had been repulsed, sharp fighting took place on the south side of the river, but we were everywhere successful. Monday, November 30.-Very quiet. Our forces at work, as usual. The line of rifle-trenches from the Sevierville road to the central hill was staked out. The work on that part of the line from Sevierville Hill to the road was finished. A two-gun battery was located just east of Second Creek, and good progress was made upon it. The design of this battery was to enfilade the railroad cut to the westward, and to flank the northern front of Fort Sanders, throwing a fire upon ground which that fort could not reach. The work upon the large fort on our right, in front of Bell's house, was so far advanced as to make it defensible. During the day the enemy, apparently, did little or nothing, as though he were stunned by the severe punishment he had received the day before. Tuesday, December 1.-The Engineer Battalion and contrabands at work. A line of rifle-trenches was located across the gorge between Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill, and a portion of it completed. The troops on the south side of the river were hard at work, with all the tools we had to spare from the north side. During the afternoon, large trains belonging to the enemy were seen to move toward the eastward, and the belief began to grow upon us that the siege would be raised. Wednesday, December 2.-The Engineer Battalion and contrabands were particularly engaged on the rifle-trenches between Temperance Hill and Mabry's Hill, and an epaulement for two guns in the gorge. These were all finished by midnight. Still at work on large fort at Bell's house and on rifle-trenches on south side of the river. Everything unusually quiet for the fifteenth day of a siege. Thursday, December 3.—Still hard at work on both sides of the river. A disposition apparent among the troops to consider their position strong enough to repel any assault the enemy might make, and a consequent indisposition to work. Evidently but a small force of the enemy east of the Tazewell road. The enemy's trains seen moving to the eastward. Friday, December 4, 1863.-Still working a little, but the news of approaching re-enforcements and the movements of the enemy's trains lead us to believe that he will soon abandon the siege. Saturday, December 5.-The siege of Knoxville terminated by the retreat of the enemy in the direction of Strawberry Plains (eastward). Heavy re-enforcements for us reached the south side of the river. The enemy's infantry, or at least that part of it belonging to Longstreet's own corps, left in a solid body, very deliberately, no signs of haste being apparent. The rear guard of his column passed the Tazewell road about 7 a. m. A feeling of intense satisfaction pervaded the whole command, and many persons assured me of their conversion to a belief in "dirt digging." It certainly proved efficient here. Examined the enemy's late position, and was surprised to find so little evidence of good engineering. I saw positions for only eighteen guns on the north side of the river, but could not discover that more than twelve of them had been used. Any other artillery he used was without cover. The cavalry force available was at once sent in pursuit of the retreating enemy, and during the day sent in quite a number of prisoners. On Monday, December 7, all the available infantry force of the Army of the Ohio was put in motion toward the enemy, and followed him slowly until the 9th, when our forces halted, the cavalry at Bean's Station and the infantry at Rutledge. The enemy had halted at or near the Red Bridge, between Bean's Station and Rogersville. No attack was made by us, as the enemy was still in vastly superior force. On the 11th, Major-General Burnside, having been relieved by Major-General Foster, left for the North, and properly fixes the close of this report. To Lieut. Col. O. E. Babcock, assistant inspector-general of the Ninth Army Corps, and captain of engineers, I am under very heavy obligations. Always ready with the most practical advice, he cheerfully gave it, and it never passed unheeded. To Maj. Š. S. Lyon, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, and assistant engineer, I am under obligations for valuable reconnaissances. It is a matter of regret that the age and failing health of this officer impaired to a certain extent his usefulness as a topographer, for which branch of science he has such a wonderful talent. Capt. C. E. McAlester, Twenty-third Michigan Infantry, acting as chief engineer of the Twenty-third Army Corps; Capt. G. W. Gowan, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, as assistant engineer of the Army of the Ohio, and Capt. O. S. McClure, Fiftieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, in command of the Engineer Battalion, rendered important assistance. The Engineer Battalion proved almost invaluable. Its members were always ready to work, day or night, and did it with an intelligence which directed the labor toward a result. My thanks are due and are freely given to its officers and men. The siege of Knoxville passed into history. If mistakes were made in the defense they were covered by the cloak of success. That many were made in the attack was apparent to us all. That the rebels made a great error in besieging is as evident as it now is that to accept siege at Knoxville was a great stroke of military policy. The results of the successful defense are, the defeat of Bragg's army and consequent permanent establishment of our forces at Chattanooga, with tolerably secure lines of communication; the confirmation of our hold upon East Tennessee; the discomfiture of and loss of prestige by the choicest troops of the enemy's service. There is no language sufficiently strong which I can use to express admiration for the conduct of our troops. From the beginning of the siege to the end every man did his whole duty. The cheerful looks and confident bearing which met us at every turn made it seem as though we were sure of victory from the first. It is doubtful whether any man within our lines had at any time after the first forty-eight hours any fear of the result. All privations were borne, all hardships undergone, with a spirit which indicated as plainly as if written on the walls that success would attend our efforts. And is there any man of that part of the Army of the Ohio which was in Knoxville who would exchange his nineteen days of service there for any other of the achievements of his life? Was there a regiment there which will not put Knoxville as proudly on its banners as they now bear Roanoke or New Berne, Williamsburg or Fair Oaks, Chantilly or South Mountain, Antietam or Vicksburg? The troops of the Ninth Army Corps and of the Twenty-third were chivalric rivals where duty was to be done. Never before had an engi21 R R-VOL XXXI, PT I neer officer less cause to complain of the manner in which his instructions and directions were carried out. And here I feel it my duty to refer to the great value of the services of the contrabands. Tractable and willing (many of them came to me and volunteered to work), they did an amount of work which was truly astonishing. Day and night they worked without a murmur. For the first week they labored regularly eighteen hours out of the twenty-four, and during the whole siege, out of nearly 200 that we had at work, only one asked to be excused, and he for only one afternoon. The question of supplies during the siege was second to none in importance. The failure of the enemy to close the Sevierville road and French Broad River enabled us even to accumulate a quantity of commissary stores. I was told that it was officially reported at the beginning of the siege that we had on hand full supplies for only one day and a half, yet, after nineteen days' siege, we had accumulated to such an extent over the lines just referred to that we had provisions enough to last ten days. The topography of the vicinity of Knoxville may be briefly described as follows: On the north bank of the river a narrow ridge is formed, extending from a point about 2 miles east of Knoxville to Lenoir's. It has an average base of about 11⁄2 miles in width. At Knoxville the width is about 1 mile. This ridge is cut through at short intervals by small streams, two of which, First and Second Creeks, run through the town of Knoxville, at a distance from each other of about threefourths of a mile. The main part of the town is built upon that portion of the ridge bounded on the northwest by the valley; on the southwest by Second Creek; on the southeast by the Holston River, and on the northeast by First Creek. It has the appearance of a table elevated about 150 feet above the river and about 100 feet above the valley. Again, Third Creek is found about seven-eighths of a mile below Second Creek, forming a second similar table. A depression in the ridge, about the same distance east of First Creek, forms still another table, upon which is built East Knoxville. This elevated ground is called Temperance Hill. From this eastward the ridge is more broken until it disappears, and other ridges spring up. This last division is known as Mabry's Hill, and is the highest ground by some 20 feet to be found on the north side of the river within cannon range of Knoxville. Commencing at Third Creek and going eastward these tables may be numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. A succession of ridges, all parallel to the one alluded to above, are found at short distances apart as one goes back from the river, the most important of which is at an average distance of 1 mile from the one Knoxville is situated upon, and is that which the enemy occupied. As near as can be ascertained by a pocket level, its elevation is exactly that of table No. 1 at its highest point. In selecting lines, it was my opinion that tables Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 should be occupied. In this opinion the general commanding concurred, except regarding No. 4. It was a question whether it was most prudent with our small force to attempt to occupy No. 4, or to limit our occupation in force to Nos. 1, 2, and 3, simply holding No. 4 with a strong outpost. It seemed to me that we could (as we did) construct lines on No. 4, and also on No. 3, those on No. 4 to be thrown so far to the front that they could not be made available against us in event of their capture by the enemy, and to be held by us with obstinacy, only leaving them when absolutely compelled to do so; in which case the lines on No. 3 would form our defense, and the enemy, after a stubborn fight in which he would have suffered, would only have occupied a position from which, in the former case, it would have been necessary to dislodge a mere outpost. In other words, after crippling him all we could in his successful assault upon No. 4, we would still have just as good a defense as if we had occupied No. 3 in the first place. But, on the other hand, by extending our lines to include No. 4, we made them weak in numbers at any one point, and we were consequently exposed to greater danger of being successfully assaulted along our whole position. This difficulty was partially obviated by the successful construction of a dam across First Creek, by which an impassable water obstacle of three-quarters of a mile in length was made immediately in front of and parallel to the crest of No. 3, which enabled us to greatly weaken our numbers (of infantry) on that part of the line. The general commanding yielded to my opinion, and all the foregoing positions were occupied as follows: On No. 1, Forts Sanders and Byington, and Batteries Noble and Zoellner. On No. 2, Fort Comstock, and Batteries Galpin, Wiltsie, and Billingsley. On No. 3, Fort Huntington Smith, and Batteries Clifton Lee, Fearns, and Stearman. On No. 4, Fort Hill. All our works were connected by a continuous line of rifle-trenches. Between the ridge occupied by ourselves and that occupied by the enemy, the valley varied in width, but its average breadth was in the neighborhood of 1 mile. It was almost entirely cleared of timber, and was at every point under the fire of our artillery. A direct advance over it would have been made only with serious loss. This would have been particularly the case in front of No. 4, where the valley widened to 14 miles, and was without timber or cover of any kind for troops. On the south side of the river the ground rises into a series of prominent points, the highest of which is about 350 feet, and is directly opposite Knoxville, the prolongation of Gay street passing directly over it. These knobs formed a range quite close to the river bank, with a wide valley beyond them. It was all important to us that at least three of these knobs should be held. We actually held four of them, commencing with the first hill, east of the Sevierville road, and counting down the river. As already stated, the enemy made several attempts to get possession of these heights, the first being made on Sunday, November 15, by a heavy force of cavalry, under the command of Wheeler, which was repulsed by Sanders' division of cavalry, which had been guarding the right bank of the Little Tennessee, and had gradually fallen back before Wheeler's heavier force. Sanders was assisted by Cameron's brigade of infantry. From these heights an artillery fire can be delivered in front of each flank of the lines on the north side of the river. Commencing with the most easterly hill (which we call "Sevierville Hill") and numbering them 1, 2, 3, and 4, our works were as follows: On No. 1, only rifle-trenches. On No. 2, Fort Stanley. Nos. 1 and 2 were connected by rifle-trenches, while Nos. 3 and 4, though not connected, each was well provided with rifle-trenches to cover the infantry supports of the batteries. With sufficient time this disposition could be very much improved by making the several forts of such a character (building bomb-proofs for stores and cisterns for water) that each would be self-reliant. All of which is respectfully submitted. ORLANDO M. POE, Captain, U. S. Engrs., Chief Engr. Army of the Ohio. Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH, Chief Engineer, Military Division of the Mississippi. No. 8. Report of Capt. William H. Harris, U. S. Ordnance Corps, Senior Ordnance Officer. ORDNANCE OFFICE, Cincinnati, January 1, 1864. SIR* The ordnance and ordnance stores captured by the Army of the Ohio, in the twenty-one days' continuous fighting and skirmishing with the enemy, from the 14th of November, are as follows, viz: One 3-inch wrought-iron rifle gun, I. M. W., No. 410, P. I. Co., 1862, 816 pounds; two 6-pounder brass guns, C. A. & Co., Boston, 1851, marked "Arkansas Military Institute;" one navy carronade, iron, caliber about 4.8 inch, no marks; two iron smooth-bore guns, caliber about 4 inch, marked T. M. Brennan, maker, Nashville, Tenn., 1861; carriages for each of the above unserviceable; 500 stand of small-arms. The arsenal, including storehouses and machine-shops, being without the line of intrenchments, was destroyed to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy and becoming a shelter for sharpshooters. After its destruction, which was complete and total, a lathe was moved into the town, and, with the aid of water power, a small machine-shop was started, which was used in reducing the caliber of Hochkiss shells for James 3.8-inch rifle gun to 3.67-inch, after which they were fired from the 20-pounder battery commanded by Lieut. S. N. Benjamin, of the Second U. S. Artillery. About 200 were thus prepared and found to answer satisfactorily. His own ammunition was partially exhausted during the series of battles in which he was engaged and partially abandoned to lighten his carriages on the retreat from Loudon to Knoxville. Communication was cut off, and no ammunition could be obtained elsewhere. Some of the shells thus prepared by the Ordnance Department were used with terrible effect as hand-grenades upon the rebels in the ditch of Fort Sanders during the assault on the 29th of November. The repeated assaults upon this fort, and the close proximity of the enemy's rifle-pits, made it very desirable to mount two or three mortars for the purpose of shelling out the enemy's trenches. As none were on hand, a wooden mortar was constructed, capable of throwing a 24-pounder howitzer shell. It was made of a live white oak, 24 feet *For portion (here omitted) covering operations in East Tennessee, August 15 to October 10, 1863, see Series I, Vol. XXX, Part II, p. 571. |