chinery, while it obeys the great laws of matter and mind, accom plishes the beneficent intention of the Creator; and each individual enjoys his hour of physical good. The well-being of man is in the same manner provided for, in the constitution of his more complex nature; and so long as all the parts of this constitution perform their functions, all is well. Damage and ruin arise from the inaction or decay of some of the parts. The actual existence of this damage is precisely that point of physical science at which it is intersected by theo logy, and where the former must ask light and aid from the latter.'

pp. xcix, c.

But, while it belongs to Theology, to expound the cause and moral nature of this damage, the naked fact forces itself upon the intellectual physiologist, as a circumstance of the condition of human nature, which cannot be overlooked, much less denied, without vitiating the whole system of his philosophy. Call it sin, depravity, misfortune, imperfection, disorder, or what we may, the injury which man's moral nature has received, and which prevents his higher faculties from working as, from what we can judge of his original constitution, they were clearly intended to work, and with that uniformity and harmony with which the faculties of the inferior classes perform their functions, this awful feature of the phenomena of human agency, is as much a physical truth, though not to be accounted for by physical science, as is that other mysterious phenomenon to which it is so closely related,-death. A Christian philosopher, who has, by other means than either abstract reasoning or an induction from physiological facts, arrived at the only true explanation of the origin of the damage, and is also informed of the Heaven-provided remedy, finds no difficulty or embarrassment in dealing with it as a simple matter of fact, abstracted from the considerations which belong to ethics and theology. Not so the sceptic, who, haunted with the dim apprehension of consequences stretching beyond the limits of his philosophy, is strongly tempted to banish from his thoughts, so far as possible, or to disguise by some thin hypothesis, the evil which, in spite of him, is; and thus, all his science becomes untrue, because it includes the fallacy, either that evil does not exist, or that evil is not evil.

The present Writer does not, however, pursue the subject beyond the strict limits of his philosophical inquiry. He refers us, in a note on this subject, for further illustration, to a volume which we are glad to take this opportunity of strongly recommending to the notice of our readers; "An Essay on Moral Freedom, by the Rev. Thomas Tully Crybbace, A.M." (Svo. Edinb. 1829.) Among our unfulfilled good intentions, (of which who has not reason to complain?) is that of devoting, long since, an article to this able and valuable volume. In the

commendation bestowed upon it by the present Writer, its Author will, perhaps, feel indemnified for our involuntary, at least unpremeditated neglect; for which our best apology will be, the citation of the following remarks in vindication of the correct views entertained by Luther and the other Reformers respecting the condition of man.

This important and arduous subject was never more ably treated than by Luther, and some of those illustrious men who were the means of effecting the Reformation in the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the midst of the profound ignorance with which they were surrounded, and, which is more unfavourable to the discovery of truth, among the absurd dogmas on this subject held by the scholastic philosophers, they clearly illustrated the doctrine of universal causation, and hence, in consequence of human depravity, the moral necessity by which the whole race of mankind are less or more enthralled. From the absurdity of the contingency which virtually denies the existence of the universe, as well as from that of indifference, as essential to moral freedom, which virtually deprives man of his moral nature, they are equally free. They described man as they found him,-an agent possessed of a moral nature, and who hence, in a state of purity, would invariably act consistently with the principles of moral rectitude, but who, in the state of moral corruption consequent to a fall, would, to a great extent, as invariably and necessarily commit nothing but sin. They did not, indeed, in common with all the philosophers of the age, and perhaps of all ages before, with the exception of the inspired writers, clearly perceive some of the important relations of their subject, and, consequently, occasionally seem to make contradictory and inconsistent statements; but, enlightened and guided by revelation, they always were, what no philosophical writer, ancient or modern, ever was, right in their practical conclusions. And after all the wretched attempts which superficial observation, ignorance, false philosophy, and party zeal have made to refute their doctrine, every candid and careful observer of human nature will readily assent to the great truths so skilfully and ably maintained by Luther against the contemptible sophistry of Erasmus, that in man, as he is now found, there is, with respect to God, no good thing, but that it is God who worketh in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure.' Crybbace, pp. 148, 149.

By this Writer, the phrase 'moral necessity' * is always employed in a bad sense, as implying that derangement of man's moral and intellectual being which impels him to will and to perform what he disapproves. Moral thraldom would express this more appropriately, and would have the further advantage

*Luther, in a passage cited by Mr. Crybbace, deprecates the misapplication of the term necessity in metaphysical discussions, as nimis ingrate et incongruæ significationis. Necessitas non rectè dicitur, nec

'de divinâ neque de humaná voluntate.'

of answering exactly to the idea intended to be conveyed by St. Paul's νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. And the principle of spiritual life' (vóuos TOÙ пVEÚμatos Tns twns) by which we are 'set free from this thraldom of sin and death', may be considered as the introduction of that new and commanding power into the complex yet incomplete agency of man, by which its complicated movements are restored to simplicity and harmony, and the whole machinery is set right. This also, we speak it with reverence, is a physical fact, we mean the restoration of man's moral nature to its integrity and true freedom by the Spirit of God,-which, though arbitrarily assigned by philosophers to the region of ethical truths or theological dogmas, as inseparably belongs to every sound physiological view of human nature, as any intellectual phenomenon.

But we must hasten to conclude our analysis of the Essay before us. In the sixth (and last) section, the Writer considers the question of liberty and necessity as belonging to metaphysical science. Here, in entering upon the theory of Causation, and in shewing the fallacy of confounding, under the common name of cause and effect, 'conjoined events', or sequences, of very different descriptions,—our Author becomes unavoidably abstruse; and we must refrain from taxing the attention of our readers too heavily, by even a sketch of his argument. The whole is wound up with the remark, that, if liberty be taken in the unintelligible sense of contingency, or freedom from causation, then, the human mind has no liberty; for it always stands ' under a triple relationship,-namely, to its own attributes and 'conditions, to the world of actual or conceivable existence, and 'to the interferences of Divine power; and so far from its being insulated from reasons and motives, it is only upon and among 'reasons and motives that it can work.' But if, by liberty, be meant freedom from restraint,—

Then, the sad truth must be confessed, that this power, in the human subject, is largely invaded, and much damaged and obstructed, by the moral ruin that has affected the race. Man, in this sense, is free only in degree; and it is in contemplation of this lamentable infringement of his native power, that he should thankfully receive the succour and the remedial interference offered to him by Christianity.'

p. cxxii.

In conclusion, the Arminian and the Calvinistic metaphysician have their wise and reverend heads thus gently knocked together.

The Arminian divine, inwardly persuaded, he knows not on what ground, that human nature contains a something more than the passivity of brute matter, or of animal life, has recourse to the figment of Contingent Volition; and then, to give his unintelligible notion an

appearance of consistency, has been led to the enormous error of denying the Divine foreknowledge. Thus, in his zeal to defend one attribute of Deity, he has demolished another. Why will he not be content with the simple principles of human nature, as known to all men, and as recognized in the transactions of every day, and with the plain evidence of the Bible, which always takes up and supposes the existence of those principles?

His opponent, the Calvinist, spurning the absurdities of Arminian metaphysics, believes that, when he has scattered these sophisms, he has exhausted the subject of human agency, and may triumphantly return from the vanquished field to his own theological position; nor deems it necessary once to lay aside his high lenses, or to look abroad upon human nature as it shews itself to the naked eye of common sense. Then he goes to his Bible, cased in metaphysical certainties, and proceeds, without scruple or compunction, to apply the crushing engine of dogmatical exposition to all passages that do not naturally fall in with the abstractions which he has framed to himself. Meanwhile, men of sense are disgusted, and sceptics glory. How shall these evils be remedied?-how, unless by the prevalence of a better-a genuine system of interpretation ?

But even without this better exposition, a great and important reform would spontaneously follow from a more vivid persuasion of the reality of the great facts affirmed in the Scriptures. Let but the quickening affirmations of the inspired writers be allowed to take effect on the ground of the ordinary motives of human life; let it but be believed that the Son of God has come to inform men (his fellows, by an ineffable condescension,) of a a future danger to which all are liable; and to impart to them freely a benefit they could never have obtained by their own efforts; and then it will no more seem pertinent or necessary to adjust the terms of this message of mercy to metaphysical subtilties, than it does to do the like when a friend snatches a friend from ruin, or when a father bears his children in his arms from a scene of perils. How much mischief has arisen from the supposition that a mystery belongs to the matter of salvation, which waits to be cleared up by philosophy!

Philosophy, it is to be hoped, will at length work its way through its own difficulties. But the result to Christianity of so happy a success, would simply be, to set in a stronger light the enormous folly of obstructing the course of a momentous practical affair by the impertinences of learned disputation.' pp. cxxvii-cxxix.

Our own opinion of the very extraordinary merit and high value of the production which we have deemed worthy of this extended analysis, our readers will already have inferred; and we need not, therefore, employ any of the common-places of commendation. Its Author has already taken his station among the most influential as well as most truly philosophical writers of the day; and his present performance, whatever attention it may meet with, we cannot but regard as the most valuable service which he has yet rendered to the cause of Truth and

of answering exactly to the idea intended to be conveyed by St. Paul's νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. And the ' principle of 'spiritual life' (vóμos тOŨ пVεÚματos τns ¿wns) by which we are 'set free from this thraldom of sin and death', may be considered as the introduction of that new and commanding power into the complex yet incomplete agency of man, by which its complicated movements are restored to simplicity and harmony, and the whole machinery is set right. This also, we speak it with reverence, is a physical fact, we mean the restoration of man's moral nature to its integrity and true freedom by the Spirit of God,-which, though arbitrarily assigned by philosophers to the region of ethical truths or theological dogmas, as inseparably belongs to every sound physiological view of human nature, as any intellectual phenomenon.

But we must hasten to conclude our analysis of the Essay before us. In the sixth (and last) section, the Writer considers the question of liberty and necessity as belonging to metaphysical science. Here, in entering upon the theory of Causation, and in shewing the fallacy of confounding, under the common name of cause and effect, 'conjoined events', or sequences, of very different descriptions,-our Author becomes unavoidably abstruse; and we must refrain from taxing the attention of our readers too heavily, by even a sketch of his argument. The whole is wound up with the remark, that, if liberty be taken in the unintelligible sense of contingency, or freedom from causation, then, the human mind has no liberty; for it always stands 'under a triple relationship,-namely, to its own attributes and 'conditions, to the world of actual or conceivable existence, and to the interferences of Divine power; and so far from its being Winsulated from reasons and motives, it is only upon and among reasons and motives that it can work.' But if, by liberty, be meant freedom from restraint,

Then, the sad truth must be confessed, that this power, in the human subject, is largely invaded, and much damaged and obstructed, by the moral ruin that has affected the race. Man, in this sense, is free only in degree; and it is in contemplation of this lamentable infringe ment of his native power, that he should thankfully receive the succour and the remedial interference offered to him by Christianity."'

р. сххіі.

In conclusion, the Arminian and the Calvinistic metaphysician have their wise and reverend heads thus gently knocked together.

The Arminian divine, inwardly persuaded, he knows not on what ground, that human nature contains a something more than the passivity of brute matter, or of animal life, has recourse to the figment of Contingent Volition; and then, to give his unintelligible notion an