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him, when he knows that he therefore only doubts. of it, because it is not evident unto him.

Although therefore that God is, be of itself an immediate, certain, neceffary truth, yet must it be (t) evidenced and made apparent unto us by its connexion unto other truths; fo that the being of the Creator may appear unto us by his Creature, and the dependency of inferior Entities may lead us to a clear acknowledgment of the fupreme and independent Being. The wifdom of the Jews thought this method proper, for by the greatness and beauty of the wild. of creatures, proportionably the maker of them is feen; and Sol. xii. not only they, but St. Paul hath taught us, that (u)

the invifible things of God, from the Creation of the Rom. i, 20 World, are clearly feen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godbead. For if (v) Phidias could fo contrive a piece of his own work, as in it to preserve the memory of himfelf, never to be obliterated without the destruction of the work, well may we read the great Artificer of the World in the works of his own hands, and by the existence of any thing demonftrate the first Cause of all things.

We find by the experience of ourselves, that fome things in this World have a beginning, before which they were not; the account of the years of our age fufficiently infer our nativities, and they our conceptions, before which we had no being. Now if there be any thing which had a beginning, there muft neceffarily be fomething which had no beginning, because nothing can be a beginning to itself. Whatsoever is, muft of neceffity either have been made, or not made; and fomething there must needs be which was never made, because all things cannot be made. For whatsoever is made, is made by another, neither can any thing produce: itself; otherwise it would follow, that the fame thing is and is not at the fame inftant in the fame respect it is, because a producer; it is not, be-. VOL. I.

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caufe to be produced: it is therefore in being, and is not in being, which is a manifeft contradiction. If then all things which are made were made by some other, that other which produced them either was itself produced, or was not; and if not, then have we already an independent being; if it were, we must at last come to fomething which was never made, or else admit either a circle of productions, in which the effect shall make its own cause, or an (x) infinite fucceffion in caufalities, by which nothing will be made: both which are equally impoffible. Something then we muft confefs was never made, fomething which never had beginning. And although thefe effects or dependent beings fingly confidered by themselves, do not infer one fupreme cause and maker of them all, yet the admirable order and (y) connexion of things fhew as much; and this one fupreme Caufe is God. For all things which we fee or know have their exiftence for fome end, which no man who confidereth the uses and utilities of every species can deny. Now whatsoever is and hath its being for fome end, of that the end for which it is, muft be thought the cause; and a final cause is no otherwife the caufe of any thing than as it moves the efficient cause to work: from whence we cannot but collect a prime efficient Cause of all things, indued with infinite wifdom, who having a full comprehenfion of the ends of all, defigned, produced, and difpofed all things to those ends.

Again, as all things have their existence, so have they alfo their operations for fome (z) end; and whatsoever worketh fo, muft needs be directed to it. Although then thofe creatures which are indued with reafon can thereby apprehend the goodness of the end for which they work, and make choice of fuch means as are proportionable and proper for the obtaining of it, and fo by their own counsel direct themselves unto it; yet can we not conceive that

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other natural Agents, whofe operations flow from a bare inftinct, can be directed in their actions by any counsel of their own. The ftone doth not deliberate whether it fhall defcend, nor doth the wheat take counsel whether it fhall grow or no. Even Men in natural actions ufe no act of deliberation : we do not advise how our heart fhall beat, though without that pulse we cannot live; when we have provided nutriment for our ftomach, we take no counsel how it shall be digested there, or how the chyle diftributed to every part for the reparation of the whole; the mother which conceives takes no care how that conceptus fhall be framed, how all the parts fhall be distinguished, and by what means or ways the child fhall grow within her womb: and yet all these operations are directed to their proper ends, and that with a greater reason, and therefore by a greater wifdom, than what proceeds from any ining of human understanding. What then can be more clear, than that thofe natural Agents which work conftantly for thofe ends which they themselves cannot perceive, muft be directed by fome high and over-ruling Wifdom? and who can be their director in all their operations tending to thofe ends, but he which gave them their beings for thofe ends? and who is that, but the great Artificer who works in all of them? For Art is fo far the imitation of Nature, that if it were not in the Artificer, but (a) in the thing itself which by Art is framed, the works of Art and Nature would be the fame. Were that which frames a watch within it, and all thofe curious wheels wrought without the hand of Man, it would feem to grow into that form; nor would there be any distinction between the making of that watch, and the growing of a plant. Now what the Artificer is to works of Art, who orders and disposes them to other ends. than by Nature they were made, that is the Maker

of all things to all natural Agents, directing all their operations to ends which they cannot apprehend; and thus appears the Maker to be the Ruler of the World, (b) the Steerer of this great Ship, the Law of this univerfal Commonwealth, the General of all the hofts of Heaven and Earth. By these ways, as by the (c) teftimony of the Creature, we come to find an eternal and independent Being, upon which all things elfe depend, and by which all things elfe are governed; and this we have before fupposed to be the firft notion of God.

Neither is this any private collection or particular ratiocination, but the publick and univerfal reason of the World. (d) No Age fo diftant, no Country fo remote, no People fo barbarous, but gives a fufficient testimony of this truth. When the Roman Eagle flew over most parts of the habitable world, they met with Atheism no where, but rather by their miscellany Deities at Rome, which grew together with their victories, they fhewed no Nation was without its God. And fince the later art of navigation improved hath discovered another part of the world, with which no former commerce hath been known, although the Cuftoms of the people be much different, and their manner of Religion hold small correfpondency with any in these parts of the world profeffed, yet in this all agree, that fome religious obfervances they retain, and a Divinity they acknowledge. Or if any Nation be difcovered which maketh no profeffion of piety, and exercifeth no religious obfervances, it followeth not from thence that they acknowledge no God: for they may only deny his Providence, as the Epicureans did; or if any go farther, their numbers are fo few, that they must be inconfiderable in refpect of mankind. And therefore fo much of the Creed hath been the general confeffion of (e) all Nations, I believe in God. Which were it not a moft

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moft certain truth grounded upon principles obvious unto all, what reafon could be given of fo univerfal a confent? or how can it be imagined, that all Men fhould (f) confpire to deceive themselves and their pofterity?

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Nor is the reafon only general, and the confent unto it univerfal, but God hath still preferved and quickened the worship due unto his name, by the patefaction of himself. Things which are to come are fo beyond our knowledge, that the wifeft man can but conjecture: and being we are affured of the contingency of future things, and our ignorance of the concurrence of feveral free caufes to the production of an effect, we may be fure that certain and infallible predictions are clear divine patefacFor none but he who made all things, and gave them power to work; none but he who ruleth all things, and ordereth and directeth all their operations to their ends; none but he upon whose will the actions of all things depend, can poffibly be imagined to foresee the effects depending merely on thofe causes. And therefore by what means we may be affured of a Prophecy, by the fame we may be secured of a Divinity. Except then all the annals of the world were forgeries, and all remarks of history defigned to put a cheat upon pofterity, we can have no pretence to fufpect God's existence, having fo ample teftimonies of his influence.

The works of Nature appear by observation uniform, and there is a certain fphere of every body's power and activity. If then any action be performed, which is not within the compafs of the power of any natural agent; if any thing be wrought by the intervention of a body which beareth no proportion to it, or hath no natural aptitude fo to work; it must be afcribed to a caufe tranfcending all natural causes, and difpofing all their operations. Thus every Miracle proves its Author, and every act of Omnipotency is a fufficient demonftration of a Deity.

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