march after Longstreet. Granger will probably be removed and Sheridan assigned to succeed him, subject to approval of Government. Granger is certainly unfit to command. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. [C. A. DANA.] CHATTANOOGA, December 12, 1863-10.30 a. m. Elliott was heard from yesterday. He was at Crossville on the 9th instant, moving with a forage train, though ordered to pursue Longstreet. Sherman was ordered back to Bellefonte yesterday with view to a demonstration against Rome, by one column starting from Bellefonte and one from Chattanooga, the object being destruction of railroad bridge over the Oostenaula and removing enemy farther south than Dalton, his present position. Winter rains, which now threaten to set in, may prevent this movement. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. No. 2. [C. A. DANA.] Report of Lieut. Col. James H. Wilson, Assistant Inspector-General, U. S. Army. KNOXVILLE, November 13, 1863. (Received 14th.) GENERAL: Since the arrival of Mr. Dana and myself here, General Burnside, in a complete discussion of the situation in East Tennessee and its relation to the general campaign, has given us his views clearly and in detail, and requested me to communicate them to you without delay. He assumes that it is of the first importance to hold East Tennessee, because doing so he draws an ample supply of bread, meat, and forage from the rich country between the Clinch River, Rogersville, and the great Smoky Mountains, for his entire force protects and encourages a large population of loyal people, and deprives the enemy of a source of supplies of the greatest necessity to him. It simply becomes a question of how this can best be done, of how his forces can be most advantageously posted with that object in view, or in case he is compelled to give up the country entirely, to have for his selection such lines of retreat as will lead him in directions upon which he can reach supplies, and at the same time leave him most advantageously situated to assist the main body of your troops in future operations. The instruction of the General-in-Chief seems to have no other object in view in furtherance of this; therefore he thinks Knoxville the point to be held and around which he must operate. For this point he has the use of the railroad from Lenoir's to Greeneville, and rolling stock sufficient to bring in such supplies as may be accumulated at various points along it. The Holston, French Broad, and tributary streams may be also used for flats when the road becomes too bad for wagons. Knoxville is in the region of supplies, and has mills in running order to turn out 150 barrels of flour per day, and can receive the product of other mills able to grind another hundred; contains shops capable of keeping the major part of the material in good order; is susceptible of vigorous defense, and when finally abandoned is so situated as to allow ready access to all the roads except the one leading through Kingston. In short, he can concentrate his forces here more rapidly, supply them more easily, defend himself quite as successfully, and finally, if it comes to the worst, he can carry off his command in better condition, and by routes which, although longer, would be safe, and ultimately enable him to move wherever you might direct. In case he is compelled to relinquish Knoxville, after destroying everything that could help the enemy, he would prefer to go to Morristown and Bean's Station. He thinks he could maintain those positions against any force that could be sent against him; they being admirably situated with reference to the gaps, would enable him to keep up communication in that direction, to prevent the repair of railroad, and still allow him to forage much of the country to the south and eastward. There being plenty of mills, he could still be able to supply himself in a degree with bread from the country, and use his transportation for hauling sugar, coffee, and salt. In anticipation of this step he could at once set to work fortifying these places as strongly as possible from Knoxville. If you should direct it, he could move when necessary by Clinton, Winter's Gap, and Morganton either to Carthage or McMinnville. But in this event his live stock, coming by way of the gaps, together with the main part of the cavalry should be turned back into Kentucky, to be disposed of afterward as necessity might demand. The general's idea of Kingston is that, although a point of considerable natural strength, and, if well supplied, of strategic importance, it is almost entirely out of the question now either as a point of his line of retreat or as one from which he could exercise a controlling influence over East Tennessee. The country about it is poor, the Clinch and Emory River regions having been exhausted of supplies by his previous operations. If his whole force were concentrated there, he could not possibly take with him more than seven days' supply. The railroad would at once fall into the enemy's hands, and could be repaired at leisure. They would also get Knoxville, all the mills, and nearly the entire productive region of East Tennessee. This would necessarily be the case, for, with a few more [days of] good weather, the Holston could be forded at any place south of Knoxville, and, in addition, bridges might be easily constructed so as to cross either it or the Tennessee. It is reported now that the rebels are building a pontoon bridge upon Pond Creek, and that they are watching every ford and ferry from the foot of the mountain to Kingston with the greatest care. It seems entirely practicable for the enemy to cross if he desires it, and that before Burnside's forces could be concentrated at any point; hence the general argues that if it becomes necessary to leave East Tennessee, and he were to be ordered to do it by way of Kingston, the enemy could precipitate that necessity, in spite of all activity, before our forces could possibly be disposed to prevent it or to effect their retreat. In this event his forces would either be beaten in detail or be compelled to go at once to Kingston, where they cannot feed themselves and are still far from a junction with Thomas. This is the case considered defensively only, but if the good weather continues it will become desirable to concentrate a force sufficient to anticipate the enemy in offensive operations, and thereby prevent him from gaining even the temporary advantages to be derived from compelling Burnside to adopt either of the plans alluded to above. Weath ́r that will enable the enemy to operate will afford us the same opportunity, and any plan which may be adopted involving Sherman and Thomas can be co-operated with from here. A bridge-head and bridge in the neighborhood of Dallas or Igou's Ferry, with a force threatening Cleveland, would probably bring the enemy either from the front of Burnside or Thomas. If from the former he could advance at least to the line of the Hiwassee, and if the whole plan was fortunately executed, would give us all the country as far south as Cleveland, and allow a complete junction of your entire army. The general also says, should a plan of operations of this kind be put on foot, he could use four or five thousand of Thomas' cavalry to great advantage. Or, even if it is determined to do no more than try to hold the present line of the Little Tennessee, this additional cavalry force would be of great benefit to him. He thinks it would enable him to hold his line against any ordinary force that the enemy can send against him. The general does not wish to be understood as requesting 10,000 infantry to be sent to him, but makes this suggestion in view of the possibility that no operation toward Cleveland on the part of Thomas may be deemed practicable, and that you may still desire and make his occupancy of this country certain. Major-General GRANT, Chattanooga. No. 3. J. H. WILSON, Lieutenant-Colonel, &c. Abstract from returns of the troops in East Tennessee, under command of Maj. Gen. Åmbrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, November 30, 1863. No. 4. Reports of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio, with congratulatory orders, &c. KNOXVILLE, TENN., November 17, 1863-1.30 a. m. Longstreet crossed the Tennessee River on Saturday (12th), at Huff's Ferry, 6 miles below Loudon, with about 15,000 men. We have resisted his advance steadily, repulsing every attack, holding on till our position was turned by superior numbers, and then retiring in good order. He attacked us yesterday about 11 o'clock at Campbell's Station, and heavy fighting has been going on all day, in which we have held our own and inflicted serious loss on the enemy. No fighting since dark. We commenced retiring, and the most of the command is now within the lines of Knoxville. At the same time that Longstreet crossed the river a heavy cavalry force crossed the Little Tennessee, and advanced on this place by way of Maryville. Our cavalry force at Rockford was slowly pressed back by superior numbers, and at sundown Sunday (13th) night had fallen back to the infantry support on the first ridge from the river. They did not attack yesterday morning, but in the course of the day disappeared from our front. I shall make every exertion to hold this place, and trust we shall be able to do so. The men are in good spirits and are behaving splendidly. A. E. BURNSIDE, His Excellency the PRESIDENT. KNOXVILLE, November 17, 1863-10 p. m. (Received 6 p. m. 18th.) Since I reported to you at 1 [1.30] this morning, troops, batteries, and trains have all arrived. The enemy did not press us during the night. The troops were placed in position, intrenchments thrown up where none existed, and every exertion made to render the position secure. The enemy have made no serious demonstration during the day. Our cavalry on the Kingston road have been skirmishing all the afternoon, and have been pressed slowly back, and the enemy's pickets are now about 2 miles from town. His advance to-day has not been vigorous, and he is evidently holding back for the arrival of his batteries or the development of some flank movement. If he should assault our position here, I think we can give a good account of ourselves. They still have a force on the other side of the river with pickets in sight of ours, but have made no demonstration to-day. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. (Copy sent General Grant.) HEADQUARTERS, Knoxville, November 21, 1863. The enemy has not yet attempted an assault; he is, however, busily engaged throwing up batteries and making approaches. We have the town completely surrounded by a continuous line of rifle-pits and batteries, and hold the heights on the opposite side of the river. A desultory fire is kept up along our skirmish line, which is from 500 to 1,000 yards beyond our line of rifle-pits. The enemy thus far has not attempted a complete investment. His main body seems to occupy the ground extending from the river below town around to the Clinton road. There has been occasional cannonading since the 18th. Our loss has been trifling. The death of General Sanders is a serious loss, and keenly felt by us all. We have on hand eight days' bread, half rations; fifteen days' beef, and of fresh pork full rations, and an abundance of salt. Our forage trains cross the river daily, and have so far been successful. The cavalry force that threatened us on the opposite side of the river have retired from that immediate front and gone certainly beyond Little River, and there is but a small force between Little River and the Little Tennessee. The rains of last night and this morning will render the streams unfordable. We have a reasonable supply of ammunition, and the command is in good spirits. The officers and men have been indefatigable in their labors to make this place impregnable. General GRANT. A. É. BURNSIDE, KNOXVILLE, November 23, 1863. The enemy are still in our front. They have not yet molested the place, but hold all outlines here and other side of the river. Our defenses are comparatively strong, the men in good spirits; we have provisions for, say, ten or twelve days longer, and will hold out as long as we can. It is possible the enemy are strong enough to carry the place by assault. The enemy have last night attempted to break our pontoon bridge by floating rafts down against it, but did not succeed. We have taken precautions which we hope will defeat any future attempt. Major-General GRANT. A. E. BURNSIDE, KNOXVILLE, TENN., November 28, 1863. I dispatched you last on the 23d. During that night a body of the enemy crossed the river about 3 miles below our lines and established themselves on a high point just beyond our picket line and threw up a rifle-pit facing our position on that side. During next day and the forenoon of the 25th, continued skirmishing went on, and on that afternoon they assaulted our right on that side of the river with two brigades. Colonel Cameron, who held that position with his brigade, held his ground in the most gallant manner, and finally repulsed them and drove them half way up the opposite hill, inflict |