the officers in command at Loudon and below, showing that the enemy were advancing toward Loudon, were also submitted. To the question, then, whether we should attempt to join General Bragg, or change our base toward Virginia, I was called on for my opinion, being next in rank to General L. Í submitted that our first duty was to endeavor to join General Bragg, as the President directed, and General Bragg intimated as being his desire, and in discussing that question I argued against making the attempt, for the reason that we could not go by the route we came, but would have to choose one farther to the east, and there was none in that direction that did not lead through a rough, mountainous, and desolate country, where neither forage nor subsistence could be obtained for the men and animals. That snow, as we could perceive, had fallen over that country, which would add to the difficulties of the march, as many of our men were without shoes, and our sick would be unable to keep with us. That in all probability the command would have to be divided in order to obtain subsistence, in which event it would be a long time before we could be united again, so as to be of efficient service, and that the mere fact of retiring in that direction would have a very bad moral effect upon our troops, as we would thus abandon East Tennessee to the enemy, and the fainthearted would despond and perhaps leave us, especially those of that class in the regiments from Tennessee, and at the same time the enemy, having nothing to oppose them in East Tennessee, could re-enforce General Grant at Chattanooga with nearly their entire force from Knoxville, and thus enable him to push on before our forces could possibly join General Bragg, even in the unserviceable condition they would be in after the long and tedious march over the desolate country we would be compelled to travel. On the other hand, if we remained in East Tennessee, with our base changed toward Virginia, our force would act as a constant menace upon General Grant's flank and rear, and compel him to keep one equally as large in and about Knoxville to watch our movements. That we owed it to the people of East Tennessee, who had been loyal to us, to afford them some protection and not abandon them suddenly to the enemy. That the effect upon our troops would be beneficial, and that we would by remaining relieve Georgia and the whole South, excepting East Tennessee, from the burden of subsisting our forces, at a time, too, when the relief would be very sensibly felt; and that if we did have to draw heavily upon the resources of East Tennessee we would be drawing from a population the large majority of which were inimical to our cause, and which would be much better than necessitating us to oppress those farther south who were entirely loyal.. There was no dissent from these views and the army was withdrawn toward Virginia. I do not claim that my views were the cause of that course being adopted, but I merely place my opinion upon record. I have no doubt but any other member of the council would have given the same opinion and have more forcibly expressed it.* L. McLAWS, *Casualties in McLaws' division at Bean's Station: Kershaw's brigade-killed, 5; wounded, 52; missing, 5; total, 62. Bryan's brigade-killed, 1; wounded, 1; total, 2. General S. COOPER, AUGUSTA, GA., Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.: On the 15th instant I received from General Longstreet's headquarters a copy of a charge preferred against myself, with an accompanying letter, being a copy of one which he had forwarded to you, referring to the charges. To prevent any misunderstanding, I herewith inclose copies of both the charges and letter. I beg leave to remark concerning the charge and specifications: The assault against Fort Loudon, which was made by three brigades of my division, on the morning of November 29 last, had been ordered to be made on the 28th, the day previous, at, I think, 2 p. m., perhaps earlier; but at my request and on my suggestion it was delayed until the morning of the 29th, to enable me to advance my line of sharpshooters so as to fire along the enemy's works and thus facilitate the advance of the assaulting columns by distracting and preventing the enemy's fire. The enemy's pits were taken all along my line, and my sharpshooters advancing beyond them established a new line for themselves within easy musket range of the main work. This was done, excepting with the sharpshooters from Bryan's brigade, and the exception was made for the following reasons: The sharpshooters of the brigades were arranged from left to right, as follows: Wofford's, Humphreys', Bryan's, Kershaw's. Kershaw's line was so far advanced on the right that the connection could not be established with Bryan's, and Colonel Holt, of the Tenth Georgia, who commanded Bryan's sharpshooters, came to me some time laté in the night of the 28th, and informing me of the circumstance, requested authority to throw the right of his line back, so as to protect his right flank, which I authorized him to do, deeming it essential for the safety of his line. The enemy had not long previous assaulted my line of sharpshooters by coming down on their flank, which had not been properly supported on the left by the advance of Hood's division, and had taken their pits temporarily, but were finally driven back with considerable loss by the reserves coming up. I did not wish the experiment to be repeated, and therefore had the right of Bryan's line thrown back, or, rather, authorized it to be done; but that it had any effect upon the final result I deny, because my loss was but about 50 or 60 before reaching the ditch, and the enemy fired but one gun, as some say, and others but two, upon the advancing columns, being kept down by the sharpshooters. To the second specification I merely assert that the Seventeenth Mississippi, of Humphreys' brigade, and Phillips (Georgia) Legion, of Wofford's brigade, two as fine bodies of men and as well commanded as can be found anywhere, were selected to lead, and did lead, the assaulting columns, and they, as well as all others, were ordered to take the work and hold it against all comers until I arrived to direct otherwise. My orders were to take the works; that was all for the assaulting column to do, and I was notified that General Jenkins, commanding Hood's division, would follow my column and lead division to the left. I am at a loss to conceive as to what definite instructions further than those I gave could have been given, as the inside of the work was an unknown quantity. What was to be done after it was taken was to be found out. If there was no ditch on the left (the west side) that offered any obstacle, or but little, to the entrance to the work, I have been most egregiously misinformed, for I have in my possession a paper, of which the accompanying one, marked B, is a copy from the column of my division which assaulted on the left, showing a very different state of affairs. In regard to the men not being supplied with ladders or other means of crossing the ditch, I was assured by General Longstreet himself, and by members of his staff who made observations of the work from the heights around on both sides of the river by means of powerful glasses, that there was no ditch that offered any great obstacle. I was pertinaciously pressed with the fact that there would be but little difficulty, so far as the ditch was concerned, in entering the work, and I endeavored to impress the fact upon the men, and in connection with it urged them to rush to the assault with impetuosity and without halting. How well my instructions were obeyed the history of the contest will show. I, however, contemplated getting bundles of wheat for the men to carry, and therewith fill up the ditch if one was found offering a serious impediment to our advance; but there was not a sufficient quantity available for the purpose where I expected to find it. As for ladders, I had no means, or time, or material to make any. The idea of obtaining them was entertained, but as I had nothing to make them with I said nothing about them, deeming it unadvisable to broach the subject. No one ever mentioned the probability of any necessity for them, as it was regarded as a work requiring dash and daring only. If General Longstreet, after reconnoitering the works, had considered that ladders, or other means for crossing the ditch, were necessary, I suppose he would have made some mention of them at least on some occasion. I should think it was his place to order them. His omission to do either looks very strange, when he charges me with being criminally negligent in not getting them. It is an easy matter after the assault is over to see where errors have been committed; but of those I am charged with, where there was any in fact, I do not consider myself responsible, and hold myself unjustly charged; and I object to being put forward as a blind to draw attention away from the main issue, which is the conduct of the campaign in East Tennessee under General Longstreet. I assert that the enemy could have been brought to an engagement before reaching Knoxville; that the town, if assaulted at all, should have been on the first day we arrived, or on the next at farthest; that when the assault was made on Fort Loudon it was not called for by any line of policy whatever; but, on the contrary, no good results could possibly have been attained. You will recollect that on December 29, ultimo, I forwarded to you a copy of an order relieving me from duty with General Longstreet's command. Before leaving I addressed a note to his headquarters inquiring the reason why the order was issued, and the reply was that, having exhibited a want of confidence in the plans and efforts of General Longstreet throughout the campaign on which he was then engaged, he (General Longstreet) was apprehensive it might be extended to the troops under my command, and as he could not leave himself, I was ordered to do so. This was the sole reason assigned at that time, and yet after my departure a charge of neglect of duty, with three specifications, was forwarded to your office against me, and in the letter accompanying the charges he writes I was not arrested for the reason he thought I might be of service elsewhere. I inquired why I was relieved from duty for the reason that, if there was any part of my conduct needing investigation, I might before leaving be informed, so that I might make the necessary preparations to defend myself. But as it is now you can perceive the disadvantages I am laboring under. I must therefore demand that the charges be investigated at an early day by a court of inquiry or court-martial, or they be withdrawn and I restored to duty at once. Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, [Inclosure.] L. McLAWS, Major-General. HEADQUARTERS, General S. COOPER, Russellville, Tenn., December 30, 1863. Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond : GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose herewith charges and specifications against Maj. Gen. L. McLaws and against Brig. Gen. J. B. Robertson.* I have no authority to order courts, and have therefore to ask that a court be ordered for the trial of Brigadier-General Robertson. General McLaws was not arrested when he was relieved from duty, for the reason that it was supposed that his services might be important to the Government in some other position. If such is the case, I have no desire that he should be kept from that service or that his usefulness should be impaired in any way by a trial.t I remain, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, JAMES LONGSTREET. Lieutenant-General, Commanding. [Sub-inclosure.] CHARGE AND SPECIFICATIONS PREFERRED AGAINST MAJ. GEN. L. M'LAWS. CHARGE.-Neglect of duty. Specification 1.-In this, that Maj. Gen. L. McLaws, being in command of a division of the Confederate forces near Knoxville, Tenn., and being ordered by his commanding officer (Lieut. Gen. J. Longstreet) to advance his line of sharpshooters at dark on the night of November 28 to within good rifle range of the enemy's works, so as to give his sharpshooters play upon the enemy behind his works (it being part of a plan of attack that the sharpshooters should engage the enemy behind his works along our entire line while an assault was made upon one of the enemy's forts), did fail to arrange his line of sharpshooters so as to meet this view, and did allow a portion of the rifle-pits to be sunk about 200 yards from the point to be attacked under a hill entirely out of view of the fort aforesaid, thus failing to give his assaulting columns the protection of the fire of his sharpshooters at this point during their advance and attack, Specification 2.-In this, that the aforesaid Maj. Gen. L. McLaws, * See p. 470. + See Confederate Correspondence, etc., McLaws to Cooper, December 29, 1863, and Cooper to Longstreet, January 5, 1864, Part III, pp. 881, 893. being ordered by his commanding officer (Lieutenant-General Longstreet) to arrange an assaulting column of three of his brigades, and to attack the enemy's fort at the northwest angle of his works at dawn of day on November 29, did fail to organize a select body of men to lead in the assault as is customary in such attacks, and did allow his three brigades to advance to the assault without definite and specific instructions for the leading columns, and for the troops that were to enter the fort first, which are essential to success in such attacks. Specification 3.-In this, that the aforesaid Maj. Gen. L. McLaws, being ordered to assault the enemy's position at the northwest angle of his works at daylight on November 29, did make his attack upon a point where the ditch was impassable, and did fail to provide any of his assaulting columns with ladders or other means of crossing the ditch and entering the enemy's works, and did fail to inform his officers that the ditch on the west side of the fort was but a slight obstacle to his infantry, and that the fort could be entered from that side with but little delay, thus failing in the details of his attack to make the arrangements essential to success. All this near Knox ville, Tenn., on or about November 28 and 29, 1863. Witnesses: Brig. Gen. B. G. Humphreys, Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan, Brig. Gen. M. Jenkins, Col. E. P. Alexander, Maj. J. M. Goggin, Lieut. Col. W. C. Holt, Surg. J. S. D. Cullen, Surg. R. Barksdale, Lieut. A. D'Antignac. I herewith forward a brief of the evidence of officers and men who were present and participated in the assault on the enemy's works on the 29th ultimo relative to the points inquired of in General McLaws' note of this instant, together with the names of those who are ready to verify the statements. There are hundreds, perhaps, in the brigade whose testimony would corroborate it. Very respectfully, N. L. HUTCHINS, JR., Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Brigade. The following is the substance of the evidence of officers and men of Wofford's brigade, who were present at and in the ditch and on the enemy's works when the assault was made on the morning of the 29th ultimo, relating to the construction of the fort, to wit: The ditch is from 8 to 10 feet wide, and its depth from 4 to 6 feet, and its sides are almost perpendicular. There was no berme noticed by most of them, while others say there is, perhaps, one of not exceeding 6 inches in width, now filled by the crumbling dirt. The slope of the exterior slope of the parapet is at an angle of 60° or 70° with the base line, and the height of the work from the bottom of the ditch about 18 feet on a perpendicular line. The earth (clay) of the slope is hard and slippery, and it was difficult to obtain a foot |