with his regiment to the south end of Saint Helena Island and will report in person for instructions at these headquarters. GENERAL ORDERS, No. 94. DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, Folly Island, S. C., October 28, 1863. I. Medals of honor for gallant and meritorious conduct during the operations before Charleston will be awarded by the commanding general to a number of the enlisted men of this command, not exceeding 3 per cent. of the present aggregate strength of those regiments, companies, and detachments that have been in action or on duty in the batteries or trenches. Candidates for these honors will be nominated by company officers, acting for their respective companies in the capacity of a board. The recommendations of these boards will be forwarded to post commanders, through the usual channels, accompanied by remarks of approval or disapproval of the intermediate commanders, set opposite the name of each candidate. The lists thus obtained will be examined and pronounced upon by boards convened by post commanders, and composed exclusively of field officers, and will then be forwarded to these headquarters. II. In honor of some of the brave men who have fallen on Morris Island during the present campaign, the following names are adopted for the works herein below designated, viz: The work at Cummings Point will be known as Fort Putnam; that next to it, on Morris Island, as Battery Chatfield; Fort Wagner as Fort Strong; the new work near the south end of Morris Island as Fort Shaw; that on Oyster Point as Battery Purviance, and that on the north end of Folly Island as Fort Green. By command of Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore: [28.] W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General. I. The brigade of Colonel Howell, consisting of the Sixty-second Ohio, Sixty-seventh Ohio, Thirty-ninth Illinois, and Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, will proceed to the south end of Folly Island and report to Brig. Gen. A. Schimmelfennig, commanding post. Captain, Forty-seventh New York Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen. II. Capt. Loomis L. Langdon, First U. S. Artillery, will proceed with his battery to Hilton Head and report to the commanding officer at that post. The quartermaster's department will furnish transportation. By command of Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore: [28.] SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 621. W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General. DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, Folly Island, S. C., November 27, 1863. I. Lieut. Peter S. Michie, Corps of Engineers, will establish himself on Morris Island and take charge of the engineering operations there, under instructions from these headquarters. He will keep the commanding officers of that post informed as to the condition of the works and the nature of the operations going on. * By command of Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore: * * ISRAEL R. SEALY, [28.] Captain, Forty-seventh New York Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen. II. Col. J. C. Abbott, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, will proceed with his regiment to Saint Helena Island and report to Col. J. R. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut Volunteers. * * ED. W. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant-General. HILTON HEAD, S. C., January 12, 1864. Senator from New York, Washington, D. C.: MY DEAR SIR: I take the liberty of writing to you again upon the subject upon which I have previously written, because I conceive it to be of such momentous import, nationally, that it is worthy of the strongest and fullest consideration. Meade and Grant are now idle, and idle they must be for many months. All efforts against Charleston are now virtually abandoned. Savannah will not be attacked. A trifling expedition to reclaim Florida may be undertaken, but it will be trifling because Florida will fall of itself when Johnston is beaten and destroyed, and meanwhile all efforts should be concentrated to accomplish that desirable end. But this movement I have described is of only less consequence than was the opening of the Mississippi; it divides the Confederacy again, and in such a manner that it places us upon interior lines, upon the communications of both Lee and Johnston, and where we can be more easily and safely supplied than under any other circumstances. We can win no decisive battles unless, strategically as well as tactically, we hazard the enemy's lines of communications, and this is the fundamental principle of successful war as enunciated by the grandest of all warriors-Napoleon. This principle we too often have forgotten in this war, and the sooner we recur to it the more surely we shall win decided success. Now, I can scarcely hope that this project can be seen precisely as I, who have studied it for months past, clearly see it; but it can be submitted to any competent critic, and it has already been so submitted, and has met approval. It is of sufficient consequence to be placed before those in authority; and if it so appears to you I should be glad if our highest authority, the President or the Secretary of War, should have it brought to his consideration. These views might, if you please, be expressed as your own, but the facts and principles are changeless and belong to the art of war. I am sure that General Gillmore approves them. Among many who are wondering why this winter cannot effect some progress toward ending this war these views will be instantly received. Nowhere else can such work be done, and it is not myself if these views are correct that you are doing a service, but the cause for which we are equally working. I shall consequently be very grateful if you can take some fitting occasion to advance these opinions. And although they might be very properly brought forward through the usual military channels, you are aware that other and more influential modes of accomplishing a desirable end or object has often resulted in the public gain. And I beg you to believe that I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, T. SEYMOUR. [Inclosure.] THE MILITARY PROBLEM JANUARY, 1864. The Southern Confederacy is a line from Richmond to Montgomery or Mobile. Lee's army holds one extremity, Johnston's the other. Suppose that we are as successful in pushing back from their position as we desire those armies. The result will inevitably be that, at the end, a large central mass of resistance will be left that will possess constantly the advantage of operating upon interior while the surrounding forces are operating upon exterior lines, and constantly will be in the most disadvantageous position possible. By placing an army on the lines of railroad between Lee's and Johnston's armies we assume ourselves a central and interior position, with all its advantages, and if such force be sufficiently strong it can operate successfully against either of the existing rebel armies, or, at least, can effect the most pow erful diversion in favor of either Meade or Grant. There is every reason why such a movement should be made. The Southern Confederacy by it would be again divided as effectually as by the opening of the Mississippi; Johnston and Lee would be separated forever, and the Confederacy paralyzed. Grant can only advance to Atlanta (120 miles) in face of a powerful foe, holding every strong, position, which he is doubtless strongly fortifying this winter, and by roads that are poor and a country filled with defiles; and then move eighty miles farther (in all 200) in order to reach Macon. At least this will be the work of a year, and may not be successful. Meade can only advance by pushing Lee from one river to another, each of which will be as strongly defended as the Rappahannock and the James. It is hardly probable that such advance will be much more easily made hereafter than in the past. But between Charleston and Savannah are excellent harbors, deep streams penetrate to the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and from many points of this railroad it is only forty miles to Branchville, S. C., at which place both the grand routes between Lee and Johnston are effectually occupied by us. If our force is large enough to push on to Augusta, Savannah will fall of itself; and Charleston will also fall soon after Branchville is occupied, and Charleston will fall in no other way. (The red lines in the original are here indicated by the dotted lines.) There is no reason why this operation should not be made immediately. Fifty thousand men are required to commence it. Lee and Johnston must detach large forces to prevent the most secure method of weakening them. South Carolina would be converted into the battle field of the war, and probably, eventually, Bragg's (Johnston's) and Lee's armies would appear on this field. Meanwhile, we are occupying and fortifying strong positions, in which we could securely await attack; and at all times the base (in these sea-coast islands) is the best possible, and supplies can be furnished by sea in the shortest and cheapest possible manner. In this region of pine roads are always good, the country 7 RR-VOL LIII always healthy, and armies can operate at all times of the year. The accessions of blacks would be the greatest possible; large forces could soon be organized. By spring, when any troops sent from the North might be compelled to return, enough blacks might be organized to hold this region securely. This is the most important movement that we can now undertake; all others are insignificant in comparison, and but small force (comparatively) is to be met in putting it in execution. Neither Charleston or Savannah require to be taken in order to effect it; neither are even desirable; but both must fall as a sequence of an extended operation. At present we ignore our greatest advantages, the possession of the sea, and of these harbors, and our perfect ability to separate Lee from Johnston forever, and the future advantage of taking such a position can readily be seen by inspecting the map given here. XVI. Col. Guy V. Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts Volunteers, will proceed with his regiment to Hilton Head and report to Brig. Gen. T. Seymour. * * * VII. The two posts heretofore established on Folly Island are hereby merged into one, under the command of Brig. Gen. G. H. Gordon, U. S. Volunteers. * By command of Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore: [35.] ED. W. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant-General. SPECIAL ORDERS,} No. HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, I. The Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth, and One hundred and fifteenth New York Volunteers and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers will constitute a brigade, to be commanded by Col. W. B. Barton, Fortyeighth New York Volunteers. |