that they must assume the burden, and his declaration-vague, certainly, in view of the Mediterranean question—that whatever might be the decision of Canada, Great Britain would not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions ' of the Crown,' contrast alarmingly with his rather casual treatment of the subject in his speech on the Navy Estimates. He had declared, in the House of Commons, March 26, 1913, that any ships which we might have to build in consequence ' of new developments in the Mediterranean' would be additional to the six years' programme, 1912-13 to 1917-18. The revision of that programme, in consequence of the 1912 amendment to the German Navy Law, was announced in the House of Commons in July 1912, and given effect to in March 1913, making a total of four big ships in 1912-13, five in 1913-14, and four in each of the subsequent four years, the New Zealand and Malaya being additional to the establishment. In his recent speech in the House of Commons, the First Lord said that his friends were justified in asking what had made the Canadian ships necessary, and additional to his programme, but he did not answer the question. He referred instead to the Canadian Memorandum of 1912, which Memorandum, like the amended programme given above, had been prepared with full knowledge of the latest addition to the German Navy Law. The truth is that in July 1912 the Admiralty, as stated above, had considered the possibility of placing a new fleet in the Mediterranean, and that when the decision was arrived at, the addition of three ships, Canadian or other, was assumed. A clear necessity had arisen, and yet Mr. Churchill now takes no steps to lay down any additional ships, though he has himself so plainly declared the need for them. There seems to be no prospect of the reintroduction of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill in the existing situation in the Senate, and there can be little doubt that the deferred liability of 1912-13 and 1914-15 will have to be liquidated very early in the next financial year. And yet, in his speech on the Estimates the First Lord predicted-'in the absence of any new departure in 'policy that the Estimates of 1915-16 will be 'substantially 'lower' than those of the present year. On the other hand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said only last August that he could not see in any direction the slightest prospect of reduc'tion' of expenditure, and he added, with regard to stopping VOL. CCXIX. NO. CCCCXLVIII. 2 H the outlay, that it would be much too careless a thing to do, 'because once you stop it to the point of danger, disaster will be inevitable.' It is not the object of this article to enter into a bewildering maze of financial considerations concerning ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, liabilities inherited, current or deferred, or like matters, nor to engage in the battle of the standards and explore the mysteries of percentages in' Dread'nought' superiority, with their qualifications, and ships additional to percentages; nor to estimate the probability or otherwise of this ship or that being completed in one quarter of a year or another. Such calculations possess a character of unreality, because often they compare likes with unlikes, and estimates are apt to be defeated by labour troubles and building acceleration, as well as by other circumstances. Mr. Churchill said truly in his speech on the Estimates, that 'programmes 'supersede standards, and actual figures are better than 'percentages.' But the conclusion of the whole inquiry is definite and beyond question or cavil. The possession of unassailable superiority at sea is a matter of life and death to this country and to the British Empire. As Mr. Lloyd George once said, we do not argue about it; we go on maintaining it, whatever it may cost. This we must do consistently and steadily. The time is one of great change in the naval service. Never has development proceeded so rapidly, and we are on the eve of greater changes still. We must, above all things, cease to estimate naval strength merely in the possession of 'Dreadnoughts,' apart from trained complements of officers and men, and fighting and other auxiliaries. The Navy must be complete in every element, material and personal. Looking into the future, it is already possible to see that many of our present ideas will have to be recast. In the first place warning must be given against counting all so-called 'Dreadnoughts' as the equals of one another. It is plainly absurd to rank the original Dreadnought,' with a total weight of discharge from her main guns of 8500 lb., with the Royal 'Sovereign' class, whose broadside weight is 16,530 lb., or the German Nassau' (6750 lb. from her main guns) with the 'König' (9810 lb.). But who shall say that the Dreadnought' or super'Dreadnought' is the final element of strength in fighting fleets? The present First Lord has more than once referred to the confidence of our submarine officers in the effective power of their craft. Last year he said that if we were confronted with new foreign Dreadnoughts' in the Mediterranean, it did not follow that we should build 'Dreadnoughts' in reply. The money might be better disposed in another way. In his speech on the Estimates he suggested a doubt as to whether the war between big ships, their power of hitting one another, was not approaching its culminating phase. He declined to say to the building of how many submarines the sum of £1,150,000 is to be devoted, because that might give some clue to the design. Recently we have been told on high authority that five minutes may see the end of the next naval battle, and that the result may be determined by the first discharge. The Admiralty are increasingly convinced of the power of the submarine, and the First Lord gave assurance that the whole system of naval architecture and the methods of computing naval strength are brought under review by the ever-growing power, range, and seaworthiness of the submarine, and by the increasing range and accuracy of the torpedo. Many factors enter into these speculations. Submarines are growing in cost even more rapidly in proportion than big ships, but it is still possible to build many submarines for the cost of one modern battleship. The mean cost of the Iron Dukes' of 1911 was £1,891,572, and of the Queen Elizabeths' of 1913 £2,336,075 apiece. The 'life' of submarines, however, is shorter. The growing power of the submarine is seen by the manner in which it is superseding the destroyer. Our programme of destroyer construction has been reduced from twenty in each year to twelve, and possibly the process will continue until the destroyer has disappeared. Its disappearance will be accelerated by the development of a new class of superdestroyers, which are indistinguishable from small cruisers. The existence of submarines has given the coup de grâce to any form of close blockade. Battleships will never again lie off an enemy's port as the ships of Jervis, Nelson, and Cornwallis lay off Brest and Toulon. They can be attacked as they return to their own harbours, and unless they lie in enclosed and well-protected harbours, they will probably be in danger at any time. It is true that, with oil as a fuel, periodical returns to port may be unnecessary, since oil can be pumped into the ship on the open sea, but the airship and aeroplane have come to discover the whereabouts of squadrons, and a squadron discovered, even with 'sea room' all around it, would be in a situation of great peril. We have spoken of the Mediterranean and its defence, but, in the future, who will say that battleships can live in its waters? These considerations suggest that we are reaching a new turning-point in naval construction. What will be the exact outcome, no one can say. Therefore, though we must still demand the building of Dreadnoughts,' because they are, for the present, the most powerful weapons of naval warfare, we need not assume that they will necessarily in the future be the principal instruments for maintaining superiority at sea. Any fundamental changes must be made with the utmost caution. When Admiral Sir Reginald Custance recently suggested, as a means of reducing the cost of capital ships, that they might carry less armour, which is a very costly feature, he was careful to say that the Admiralty which first entered upon that course would need to be very bold. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Admiralty will proceed slowly in giving practical recognition to the reduced importance of the battleship and the increased importance of the submarine. They will remember how Admiral Aube, when French Minister of Marine, many years ago, listened to the pleadings of what was known as the Jeune École, building submarines of the early type, flimsy torpedo-boats, and small, swift cruisers for commerce destruction, and thus all unwittingly condemned the French navy to decline; for his frail craft rapidly disappeared, few big ships were built, and the result was a fleet which another French Admiral described as a fleet of samples.' THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KINGSHIP 1. Magna Carta. By W. S. McKECHNIE. 1914. Glasgow: Maclehose. 2. The Great Jurists of the World. Edited by Sir JOHN MACDONELL and EDWARD MANSON. Murray. 1913. 3. The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India: The Oxford: 4. How France is Governed. By President POINCARE. T. Fisher Unwin. 1913. 5. The Government of England. By A. LAWRENCE LOWELL. 1908. 6. De Monarchia of Dante. Translated by PHILIP WICKSTEED. Dent. 1897. 7. De Republica Anglorum. By Sir THOMAS SMITH. 1630. F intellectual equality could be yoked with political equality there would, perhaps, be no need to possess a constitution so adjusted as to counterbalance the strivings of ambitious or corrupt natures; but since anything more than the political equality of men is inconceivable, it is necessary to possess a governmental machine that almost automatically rejects. the tyranny of any single mind or group of minds. Yet, at the same time, the ruling power of a nation, as Dante points out in his 'De Monarchia,' must be a unity. The ruling power, in its impact with affairs, must be a single force. We have then to find a unity that shall represent the resultant force of the nation at any moment, that shall be dominant and yet shall avoid any touch of tyranny. No division of powers must appear; no breach of continuity in guidance must arise. The mind of the nation must be represented with only such changes as arise from changes of thought, not changes of personality, nor multiplication of guides. In that remarkable work, Dante's De Monarchia,' there is a passage that cannot be too often quoted. It is thus rendered in Dr. Philip Wicksteed's fine translation: 'Right governments, so conceived, contemplate freedom, to wit that men should exist for their own sakes. For the citizens |