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that the best interpreters, all the ancient, and most of the modern, translate it as I cite it, and very few otherwise, whereof, perhaps, Junius is the chief.

Another thing troubles him, that marriage is called "the mystery of joy." Let it still trouble him; for what hath he to do either with joy or with mystery? He thinks it frantic divinity to say, it is not the outward continuance of marriage that keeps the covenant of marriage whole; but whosoever doth most according to peace and love, whether in marriage or divorce, he breaks marriage least. If I shall spell it to him, he breaks marriage least, is to say, he dishonours not marriage; for least is taken in the Bible, and other good authors, for not at all. And a particular marriage a man may break, if for a lawful cause, and yet not break, that is, not violate, or dishonour the ordinance of marriage. Hence those two questions that follow are left ridiculous; and the maids at Aldgate, whom he flouts, are likely to have more wit than E the serving-man at Addle-gate.

Whereas he taxes me of adding to the scripture in that I said, Love only is the fulfilling of every commandment, I cited no particular scripture, but spake a general sense, which might be collected from many places. For seeing love includes faith, what is there that can fulfil every commandment but only love? and I meant, as any intelligent reader might apprehend, every positive and civil commandment, whereof Christ hath taught us that man is the lord. It is not the formal duty of worship, or the sitting still, that keeps the holy rest of sabbath; but whosoever doth most according to charity, whether he works or works not, he breaks the holy rest of sabbath least. So marrige being a civil ordinance, made for man, not man for it; he who doth that which most accords with charity, first to himself, next to whom he next owes it, whether in marriage or divorce, he breaks the ordinance of marriage least. And what in religious prudence can be charity to himself, and what to his wife, either in continuing or in dissolving the marriage-knot, hath been already oft enough discoursed. So that what St. Paul saith of circumcision, the same I stick not to say of civil ordinance, made to the good and comfort of man, not to his ruin: marriage is nothing, and divorce is nothing, "but faith which worketh by love." And this I trust none can mistake

Against the fifth argument, that a Christian, in a higher order of priesthood than that Levitical, is a person dedicate to joy and peace, and therefore needs not in subjection to a civil ordinance, made to no other end but for his good, (when without his fault he finds it impossible to be decently or tolorably observed,) to plunge himself into immeasurable distractions and temptations above his strength: against this he proves nothing; but gads into silly conjectures of what abuses would follow, and with as good reason might declaim against the best things that are.

Against the sixth argument, that to force the continuance of marriage between minds found utterly unfit and disproportional, is against nature, and seems forbid under that allegorical precept of Moses, "not to sow a field with divers seeds, lest both be defiled; not to plough with an ox and an ass together," which I deduced by the pattern of St. Paul's reasoning what was meant by not muzzling the ox: he rambles over a long narration, to tell us that "by the oxen are meant the preachers;" which is not doubted. Then he demands, "if this my reasoning be like St. Paul's." And I answer him, Yes. He replies, that sure St. Paul would be ashamed to reason thus. And I tell him, No. He grants that place which I alleged, 2 Cor. vi., of unequal yoking, may allude to that of Moses, but says, "I cannot prove it makes to my purpose," and shews not first how he can disprove it. Weigh, gentlemen, and consider, whether my affirmations, backed with reason, may hold balance against the bare denials of this ponderous confuter, elected by his ghostly patrons to be my copesmate.

Proceeding on to speak of mysterious things in nature, I had occasion to fit the language thereafter; matters not, for the reading of this odious fool, who thus ever, when he meets with aught above the cogitation of his breeding, leaves the noisome stench of his rude slot behind him, maligning that anything should be spoke or understood above his own genuine baseness; and gives sentence that his confuting hath been employed about a frothy, immeritous, and undeserving discourse. Who could have believed so much insolence durst vent itself from out the hide of a varlet, as thus to censure that which men of mature judgment have applauded to be writ from good reason? But this contents him not; he falls

now to rave in his barbarous abusiveness. And why? A reason befitting such an artificer, because, he saith, the book is contrary to all human learning; whenas the world knows that all, both human and divine learning, till the canon law, allowed divorce by consent, and for many causes without consent. Next he dooms it as contrary to truth; whenas it hath been disputable among learned men, ever since it was prohibited and is by Peter Martyr thought an opinion not impious, but hard to be refuted; and by Erasmus deemed a doctrine so charitable and pious, as if it cannot be used, were to be wished it could; but is by Martin Bucer, a man of dearest and most religious memory in the church, taught and maintained to be either most lawfully used, or most lawfully permitted. And for this, for I affirm no more than Bucer, what censure do you think, readers, he hath condemned the book to? To a death no less impious than to be burnt by the hangman. Mr. Licenser, (for I deal not now with this caitiff, never worth my earnest, and now not seasonable for my jest,) you are reputed a man discreet enough, religious enough, honest enough, that is to an ordinary competence, in all these. But now your turn is, to hear what your own hand hath earned ye; that when you suffered this nameless hangman to cast into public such a despiteful contumely upon a name and person deserving of the church and state equally to yourself; and one who hath done more to the present advancement of your own tribe, than you or many of them have done for themselves; you forgot to be either honest, religious, or discreet. Whatever the state might do concerning it, supposed a matter to expect evil from, I should not doubt to meet among them with wise, and honourable, and knowing men: but as to this brute libel, so much the more impudent and lawless for the abused authority which it bears, I say again, that I abominate the censure of rascals and their licensers.

With difficulty I return to what remains of this ignoble task, for the disdain I have to change a period more with the filth and venom of this gourmand, swelled into a confuter; yet for the satisfaction of others I endure all this.

Against the seventh argument, that if the canon law and divines allow divorce for conspiracy of death, they may as

well allow it to avoid the same consequence from the likelihood of natural causes.

First, he denies that the canon so decrees.

I answer, that it decrees for danger of life, as much as for adultery, Decret. Gregor. 1. 4, tit. 19, and in other places: and the best civilians, who cite the canon law, so collect, as Schneidewin in Instit. tit. 10, p. 4, de divort. And indeed, who would have denied it, but one of a reprobate ignorance in all he meddles with?

Secondly, he saith the case alters; for there the offender, "who seeks the life, doth implicitly at least act a divorce."

And I answer, that here nature, though no offender, doth the same. But if an offender, by acting a divorce, shall release the offended, this is an ample grant against himself. He saith, Nature teaches to save life from one who seeks it. And I say, she teaches no less to save it from any other cause that endangers it. He saith, that here they are both actors. Admit they were, it would not be uncharitable to part them; yet sometimes they are not both actors, but the one of them most lamentedly passive. So he concludes, we must not take advantage of our own faults and corruptions, to release us from our duties. But shall we take no advantage to save ourselves from the faults of another, who hath annulled his right to our duty? "No," says he; 66 let them die of the sullens, and try who will pity them." Barbarian, the shame of all honest attorneys! why do they not hoist him over the bar and blanket him?

Against the eighth argument, that they who are destitute of all marriageable gifts, except a body not plainly unfit, have not the calling to marry, and consequently married and so found, may be divorced: this, he saith, is nothing to the purpose, and not fit to be answered. I leave it therefore to the judgment of his masters.

Against the ninth argument, that marriage is a human society, and so chiefly seated in agreement and unity of mind if therefore the mind cannot have that due society by marriage, that it may reasonably and humanely desire, it can be no human society, and so not without reason divorcible here he falsifies, and turns what the position required of a reasonable agreement in the main matters of

society, into an agreement in all things, which makes the opinion not mine, and so he leaves it.

At last, and in good hour, we are come to his farewell, which is to be a concluding taste of his jabberment in law, the flashiest and the fustiest that ever corrupted in such an unswilled hogshead.

Against my tenth argument, as he calls it, but as I intended it, my other position, "That divorce is not a thing determinable by a compulsive law, for that all law is for some good that may be frequently attained without the admixture of a worse inconvenience; but the law forbidding divorce never attains to any good end of such prohibition, but rather multiplies evil; therefore the prohibition of divorce is no good law." Now for his attorney's prize: but first, like a right cunning and sturdy logician, he denies my argument, not mattering whether in the major or minor: and saith, "there are many laws made for good, and yet that good is not attained, through the default sof the party, but a greater inconvenience follows."

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But I reply, that this answer builds upon a shallow foundation, and most unjustly supposes every one in default, who seeks divorce from the most injurious wedlock. default therefore will be found in the law itself; which is neither able to punish the offender, but the innocent must withal suffer: nor can right the innocent in what is chiefly sought, the obtainment of love or quietness. His instances out of the common law are all so quiet beside the matter which he would prove, as may be a warning to all clients how they venture their business with such a cockbrained solicitor. For being to shew some law of England, attaining to no good end, and yet through no default of the party, who is thereby debarred all remedy, he shews us only how some do lose the benefit of good laws through their own default. His first example saith, "It is a just law that every one shall peaceably enjoy his estate in lands or otherwise.' Does this law attain to no good end? The bar will blush at this most incogitant woodcock. But see if a draught of Littleton will recover him to his senses. "If this man, having fee-simple in his lands, yet will take a lease of his own lands from anoter, this shall be an estopple to him in an assize from the recovering of his own land.”