garded it not only as proper and judicious, but I should have deemed it criminal in any commander situated as General Wood was not to have made the change. Answer to question 4. Considering that General Wood was several miles from re-enforcements, and that he had no reason to expect support, but on the contrary had been denied re-enforcements when he had reported his condition to his superior, the purposes of his mission were more likely to be accomplished by first securing a strong position, from which he could effect a retreat or hold until re-enforced in case the brigade making the reconnaissance to the front should become engaged with a superior force. Answer to question 5. The precautions taken by the general commanding the division I regard as eminently proper, and, all things considered, I believe the reconnaissance was made as early as it could have been done compatible with the safety of the command. In order to answer the sixth question, I must respectfully refer the general to my official report* of the reconnaissance made on the 7th instant. If I had arrived near the enemy's batteries at an earlier hour, I should probably have expended more time in reconnoitering their position and endeavored to have obtained more accurate information in regard to their exact strength. I believe, however, that the main object of the reconnaissance was accomplished; how well, must be determined by my superiors. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. G. HARKER, Col., Comdg. Third Brig., First Div., 21st Army Corps. CAMP AT LEE AND GORDON'S MILLS, GA., Capt. M. P. BESTOW, Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division: SIR: I have just received yours of this date, making inquiries in regard to my opinion relative to certain positions occupied and moves made by this division during our march from Shellmound to Chattanooga, Tenn. The answers are here appended in the same order as asked in your note. First. Is or not the position at the junction of the Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad with the Chattanooga and Trenton Railroad (being the position in which the division was first halted in Lookout Valley, Sunday, the 6th instant) entirely open, capable of being attacked on all sides, in front, on both flanks, and in rear simultaneously, and hence a most injudicious and dangerous position in which an inferior force in numbers should receive an attack from a superior force? Yes. I considered the position so unsafe for our force that I was going to make suggestion to the general myself, and went up to headquarters. When there I learned the subject was under discussion In my opinion, it was a position that could not have been held by us if attacked by a superior force. Second. Did or not all the information gained during the afternoon of Sunday and during the earlier part of Sunday evening (the information being derived from citizens, from a prisoner captured by our pickets, inferentially from the activity of the enemy's signal operations during this time, and especially from our own pickets) go to show conclusively that we were in the immediate proximity of a large hostile force, and indicated clearly the extreme probability of an attack in force by the enemy early next morning? *See Part I, p. 681. Yes, I was almost confident then that we would have been attacked next morning, and have had no reason to change my opinion since. Third. In view of the facts referred to in question second, was or not, in your opinion, the change of position 14 miles to the rear during the night of Sunday, whereby a very strong and defensible position was gained, eminently proper and judicious? Yes, I think that it was absolutely necessary to change our position, because it gave us a much stronger position, one that could not be easily turned; also the choice of roads in case it was actually necessary to fall back. Fourth. In your opinion was the purpose for which the division was sent into Lookout Valley, namely, to reconnoiter and threaten the enemy, at all interfered with by the change of position; but, on the other hand, was not the purpose advanced by the change, inasmuch as the command gained a strong position from which it could not be forced by a sudden and violent assault, and being thus able to maintain itself could fully effect the object of its being sent into Lookout Valley? Not in the least-rather facilitated if anything; because I have learned since the occupation of Chattanooga that the enemy were alarmed and thought we were receiving re-enforcements. Fifth. Considering the extreme proximity of a vastly preponderating force of the enemy, and the strong probability of an attack at any time, and considering also the extreme probability of Colonel Harker becoming severely engaged with a superior force in his reconnaissance, and the propriety of having the power of drawing him off successfully, were or not the precautions taken for getting the batteries and Buell's brigade strongly posted before Harker's brigade was launched on the reconnaissance absolutely demanded, and were they or not made with all possible expedition-in short, was or not the reconnaissance made at the earliest moment compatible with the safety of the command and the assurance of the success of the reconnaissance? I fully coincided with the move and I am not aware of any time lost, but on the contrary thought it expeditiously made. Sixth. In your judgment was or not everything accomplished by the reconnaissance that could have been achieved if it had moved at an earlier hour of the morning of the 7th ? Yes; there can be no doubt but what it accomplished just as much as it would have done at an earlier hour. I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient, &c., CULLEN BRADLEY, Capt. 6th Ohio Lt. Batty., Chf. of Arty., 1st Div., 21st A. C. GORDON'S MILLS, Capt. M. P. BESTOW, Assistant Adjutant-General: SIR: I would respectfully report that while in Chattanooga this p. m. I was with General Wagner when a squad of 6 or 7 deserters from the rebel army was brought in, and one of them, a bright, intelligent Irishman, was questioned in my presence. He said that he left Atlanta last Friday, came to Kingston on the cars; then to avoid the army passed up east of the railroad and came in by way of Cleveland. When he left Atlanta it was generally understood that Stonewall Jackson's former corps, now commanded by General Ewell, was on the way to re-enforce Bragg's army. All of the available cars and locomotives had gone to Augusta to bring up the troops, and an order had been published in Atlanta for all the whisky shops to be closed until after the troops should pass through. No forces were at Kingston as he passed through. It was a general understanding that the line of Bragg's army would be formed from Dalton to Rome, and battle be offered there. The strength of the expected corps was estimated at from 30,000 to 32,000, and that with this addition the whole of Bragg's army was estimated at over 80,000. While he was at Cleveland yesterday (15th), about 2 o'clock p. m., 50 or 60 rebel cavalry were driven back by a force of Federals advancing from the northward, said to be Byrd's brigade of mounted infantry. General Wagner afterward informed me that the leading brigade of General Burnside's army, crossing the river at Loudon, was commanded by Colonel or General Byrd. Hoping that this information may be of service, I am, sir, your obedient servant, T. R. PALMER, Lieut. Col., and Insp., First Division, 21st Army Corps. [Indorsement.] HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Gordon's Mills, September 16, 1863. Respectfully forwarded for the information of the commanding general. Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, my inspector-general, went to Chattanooga this morning and returned this evening. TH. J. WOOD, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj. Gen. J. M. PALMER, Comdg. Second Division, Twenty-first Army Corps: SIR: You will report at once (to-night) the exact position of your command, and to embrace the location of your picket lines. By order of Major-General Crittenden : P. P. OLDERSHAW, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General. HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Captain OLDERSHAW, Owens' Ford, Ga., September 16, 1863. Assistant Adjutant-General, Twenty-first Army Corps: GENERAL: I have the honor to report that this division is camped on the west side of the Chickamauga River and parallel with it, the right resting at Gower's Ford. The brigade of General Hazen is on the right of the division and faces southeast. The brigade of Colonel Grose is to the left of General Hazen's and faces south that of General Cruft is three-quarters of a mile to the left of Colonel Grose's and faces southeast. The picket line connects with that of the cavalry command, camped to my right, and runs in a northeasterly course at a distance of about a half a mile in front of the camp to a point three-quarters of a mile to the left (north) of the camp, and there makes an angle to the rear, and after crossing the road extends about half a mile to the rear of the camp. Very respectfully, JOHN M. PALMER, Major-General, Commanding. P. S.-The crossings of the creek are all secured to the left. [Indorsement.] HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Respectfully forwarded as per order. Reports from the two other divisions will be forwarded so soon as received. I have notified General Palmer that the cavalry (Seventh Pennsylvania) was ordered away to-day at 12 m. I did not suppose that it constituted part of the picket line, and it was not intended so to do. T. L. CRITTENDEN, Major-General, Commanding. HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Major-General PALMER, September 16, 1863-9.30 p. m. Commanding Second Division: SIR: The general commanding directs me to inform you that the cavalry (Seventh Pennsylvania) stationed near General Hazen was moved away to-day at 12 m. The general deems it important that both you and General Hazen should be informed of this, and directs that you inform the latter in the event of it being necessary that the picket line be changed or extended. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Chickamauga Creek, near Gower's, Sept. 16, 1863—9.45 p. m. Maj. Gen. J. M. PALMER, Commanding Second Division, Twenty-first Army Corps: GENERAL: The general commanding directs you to see that your men have three days' rations in haversacks, and 20 rounds of ammunition in the pockets of each man in addition to having his cartridge-box full. There are some indications that the enemy is massing for an attack on our left. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, P. P. OLDERSHAW, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-Generai HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Maj. Gen. G. GRANGER: Russell brought the dispatches and telegrams about Carthage, Winchester, and so on. Granger and Lowe must be at Carthage. A larger garrison might have been spared from Gallatin and Clarksville. Give orders accordingly. Spare brigade must come to the mouth of Battle Creek to guard the pontoon-bridge to be placed there, order of to-day. They will also see to the road via Kelley's Ferry, where we shall be able to bring provisions. You must give orders to General Morgan to complete the bridge-head defense at Bridgeport, and post his troops to guard them. You hold our left with Minty on your front to the southeast, between you and Ringgold. Burnside will move down soon, I hope; he will allow you to come forward. The rebels seem disposed to make a stand in the valley, probably as near as La Fayette and Ringgold, probably farther off. Have ordered telegraph to you, and then this way; meanwhile use signal to Gordon's Mills, only 2 miles from here. I would have been glad to have seen you here. Very respectfully, W. S. ROSECRANS, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Maj. Gen. GORDON GRANGER: The general commanding directs you to send out a brigade to reconnoiter the road toward Ringgold, and direct it to bivouac for the night well out in that direction. Colonel Minty is at Peeler's Mill, and has been attacked by the enemy, who appears to be attempting to get in his rear. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff. HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, RESERVE CORPS, Col. W. B. ANDERSON, Stevenson, Ala., September 16, 1863. Comdg. Sixtieth Illinois, at Caperton's Ferry: The following dispatch was received from department headquarters: HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Major-General GRANGER, Commanding Reserve Corps: Your dispatch of yesterday is received. Colonel Minty had already been sent to Peeler's Mill. A dispatch from General Halleck this morning confirms our reports that Longstreet has joined Bragg, or is on the way to do so, with three divisions. The general commanding directs you to order Morgan to take up the Caperton's Ferry pontoon-bridge and move it to Battle Creek. The boats can be rowed up the river. Have the bridge put down at Battle Creek as soon as possible. Lieutenant Burroughs has been ordered to give the necessary directions to the pontoon train. J. A. GARFIELD, Very respectfully, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff. |