Thomas Reid's Theory of PerceptionThe thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world - what Reid calls the Way of Ideas - is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception.Ryan Nichols lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which Nichols applies to his discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to 'signs'. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, Nicholsargues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. Nichols develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose ofsensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.Nichols brings to the writing of this book a consummate knowledge of Reid's texts, published and unpublished, and a keen appreciation for Reid's responses to his predecessors. He frequently reconstructs arguments in premise/conclusion form, thereby clarifying disputes that have frustrated previous Reid scholarship. This clarification, his lively examples, and his plainspoken style make this book especially readable. Reid's theory of perception is by far the most important feature of Reid'sphilosophical system, and Nichols offers what will be, for a long time to come, the definitive analysis of this theory. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 Reids Method | 14 |
2 Intentional Awareness | 41 |
3 Perceptual Awareness through Touch | 72 |
4 Visual Perception | 109 |
5 The Purpose of Sensations | 143 |
6 Qualities | 161 |
7 Our Awareness of Sensations | 186 |
8 Perceptual Learning | 211 |
9 Answering Molyneux | 246 |
10 Empiricism and the Way of Ideas | 277 |
286 | |
299 | |
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Common terms and phrases
acquired perception analysis answer appears argues Berkeley Berkeley’s body Buras cause chapter claim cognitively indirect color conceive conception and belief Condillac conscious cube direct distance distinction epistemic explain external objects faculties faculty psychology geometrical geometry of visibles habit Hume Hume’s identify immediate object implies Inquiry Intellectual Powers intentional awareness intentional content intentional objects interpretation Leibniz Locke Locke’s material impression means mental mind mind-independent objects Molyneux’s question natural signs Newton non-inferential one’s original perceptions passage perceive perceptual beliefs perceptual knowledge philosophical philosophy of mind physical primary qualities principle problem real figure reasoning refer Reid believes Reid holds Reid says Reid’s discussion Reid’s theory Reidian represent representational Saunderson secondary qualities seen figure Sensory Deprivation sensory experience sight signify sphere substance dualism suggest tactile sensations tangible figure theory of perception thesis things thought experiment touch visible figure vision visual perception