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spirits to preserve our liberties far beyond many of us) is made capable of any the like favours, privileges, and immunities, as ourselves enjoy; and this especially argued in the exchequer chamber by all the judges of England. The second was, the judgment upon impositions in the exchequer court, by the barons, which hath been the source and fountain of many bitter waters of affliction unto our merchants. The third was, that fatal late judgment against the liberty of the subject imprisoned by the king, argued and pronounced but by one judge alone.

I can live, although another who has no right, be put to live with me; nay, I can live, although I pay excises and impositions more than I do ; but to have my liberty, which is the soul of my life, taken from me by power, and to have my body pent up in a gaol, without remedy by law, and to be so adjudged! O improvident ancestors! O unwise forefathers! to be so curious in providing for the quiet possession of our laws and the liberties of parliament, and to neglect our persons and bodies, and to let them lie in prison, and that durante bene placito, remediless! If this be law, why do we talk of liberties? why do we trouble ourselves with a dispute about law, franchises, property of goods, and the like? what may any man call his own, if not the liberty of his person?

I am weary of treading these ways, and therefore conclude to have a select committee deputed, to frame a petition to his majesty for redress of these things; which being read, examined, and approved by the house, may be delivered to the

king, of whose gracious answer we have no cause to doubt, our desires being so reasonable, our intentions so loyal, and the manner so humble : neither need we fear this to be the critical parlia ment, as was insinuated, or this a way to distraction; but assure ourselves of a happy issue: then shall the king, as he calls us his great council, find us his good council, and own us as his good council-which God grant.

SPEECH OF THE EARL OF WARWICK, ON THE RIGHT OF THE CROWN TO IMPRISON THE SUBJECT ARBITRARILY, 1628.

MY LORDS,

I WILL observe something out of the laws, wherein this liberty of the subject's person is founded, and something out of the precedents which have been alleged; as to magna charta, and the rest concerning these points, they are acknowledged by all to be now in force; that they were made to secure the subjects from wrongful imprisonment; and that they concern the king as much, or rather more, than the subject. Well then, besides magna charta, and those six other acts of parliament in the very point, we know that magna charta itself has been at least thirty times confirmed, so that now, at this time, we have thirtysix or thirty-seven acts of parliament to confirm this liberty, although it was made a matter of derision the other day in this house.

One is that of 36 Edward III. No. 9, and another in the same year, No. 20, not printed, but

yet as good as those that are; and that of 42 Edward III. Cap. 3, so express in the point, (especially the petition of the commons that year, which was read by Mr. Littleton, with the king's answer, so full and free from all exception, to which I refer your lordships,) that I know not how any thing in the world can be more plain.

Now, therefore, if in parliament we shall make any doubt of that which is so fully confirmed by parliament, and in a case so clear, go about by new glosses to alter these old and good laws, we shall not only forsake the steps of our ancestors, who, in cases even of small importance, would answer nolumus leges Angliæ mutari, but we shall yield up and betray our right in the greatest inheritance the subjects of England have; and that is the laws of England.

Truly, I wonder how any man can think that this house (though no lawyers) can admit of such a gloss upon a plain text, as should overthrow the very end and design of the law; for whereas the law of magna charta is, That no freeman shall be imprisoned, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; it has been insisted on by some, that by these words, the law of the land, it is to be understood, that the king hath power to commit without showing any cause; which is an exposition, not only expressly contrary to other acts of parliament, and those expressly before cited, but against common sense.

Mr. Attorney confesseth this law concerns the king. Why then, where the law saith, the king shall not commit but by the law of the land, the meaning must be, (as Mr. Attorney would have it)

that the king must not commit, but at his own pleasure! and shall we think that our ancestors were so foolish as to hazard their persons and estates, and labour so much to get a law, and have it thirty times confirmed, that the king might not commit his subjects, but at his own pleasure? and that if he did commit any of his subjects without a cause shown, that then the party must lie in prison during the king's pleasure? Nothing can be imagined more ridiculous, or more contrary to reason and common sense.

From the precedents I observe, that many committed by the king or his council have been delivered upon habeas corpus, and that constantly. It is true that some precedents were brought on the king's part, that when some of these persons desired to be delivered by habeas corpus, the king, or his council, signified his majesty's pleasure that they should be delivered; or the king's attorney hath come into court and released them by the king's command. But this seems to make for the subject; for, it being in his majesty's power to deliver them, who, by his special commandment, and without any cause shown, were imprisoned, may we not think that his majesty, at that time, would rather have staid their deliverance by law, than furthered it by his letters, and so make the prisoners rather beholden to him for his great mercy, than to the judges for justice, had not his majesty known that, at that time, they ought to have been delivered by law?

I think no man would imagine a wise king would have suffered his grace and prerogative (if any prerogative there were) to be so continually ques

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tioned; or his majesty and his council to be so far from commanding the judges not to proceed to deliver the prisoners by them committed, without 'cause shown, as that on the other side, (which is all the force of these precedents) the king and council should signify to the judges, that they should proceed to deliver the parties!

Certainly, if the king had challenged any such prerogative, that a person committed, without any cause shown, might not be delivered by the judges without his consent, it would have appeared, by one precedent or other, amongst all that have been produced, that his majesty would have made some claim to such a prerogative; but it appears, on the contrary, that in many of these cases the king nor his council did ever interpose; and where they did, it was always in affirmation and encouragement to that court to proceed. And besides, the writing of letters from the king to the judges to do justice to his majesty's subjects, may, with as great reason, be interpreted, that without those letters they might not do justice; as this, that the king signified his willingness that such and such persons, which were committed by him without cause shown, should be delivered, therefore they could not be delivered without him; which is a strange reason. So that finding the laws so full, so many, and so plain in the point; and that whenever any committed without cause shown, brought their habeas corpus, they were delivered, and no command ever given to the contrary, nor no claim made on the king's part to any such prerogative; I may safely conclude, as the house of commons have done and if any one precedent or two, of late,

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