Report of Brig. Gen. John C. Moore, C. S. Army, commanding brigade. HDQRS. MOORE'S BRIGADE, CHEATHAM'S DIVISION, Near Dalton, Ga., December 3, 1863. MAJOR I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the engagement on Lookout Mountain on the 24th and that on Missionary Ridge the 25th ultimo : The brigade was composed of the Thirty-seventh Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel Green commanding; the Fortieth Alabama, Colonel Higley, and the Forty-second Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel Lanier. The result of the engagement on the mountain, as I conceive, renders it necessary for me to enter more fully into details than I would otherwise do. This position was occupied by my brigade on the right and Walthall's on the left, or beyond the Craven house, the whole force being under the command of Brig. Gen. J. K. Jackson. My brigade had charge of the picket line from the mouth of Chattanooga Creek to the railroad crossing of Lookout Creek, and Walthall's from that point around to the left. A few days previous to the attack I made a reconnaissance of the whole picket line and forwarded a report, by order of LieutenantGeneral Hardee, through Brigadier-General Jackson. At this time the picket line on Lookout Creek extended up that stream about 2 miles to a good ford near an old mill. Our line thus being very long, requiring a large detail (700) from our comparatively small force, I advised in my report the shortening of the line by turning up the mountain at a point known as the Cursey house, and that the ford at the old mill be watched by scouting parties during the day and vedettes at night. A day or two after this General Walthall informed me that he had been instructed to picket along the creek only as far as the railroad bridge, extending his line from that point up the mountain. This threw our picket line very near the brigade on the left, rendering them very liable to a surprise by the enemy crossing above and coming down on the left. Whether this was the case on the day of the assault I am not sufficiently informed to state, though the result seems to indicate such to have been the case. Up to the time of the assault none of the enemy had crossed in front of my picket line, and those who escaped informed me that the first intimation they had of the presence of the enemy on the south side of the creek was their appearance in force on the side of the mountain in their rear. Consequently, the greater portion of the picket force of this brigade (225) were captured. About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, I learned the enemy were forming their forces in line of battle in front of our pickets. I went immediately to a point beyond the Craven house from which I could see that such was the case, and reported the fact in a note to Brigadier-General Jackson, informing him also they had commenced skirmishing with our pickets. I ordered my brigade at once under arms, ready to move where ordered. General Jackson ordered me, through a staff officer, to place my brigade in the trenches, on the right of Walthall's. General Walthall's brigade not being in position in the trenches, I informed him of my order, and asked where his right would rest. I could get no definite answer, he merely stating that he intended to fight first beyond the intrench ments and then fall back if he found it necessary to do so, and desired that I leave vacant on the left space for his command. One of General Jackson's staff, being present, told me to wait until he could see the general and get further or more definite instructions; but the firing on the left in a few minutes becoming quite heavy, Í thought it advisable to place my command in position without further orders. I at once moved the brigade, urging upon the commanders the importance of dispatch; but, to my utter astonishment, before we reached the trenches (a distance of 300 or 400 yards) the enemy had driven back Walthall's brigade south of the Craven house, and had even occupied a portion of the trenches of my brigade, from which we very soon drove them on our arrival. We were thus compelled to enter the intrenchments under the fire of the enemy in front and a very heavy fire from the Moccasin Point batteries within short range. As Walthall's brigade, when driven back, did not occupy the line on our left-or, at least, the portion near the Craven house which we could see-the enemy got possession of that position, and also the commanding ground near the house, from which they completely enfiladed my left, which was afterward retired a little to the right, under cover of rising ground. We held this position from this time until between 3 and 4 o'clock, the enemy repeatedly charging, but repulsed, 2 of their color bearers being shot down by our men in the trenches while attempting to plant their colors on the embankment. I have never before seen them fight with such daring and desperation. Though they got possession of the Craven house at an early hour, yet they did not attempt to turn the left flank until between 3 and 4 p. m. We had now been engaged nearly three hours. We had but 30 rounds of ammunition at first, that being the capacity of the cartridge boxes issued to the brigade, and this supply was now nearly exhausted-entirely so with some of the men. I had not seen Brigadier-General Jackson during the day. He gave me no orders during the engagement. I sent a staff officer to his headquarters to inform him of our condition, but he returned and reported he could not find General Jackson, who was absent. If we had been properly supported on the left I believe we could have held the trenches, even with empty guns, but that support was not given us. The enemy gradually pressed around my left with an increasing force; I reluctantly gave the order to fall back. We retired about 300 yards without any great confusion. We here found Pettus' brigade in line of battle, the prolongation of which line we had selected for a second position. Had General Jackson informed me that this brigade was coming to our support, and had thrown it forward to the trenches on our left, I am confident there would have been no necessity for withdrawing my command from the first position, as this would have prevented our being flanked, or could have driven back the enemy from the left. Had General Jackson been on the ground and given proper orders for the disposition of his command, I feel assured the result would have been very different. The second line we held until about 2 a. m., the 25th, when we were ordered to fall back south of Chattanooga Creek. Our position on Missionary Ridge on the 25th was between Walthall's brigade on our right and Jackson's on the left. After the enemy broke our center, Jackson's brigade was placed perpendicular to the former line, to prevent the enemy from sweeping along the line to the right. General Cheatham ordered me to march my brigade hv 45 R R-VOL XXXI, PT II the flank in rear of and to the left of Jackson's, so as to cover the base of the ridge and support that brigade. While executing this order, and just as our leading files passed the left of Jackson's brigade, that brigade gave way, rushing back through the ranks of mine, which was still marching by the flank. After stopping them and restoring some order the two brigades fought as one, both officers and men, though we had at first great difficulty in holding them in line. did not see General Jackson or any of his staff whom I recognized, except Captain Moreno, during the engagement. The enemy made great efforts to drive us from the position, but failed. We determined to hold it at all hazards, believing that the safety of the right wing of the army in some measure, and particularly the artillery, depended on our holding this position, which covered one of the roads leading to Chickamauga. We held the line until nearly dark, when I observed the right falling back, and on inquiring the cause was informed that an order had been passed down the line from Lieutenant-General Hardee to fall back. As a general thing the officers and men of the brigade acted well. I observed Colonel Wilkinson, of the Eighth Mississippi, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards, of the Forty-seventh Georgia, of Jackson's brigade, who acted with marked gallantry. Others conducted themselves well whom I did not recognize. My own command acted much better than might have been expected under the circumstances, as they fought during the engagements of the two days with arms that had been condemned as unfit for service, and which were received while at Demopolis, Ala., to be used only for drill and guard duty. I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Maj. JOHN INGRAM, No. 229. Report of Brig. Gen. Marcus J. Wright, C. S. Army, commanding brigade. HEADQUARTERS POST, Atlanta, Ga., May 7, 1864. COLONEL: Although a report of the operations of my command near Missionary Ridge, on November 24 and 25, 1863, has not been officially required of me, yet I have the honor respectfully to request that the following report be accepted by the general commanding the Army of Tennessee at that time as a record of the part taken by my brigade in the battles near Missionary Ridge. Being under the immediate orders of the general commanding on that occasion, I address this communication to you. Having been in command of the post at Charleston, Tenn., for some weeks, I was ordered by telegram (marked A) from Colonel Brent, assistant adjutant-general, on the evening of November 23, to move with all expedition by rail to Chickamauga Station via Dalton, Ga., which I executed on the first train of cars that I could command, leaving Charleston about 8.30 a. m. on the same day. I was also ordered to leave 300 men at Charleston, in conformity with which I ordered the Thirty-eighth Tennessee Regiment, commanded by Col. John C. Carter, and my provost guard, under command of Lieutenant Richardson, to remain, making an effective force of about 300. Colonel Carter assumed command of the post and maintained his position under the severest test to which a soldier can be subjected with the highest constancy, gallantry, and firmness, until pressed by a column of the enemy, under General Sherman, numbering 15,000 or 16,000, when he reluctantly retreated toward Knoxville and successfully joined Lieutenant-General Longstreet in East Tennessee, after having destroyed the bridges at Charleston and Loudon behind him. The zeal, ability, and courage with which he conducted his isolated command out of the difficulties which environed him cannot be too highly commended. I refer you to his report, herewith submitted, for a full and accurate statement of his operations.* On the arrival of the other portion of my command, numbering four small regiments, at Chickamauga Station, I was met with an order from Colonel Brent to proceed at once to the mouth of the Chickamauga to resist any attempt the enemy might make at crossing the river at that point, leaving a regiment to guard the railroad bridge and Shallow Ford (B). In consequence of the weakness of my command, after mature consideration the regiment I had posted at Shallow Ford was ordered to withdraw and to follow on with the brigade, when the command moved in the direction of the mouth of the Chickamauga. Brigadier-General Polk's brigade being in position at the railroad bridge, General Polk dispatched a force to the Shallow Ford to take the place of the regiment withdrawn by me. I moved up in the direction indicated until I came into a road running parallel and adjacent to the Chickamauga on the margin of open fields, which gently sloped up toward a line of precipitous hills on the right. It was a very exposed position, but the road passing through this space was the only one practicable for artillery in the direction of the mouth of the creek. Capt. R. F. Kolb, with his battery, had reported to me at the railroad bridge for duty and was with my command. While marching over this ground by the right flank-the Eighth Tennessee Regiment, Col. John H. Anderson commanding, on the right; the Sixteenth Tennessee Regiment, Col. Dick Donnell commanding, following, and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiment, Col. S. S. Stanton, in the rear-the whole line was suddenly assailed with a galling fire from the opposite bank of the creek, at a distance of not exceeding 100 yards. The enemy's sharpshooters were concealed in the undergrowth along the bank, and waited before opening their fire until the entire length of the line could be commanded by their fire. I immediately ordered the troops to form, advance to the margin of the creek, and fire. This they did promptly and gallantly, returning the fire upon the foe with marked effect, nearly silencing their guns and driving them behind the railroad embankment, where they sheltered themselves and kept up a brisk but desultory fire for several minutes. In the meantime I ordered Captain Kolb to get his battery in position on a commanding point to the left of my center, which he did promptly, firing a few rounds at the enemy from this point. But *See Part I, p. 537. ascertaining that a better position might be had on the extreme left, I ordered him to that point, where he proceeded and kept up a brisk artillery duel with the enemy's battery, composed of two 3-inch rifled guns. Captain Kolb's guns were served with great coolness and signal gallantry, for which he is entitled to my thanks and the commendations of the country. His report is herewith filed. Seeing from the position of the ground the obstructions presented by the intervening stream, the overwhelming force of the enemy, and his being sheltered by a railroad embankment; and being advised by Colonel Grigsby, commanding cavalry, that a large force of enemy's cavalry had already succeeded in crossing the river above the mouth of the Chickamauga and moved out in the direction of Tyner's Station, I deemed it best to withdraw my command through the hills to the rear by the right of companies, which was done in admirable order and with but little damage from the enemy's artillery fire, Captain Kolb having opened fire upon him from an eligible position, on a route through the woods [selected] for his battery which I had reconnoitered, to prevent the necessity, if possible, of his battery being exposed to the enemy's fire in endeavoring to return on [the route by] which we had approached. In this action I lost from my command 1 killed and 11 wounded. My regimental commanders behaved with their usual gallantry, coolness, and skill. My troops displayed the highest qualities of veterans, intrepidity and self-possession, when suddenly attacked by an unseen foe. The horses of my staff and field officers not having arrived from the train, I was necessarily compelled to ride up and down the lines and convey the orders to the different commanding officers in person. My staff rendered me all the assistance that it was practicable under the circumstances. I retired about a half mile into the hills and selected a high ridge, where I placed my command in position, directing Colonel Grigsby to occupy the right flank with his cavalry, while the left was protected by a precipitous bluff extending to the creek. About 9 p. m. I received an order from Colonel Brent to move with the command to Chickamauga Station, which I reached in about an hour and a half. Finding three batteries there, I ordered them to be disposed for the defense of the station, and selected a position for my brigade to defeat an apprehended cavalry raid. The men were ordered to rest in their position. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, I received an order to return to the railroad bridge, and in the act of executing it was taken ill with a severe chill, which was brought on by exposure during the preceding day. I immediately directed Col. John H. Anderson, senior colonel present, to take command of the brigade and carry out the order, which he promptly did. You are respectfully referred to his report for an account of the subsequent operations of the brigade. It affords me high satisfaction to express my acknowledgments to Colonel Grigsby, commanding cavalry, and Captain Kolb, commanding battery, who were not of my permanent command, for the valuable assistance rendered my command and the intelligent counsel which they rendered me. Colonel Grigsby's knowledge of the ground and his careful and thoughtful interest contributed materially to the successful maneuvering, by which my command was saved from the heavy and useless waste of life. |