actly the same degree, unfit them for forming an unprejudiced or rational judgement of such matters. A man's passions may derange or disturb his judgement: his affections may almost be considered as an essential part of his judgement, or a necessary condition of his having any judgement on moral questions, Were a man capable of being reduced to a mere thinking machine, virtue and vice would be to him what colours are to a man born blind.

The ultimate source of the difficulties with which the ethical philosopher has to contend, we think it might be shown, lies deeper than the inadequacy of ordinary language; it must be sought for in the causes of an imperfection which can exist in language, only as it exists in the mind itself, of which language is the faithful image, the all-accommodating expositor. But we pass on to transcribe the concluding paragraphs of this img. dactory section: they will illustrate, incidentally, the forestul propriety of popular and familiar expressiour, when the out is to state witi cearnest, an important pubosophia, az taxton, - There is a deribution of the jare of kuntatge was wat al and time the of the Pace and Sora bacuda; mus

ble. But it is equally certain, that the word Ought introduces the mind into a new region, to which nothing physical corresponds. However philosophers may deal with this most important of words, it is instantly understood by all who do not attempt to define it.* No civilized speech, perhaps no human language, is without correspondent terms. It would be as reasonable to deny that Space and Greenness are significant words, as to affirm that Ought, Right, Duty, Virtue, are sounds without meaning. It would be fatal to an Ethical Theory, that it did not explain them, and that it did not comprehend all the conceptions and emotions which they call up. There never yet was a theory which did not attempt such an explanation.'

Intelligible to the humblest capacity as is this broad and palpable distinction between the Sciences which treat of what is, and that which relates to what ought to be; a distinction which exists in the nature of things, and must therefore govern every sound classification of the objects of knowledge; it is one which has been entirely disregarded by almost every ethical and theological writer. Nor is it quite so easy as it may at first sight appear, to distribute the branches of science according to this simple and primary division. On which side of the line shall we place Theology? Its very etymology would justify our ranking it with the physical sciences, as treating most especially of that which alone essentially, necessarily, eternally is; and true Christian theology may be said to consist almost entirely of facts and their evidence. Yet, while Ethics cannot include Theology, it is obvious that Theology must include Ethics. Part of what Theology offers to teach, is substantially the same that Ethics proposes by another mode of investigation to ascertain; namely,' what ought to be.' They have so far a common object, though differing most essentially in the process of inquiry; the one science resting as it were the OUGHT TO BE on the is, the other making the great facts relating to Moral Being to rest upon the theory of what ought to be.

Again, under which denomination shall we class Intellectual Philosophy? If a science at all, it must clearly rank with the physical sciences. Yet, confined to the limits assigned to it by the learned Writer, as a mere subdivision of the philosophy of human nature,-separate from that which treats of the laws of sensibility and emotion, of happiness and misery, as well as from the inquiry that relates to the theory of Moral Sentiments, and carefully distinguished from Theology on the one hand, and from that branch of physiology which relates to the animal functions on the other, thus narrowed and deposed from the eminence to

An admirable remark of very extensive application, and which suggests the true source of the obscurities created by an inverted use of language, as the frame-work of thought, rather than its medium.

which some would elevate it, Intellectual Philosophy may seem to be deprived of no small degree of its apparent utility and importance. For it is not with this science as with those which relate to the laws of the material universe, in which there is a boundless field for ever-new discovery, and fresh facts are continually being added to the materials of our knowledge. The mind of an individual,-the physical structure of any single mind, viewed apart from the moral being, comprises the entire subject of investigation; respecting which nothing remains to be discovered, but the laws of the mechanism; since no one dreams that any latent faculty remains to be elicited, or that science will ever detect what simple consciousness has failed to reveal as to the real powers of the man. This being the case, and the ultimate facts being already in our possession, 'no very important truth,' the Author of the Introductory Essay contends, can be expected to result from even the most complete analysis of the phenomena.

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Science is little better than a learned amusement, when employed in analysing a mechanism, the powers of which are already familiarly known, and the conformation of which is unalterable. This is very much the disadvantage of the entire circle of intellectual philosophy.'

p. lx.

Should this be thought a depreciating view of the science, and one which scarcely accords with the language we have ourselves held respecting its value on some occasions, it must be remembered, that the terms metaphysics and intellectual philosophy are generally used in a much wider reference, as including logic, or the science of reasoning, together with the laws of evidence, and that branch of the philosophy of human nature from which, Sir James Mackintosh contends, it ought to be constantly and vigilantly distinguished. Taken in this wide conventional acceptation, no one will deny its paramount importance; and even in its most restricted sense, the study cannot but be highly useful as a sort of intellectual gymnastics, by which the powers of the mind are invigorated, and habits of self-reflection and close investigation are formed. It is very much the aim of ' education,' the present Writer observes, ' to cultivate the faculty ' of continued, or, as it is called, close attention; and there can 'be no doubt that this power is of high importance, and much needed in all the occasions of life.' The power of complex attention also, he remarks, recommends itself by its connexion 'with the moral faculties. The habit of thinking comprehen'sively, may be called a means of virtue. Upon this ground, the true value of such studies may safely rest. The indirect, beneficial results may well compensate for the small amount of direct utility. It is when Intellectual Philosophy intrudes upon

the province of ethics, and forsakes the laws of physical investigation for abstract and à priori reasoning, that it at once loses the character of science, and becomes a mere learned amuse'ment,'-or something worse. The entire mass of intellectual and theological philosophy may, in fact, be divided, the present Writer remarks, into two classes, the one irreconcilably opposed to the other: the one, the philosophy of induction, the other, the philosophy of abstraction, as opposed to induction; the former in harmony with science and human nature, the latter at war with both,-paradoxical, unnatural, and anti-human.

But, unfortunately, this division, and the broad distinction between physical and ethical science, have been hitherto utterly disregarded by metaphysical writers, with scarcely an exception, down to the present day; and on no subject, have our metaphysicians discovered this disregard of the proper boundary and laws of physical inquiry, more than on that which respects the phenomena of volition. This subject may be considered, indeed, as a sort of border region between physics and ethics; and it is not to be wondered at, much as it may be deplored, that divines and philosophers on either hand, the orthodox as well as the sceptical, have overstepped the line of their respective territories. This is the grand fault of President Edwards's masterly Inquiry' concerning the Freedom of the Will; a work of which the Author of the Introductory Essay predicts, that, as a specimen of exact analysis, of profound or perfect 'abstraction, of conclusive logic, and of calm discussion,' it will long support its high reputation, and will continue to be used as a classic material in the business of intellectual education. one, in fact, who has not made himself master of this celebrated treatise, can have any pretensions to be listened to, when undertaking to treat of the subject to which it relates. In his immediate object, its Author was triumphantly successful.

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He exposed to contempt, in all its evasions, the Arminian notion of contingency as the blind law of human volitions. And he did more; he effectively redeemed the doctrines called Calvinistic from that scorn with which the irreligious party, within and without the pale of Christianity, would fain have overwhelmed them. He taught the world to be less flippant; and there is reason also to surmise, (though the facts are not to be distinctly adduced,) that, in the re-action which has of late counterpoised the once triumphant Arminianism of English episcopal divinity, the influence of Edwards has been much greater than those who have yielded to it have always confessed.' p. xxv.

If literary ambition had been (which certainly it was not) the 'active element of Edwards's mind, as it was the single motive in 'the mind of his contemporary and admirer Hume, and if he could have foreseen the reputation of his Essay on Free Will, he need 'have envied,' remarks the present Writer, very few aspirants

'to philosophical fame.' The 'modest pastor of the Calvinists ' of Northampton' (U. S.) could scarcely have anticipated that he should have assigned to him, by common consent, a seat among sages as a master of science, his faith being pardoned for the sake of his philosophy. This remarkable man,' so Sir James Mackintosh describes him, 'the metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists of New England, when their stern doctrine retained its rigorous authority. His power of subtile argument, perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in some of the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his piety to fervour.' Of the Inquiry concerning the Will, the learned Author of the Dissertation, is not led by his immediate subject to take specific notice. Edwards comes under review as an ethical writer ; and his ethical theory, as explained in the “Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue," is shewn to rest upon no solid foundation. It exhibits the same strange disposition to fix on ab'stractions as the objects of our primitive feelings,' which characterizes the systems of Malebranche, Clarke, and many of their accomplished predecessors. Edwards's Treatise on Religious Affections, the most valuable of all his practical writings, is incidentally referred to, as approaching to the doctrine of the ancient mystics. But, strange to say! where the Christian divine turns off from the road pursued by Plato, Shaftesbury, and Malebranche, the learned Reviewer deems him to have gone wrong, and, disliking the 'narrow way,' forsakes him.

Edwards was, however, no mystic, although, in his theory of the affections, he may have verged on mysticism. His devotion

*The Author of the Introductory Essay claims Edwards as an Englishman: he was such in every respect but the accident of birth in a distant province of the empire.' Old and New England at that time acknowledged one sceptre; and those who were born in the American plantations,' still regarded themselves as Englishmen. We have no wish, however, to rob our transatlantic brethren of the credit reflected upon their country by the name of the American metaphy'sician.'

+ It is satisfactory to us to find our own views of the defective character of Edwards's theory, confirmed by so high an authority in philosophical matters as that of Sir James Mackintosh. Edwards's

error, we remarked, in an article which appeared eight years ago, appears to us to consist, not so much "in placing virtue exclusively in some one disposition of mind," (an objection urged by Mr. Robert Hall,) as in placing it in an abstraction which has no relation to either human nature or the Divine. We have only an indefinite sen<timent substituted, as a generic appellation, for the various distinct principles comprehended in love to God and love to man.' Ecl. Rev. 2d Ser. Vol. xix. p. 99.