accordance with the general context. 88 ING., 281; WASH., 279-280. 89 A. A. S., IX, 419. 90 A. A. S., XV, 354-355. Victoria adds by way of corollary that "when victory has been won and redress obtained, the enemy may be made to give hostages, ships, arms and other things when this is genuinely necessary for keeping the enemy in his duty and preventing him from becoming dangerous again." 5. Further, a prince prosecuting a just war may lawfully punish those of the enemy who are malicious, for alien malefactors could not otherwise be deterred from their evildoing, nor could order be maintained in the world. The same reason serves to justify the punishment of his own citizens who are guilty of crimes. "But if the state can do this to its own citizens, society at large no doubt can do it to all wicked and dangerous folk, and this can be only through the instrumentality of the princes." For at the end of a just war, the enemy who have been guilty of wrong-doing are amenable to the decision of the victor of the war as if he were their own judge. Thus the right of inflicting punishment belongs to a ruler not only for the protection of property, but also for the preservation of the honor and authority of the state.91 When he speaks of punishing the malefactors of the world at large Victoria seems to have in mind some league of nations working in harmony against evildoers. b) Our author finds that what has been said may give rise to many difficulties: 1. The first difficulty is concerned with the justice of the war, that is, whether, in order that a war be just, it is sufficient that the ruler believe his cause is just? Victoria's first answer is that this is not always enough. When the causes are of minor importance it is not sufficient for him to believe that he is acting justly. For he may err vincibly and willfully. Victoria's second response to this difficulty is: "It is essential for a just war that an exceedingly careful examination be made of the justice and causes of the war, and that the reasons of those who on grounds of equity oppose it be listened to and he (the ruler) ought to consult the good and wise and those 91 ING., 281-283; WASH., 280-281. who may speak with freedom, and without anger or bitterness or greed.""2 To obtain an impartial judgment on peace and war it is, therefore, by no means sufficient to consult men who are skilled merely in politics, economics, business, law, military matters and the like, and who have little solicitude for questions of justice among nations. Wherefore Victoria expressly declares in the beginning of his first dissertation concerning the Indians that such questions pertain not only to lawyers but also to theologians. It is necessary above all else that these men be imbued with justice, equality and fraternal charity, and free from "that sort of ambition which blinds them to the public weal and love of country." It is particularly necessary to repeat this again and again in our own day, since, as Pius XI attests, the evil of materialism is creeping into our everyday life and into domestic and civil society."5 93 2. The second difficulty: are subjects obliged to inquire into the cause of a war or may they bear arms without considering the cause? Our author's answer to this question is contained in four propositions:96 First: "If subjects are convinced of the injustice of a war, they ought not to serve, even on the command of their prince." For they are not allowed to kill innocent citizens or innocent aliens at the unjust command of a ruler; yet that is what would occur in an unjust war. It follows as a corollary that in this matter subjects are bound to follow their conscience even if it be erroneous. These questions are of vital importance in our own day, especially for pastors and professors. Secondly: "Senators, petty rulers and in general those who are admitted on summons or come voluntarily to the public council or to the prince's council, ought and are bound to examine into the causes of a just war." Such men are responsible for any war 92 ING., 283-284; WASH., 281-282. 93 ING., 206; WASH., 222. 94 95 A. A. S., XIV, 682, in the Encyclical "Ubi arcano Dei." 96 ING., 284-286; WASH., 282-283. |