ported to me that he rode rapidly forward to a point some 200 yards from the Craven house, passing General Moore's brigade moving up to their position and to support General Walthall's brigade, which was being rapidly driven back by overwhelming numbers. The substance of my order was delivered by Major Ingram to Generals Moore and Walthall. The latter stated that, although the order did not reach him in time, he had carried it out in his efforts to defend the position. General Moore expressing a desire to have a full supply of ammunition, was informed by Major Ingram that Captain Clark, division ordnance officer, had been ordered to furnish him from the division train. Within a few minutes after Major Ingram left as bearer of the above order to Generals Moore and Walthall, I proceeded in person, accompanied by Major Vaulx, of the division staff, to superintend the execution.

Passing a great many stragglers (officers and men) along the road, I was met at some short distance from the Craven house by an officer from General Walthall, who brought the information that his brigade had been driven back in considerable confusion, and that the Craven house was in possession of the enemy. I immediately dispatched a staff officer to speed the re-enforcements and endeavored to rally the men, who were coming to the rear in large numbers, and form a line where I was, selecting what I considered the most favorable position for a line among rocks, where no regular line was practicable and where the battle could be but a general skirmish. Failing in this, I rode back to the junction of the roads and there met Brigadier-General Pettus with three regiments of his brigade. He informed me that he had been ordered by General Stevenson to report to me. I directed him to proceed on the road and form line to re-enforce Generals Moore and Walthall. I at the same time sent for a piece of artillery from the battalion of the division, and upon its arrival directed the officer in command to select the most favorable position on the Craven house road and check the enemy. He soon after reported that he could find no position in which he could use his gun to advantage, and for not more than one or two shots at all.

I remained generally at the junction of the two roads, because I considered it most accessible from all points. General Stevenson was communicating with me by the road down the mountain, General Moore by the same road up the mountain, and Generals Pettus and Walthall by the cross-road. General Pettus informed me by an officer of the disposition made of his troops, and asked for orders. Having placed his regiments on the left of the cross-road with their left against the cliff and with extended intervals, so as to connect with General Moore on the right of the road, I had no orders to give him except to hold that position against the enemy. His dispositions were satisfactory, and I did not wish to change them. I subsequently received a message from him that the enemy was pressing his left and asking for re-enforcements, and about the same time I was informed by one of the division staff that General Walthall had sent the fragments of two regiments to that point, and that there was no danger to be apprehended there. I replied to General Pettus that I had no re-enforcements to send him; that no more could be obtained from General Stevenson, and that he must hold his position.

The enemy being held in check, matters so continued not materially changed until quite late in the afternoon, when I received a 44 R R-VOL XXXI, PT II

report by an officer of General Moore's brigade that unless he was re-enforced his right would be turned. Receiving intelligence also from officers of pickets who had escaped that way that the Kelley's Ferry road was entirely open, I knew that the enemy had only to press forward on it to obtain control of our road from the mountain, and expecting that they certainly would do so, I rode to the top of the mountain to confer with General Stevenson, my immediate superior, upon the subject. We agreed that if the enemy did get possession of the road at or near the base of the mountain, I should withdraw the troops of my command at dark and join him on the top of the mountain, and he so directed. Availing myself of General Stevenson's writing material, I addressed written orders to the division quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, ordnance officer, and chief of artillery, who were in the plain below, to retire beyond Chattanooga Creek and then look for orders from corps headquarters, as I expected to be cut off from them.

After this short absence I returned to my position on the mountain side, and there remained until near dark, having sent orders to the brigade commanders that if we were cut off or overpowered we would retire by the top of the mountain, but to hold their positions if possible until dark, and to await further orders. When it was near dark, and when the firing had become rather desultory, I again went to General Stevenson's headquarters for final orders as to withdrawing the troops. I was there informed that General Bragg ordered us to retire down the mountain, the road being still open, and that we must assemble at the Gillespie house to make final arrangements. A guard having been detailed from my command for some subsistence stores on the top of the mountain, I went to relieve them, but found that it had already been done. Proceeding to the Gillespie house, at the base of the mountain, I received orders from General Bragg, through General Cheatham, as to the time and mode of withdrawing the troops, and immediately dispatched them to the brigade commanders by the assistant adjutant-general and the acting inspector-general of the division. In conformity with these orders, the troops retired south of Chattanooga Creek, and the bridge was destroyed.

On November 20, the date of the report nearest to the day of the battle, Moore's brigade had a total effective of 1,205, and Walthall's brigade a total effective of 1,489. The casualties in the first were 4 killed, 48 wounded, and 199 missing. In the second the casualties were 8 killed, 91 wounded, and 845 captured. In Pettus' brigade there were 9 killed, 38 wounded, and 9 missing.

General Moore ventures the opinion that if I had given proper orders a different result would have been accomplished. I beg leave to differ. The whole effective force at my command at the beginning was 2,694 men. Of these 1,044 had been captured, some had been wounded, and a few killed. The enemy's force was (as reported) a division and two brigades. They were in possession of the high grounds around the Craven house, from which, by General Moore's own statement, his left was completely enfiladed. Under these circumstances I was unwilling to hazard an advance movement with my shattered command, even aided by the three regiments under General Pettus, who was himself pressed by the enemy.

General Moore adds a report of the battle the next day on Missionary Ridge, when he was not under my command, and goes out of his way to say that he did not see me during the engagement. I did not think it necessary for me to show myself to him. If he had

desired to see me, he could have found me at all times during the engagement near the right of my line, which was on the top of the ridge, while the left was down the hill. If General Moore means to reflect upon the conduct of my brigade, I am glad to say that there are other witnesses who bear different testimony.

General Walthall must have misapprehended the remark made to him as I descended the mountain. I expected to receive orders from General Bragg, but not to see him in person. These orders were to come through General Cheatham.

It may be remarked that there were two 6-pounder guns at the Craven house under the command of Lieutenant Gibson, but they were without horses and could not be moved. In their position they could not be fired without endangering the troops of General Walthall. Lieutenant Gibson's report accompanies this. He never reported to me, although subject to my orders, and his two guns were all the artillery that I could command for purposes of defense, although I took the responsibility of ordering up a piece from the battalion of Cheatham's division. General Walthall's communication in relation to a piece of artillery to be placed in position was sent by me immediately on its receipt to General Stevenson. Captain Henry, of the division staff, was the bearer of it.

The movements of the enemy were very rapid. An impenetrable fog hung around the mountain all day.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN K. JACKSOŃ,
Brigadier-General.

Maj. J. J. REEVE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

Return of Casualties in Cheatham's division, November 24 and 25, 1863 (incomplete).

c Lieut. D. S. Latham killed; Lieut. J. W. Campbell died of wounds.

d of this number, 20 were wounded and 8 reported missing on the 25th.

e On the 24th. Another statement on file makes total loss on that date 4 killed, 48 wounded, and 206

missing.

Return of Casualties in Cheatham's division, &c.—Continued.

a Loss by regiments not indicated by reports.

No. 222.

b No report.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Edward C. Walthall, C. S. Army, commanding brigade.

ATLANTA, GA., December 13, 1863. MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the affair on Lookout Mountain on November 24:

About dark, on the evening of the 23d, I received orders from brigadier-general commanding to hold my command in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and, later in the night, to have three days' rations prepared; but, in view of the movements of the enemy on the previous day, my command, which occupied a position on the west side of Lookout Mountain and near the northern slope, was ordered to stand to arms before daylight on November 24. My picket line, which extended along Lookout Creek from the turnpike bridge near its mouth to the railroad bridge across it, and thence up the mountain side to the cliff, was strengthened by increasing its reserves early in the morning, troops having been observed moving rapidly up the creek. The fog at that time being very dense, it was impossible to estimate the numbers of the troops in motion, and this fact (as well as what seemed to be the state of things in Chattanooga and on the river) was reported to brigadier-general commanding. Shortly thereafter, the fog having been partially dissipated in the valley (though it still obscured the crest of the mountain above), with Brigadier-General Moore, the ranking officer, at hand, I observed the movements of the enemy across Lookout Creek from a point near the right of my command, and saw a brigade take position in front of that part of my picket line between the two bridges, of which one regiment was thrown forward, and soon the pickets were engaged. Brigadier-General Moore returned to his command, it being agreed between us that he would notify brigadier-general commanding of what had been observed. Rude breastworks of logs and stones had been constructed on the mountain side by the command which had occupied the ground before me, running parallel to the mountain and the creek, and along these my command, except Thirty-fourth Mississippi Regiment, with which the picket reserves

had been strengthened, was formed awaiting the development of the enemy's purpose, it being uncertain whether he would pass across the creek on the right, as the movements discovered would seem to indicate, or would approach from the left after crossing the creek above the angle in my picket line with the troops which had already moved in that direction. Soon after the firing commenced across the creek, two batteries, which had previously been erected on the ridge beyond Lookout Creek (of which, in conversation with brigadiergeneral commanding, I had more than once made mention), opened upon my main line, less than three-quarters of a mile distant, and while these batteries were shelling two pieces of artillery were planted at a point between the creek and the river, which, though across the creek from my picket line, was yet, by reason of the course of the stream, in rear of much of that part of the line which took the direction of the creek.

Major Johnson, commanding Thirtieth, and Colonel Brantly, commanding Twenty-ninth Mississippi Regiments, occupying positions nearest to it, had been instructed to support that part of the picket line which extended up the mountain side from the railroad bridge should the enemy approach from that direction, and the other regiments, Twenty-seventh Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, and Twenty-fourth Mississippi, under Colonel Dowd, were held ready to move to the right or left, as occasion might require.

While writing a communication to inform the brigadier-general commanding of the position of the pieces in the angle of the creek, with the suggestion that a single piece in a position which had been prepared for artillery could silence them, and that, this done, I thought I could hold the force in check, I received information through scouts sent out up the creek to observe the movements of the enemy that a force had crossed the creek above the angle in the picket line. I added this to the communication and sent it to brigadier-general commanding by one of his staff officers.

In the meantime, Brigadier-General Moore had applied to me to know the position of my line, as he was ordered to form on my right, and I learned from a staff officer of brigadier-general commanding that such would be General Moore's position. I informed both where my line then was, and Captain Moreno, of the staff of brigadier-general commanding, went with me, at my request, and looked at my position, but that the direction which would ultimately be given my line would necessarily depend upon the direction from which the enemy-then engaging my pickets on the right and threatening my left almost at right angles to the part engaged-might make his main attack.

Meanwhile, the firing from the batteries beyond the creek, which before had been irregular, became constant and heavy, and soon the enemy advanced on the left in three lines running across the mountain side. Such resistance as I could offer a force like this-consisting, as the Federal General Thomas in an official dispatch to his Government says, of Geary's division and two brigades of another corps-was made with my small command, nearly one-third of which was covering a picket line more than a mile in extent. While Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Mississippi Regiments, in support of the picket line, were resisting the enemy in the positions assigned them-to cover which it had been necessary to take intervals, and where the immense numbers of the enemy had been discoveredthe Twenty-seventh and part of the Twenty-fourth Mississippi Regi