to Stevens' Gap. The Dougherty's Gap road leaves the Stevens' Gap road some 6 or 8 miles from where you now are. You will be careful to keep the Stevens' Gap road. I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS, Foot of Cooper's Gap, September 16, 1863-10 a. m. Major-General SHERIDAN, Commanding Third Division, Twentieth Army Corps: GENERAL: General McCook directs that you will bivouac your command at the foot of the mountain after having crossed into the valley, and there await further orders from him. You will find plenty of water in that vicinity, and forage can be procured by you about 2 miles up the valley. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, FRANK J. JONES, Captain and Aide-de-Camp. HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES, Camp at Dougherty's Gap, September 16, 1863. Lieut. Col. GATES P. THRUSTON: COLONEL: I have the honor to announce the arrival of my command at this point. Your order to move did not reach me until about 5 p. m. yesterday. The trains were immediately started as directed, but the hour was so late that I had either to make a night march over a route with which I was not familiar and without reliable guides, or wait until morning. Colonel Dodge's brigade, moreover, was out of rations, and had to be supplied, and, in addition, reports from our cavalry gave me some uneasiness in regard to the corps train, the rear of which I thought was threatened to some extent and desired to protect. For all these reasons I found it impossible to move until this morning. I marched at daylight, and reached the gap at 11 a. m. Had I attempted a night march I should not probably have arrived here sooner, if as soon. The road (Dougherty's Gap road) from falls of Little River is a very good one. Forage is very scarce here, and it is very difficult to procure water for the animals. To water the latter it is necessary to go down into the cove probably 2 miles or more from my camp. General Crook advises to encamp in the cove. If my command will probably remain here any time, I respectfully submit to Major-General McCook the propriety of removing my camp to the valley. in The cavalry detachment which was to have reported has not been heard from. I need it badly for courier purposes, foraging, &c.; fact, it will be almost impossible to get along here without it. Trusting that my explanation of the cause that rendered it impossible to march until this morning may be satisfactory to the general commanding corps, I have the honor to be, colonel, yours, very respectfully, W. H. LYTLE, HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Chickamauga Creek, near Gower's, September 16, 1863. Brigadier-General GARFIELD, Chief of Staff: SIR: I inclose you copy of communication from Colonel Minty; also copy of my order* to Major Seibert to report to Colonel Minty with the Seventh Pennsylvania, as I think I can do without it in this front and it may save other troops. I think Colonel Minty's a very good letter. Respectfully, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Major-General, Commanding. [Inclosure.] HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, : Twenty-first Army Corps: SIR Last night my patrol ran foul of the enemy's pickets at a little less than 3 miles from here on the Ringgold road. Shortly after daybreak this morning the pickets reported the enemy advancing in force, and they were attacked immediately after. I reenforced them, and they in turn drove the rebels back. I think there was nothing but a strong scout. A force of about 200 is now threatening me from the direction of Leet's. I have sent a squadron to disperse them. The force at Ringgold is, I believe, Scott's brigade. Pegram is at Leet's, with an outpost at Pea Vine Church. There is a good road running down the valley between Pea Vine Ridge and the Chickamauga, which exposes my rear to attack. Can you post a brigade of infantry at Reed's Bridge. As I am now situated I may be forced to retreat at any moment. I wish this could be avoided. If I send a patrol toward Leet's, it is liable to be cut off by an advance from Ringgold. If I move on Ringgold, I am liable to be attacked in rear from Leet's. However, if I had all of my brigade here, I could guard all the roads and punish the rebels if they made any demonstrations against me. Can you not send me the Seventh Pennsylvania and have the Third Indiana ordered up from Chattanooga? I am not strong enough for the position I am placed in. I think, without doubt, that Longstreet is in this part of the country. I doubt his being at Dalton. I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, R. H. G. MINTY, HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION, Near Reed's Bridge, September 16, 1863—12 m. (Received 2.15 p. m.) ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Twenty-first Army Corps: SIR: Immediately after writing you this a. m. the enemy moved against me on three roads, viz, the La Fayette, a narrow road on * Omitted. the east side of the ridge, and the road I am now on, which is on the west side of the ridge and leads from La Fayette to Harrison. Lieutenant Hedges, Fourth United States, reports the tracks of an infantry column, apparently a regiment, moving south on the La Fayette road. The intention of the enemy appears to be to gain possession of this road. This would have effectually cut off all communication with you. I therefore thought it best to fall back to this point, west of the ridge but east of the river. I still picket the La Fayette road. I have had 1 man killed. I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, R. H. G. MINTY, The rebels have been driven on all the roads from 4 to 7 miles. SEPTEMBER 16, 1863. Capt. P. P. OLDERSHAW, Assistant Adjutant-General: CAPTAIN: The note [foregoing] from Colonel Minty was brought here addressed to assistant adjutant-general, Twenty-first Army Corps, but the bearer said Colonel Minty desired I should open it if General Crittenden had moved his headquarters hence. Respectfully, &c., TH. J. WOOD, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding. HDQRS. FIRST DIV., TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Capt. P. P. OLDERSHAW, Assistant Adjutant-General: CAPTAIN: I have just returned from department headquarters, to receive your dispatch in regard to the position of my command, &c. My command is posted in a strong position on the western side of the Chickamauga, with the center about the mills. The objection to the position is that it is too extensive for my force to occupy it strongly; yet it is necessary to occupy the entire position in order to prevent the enemy, in case of attack, from getting to the_rear. With a proper force, the position is naturally very strong. In case of a vigorous attack it must necessarily be re-enforced promptly, and it might be well to do it in advance (if there is reasonable apprehension of attack), to avoid the confusion of putting troops into position during an engagement. The extreme left of our line being at this point, on the high road to Chattanooga, would probably be the first attacked. I have the bank of the river barricaded with rails, making an excellent shelter for riflemen, and the topography protects the barricades from artillery. The pickets are thrown well to the front, on the east side of the creek, and a patrol will be sent to the front of the picket-lines, to obtain a commanding position to watch any early movement of the enemy to-morrow morning. Extra ammunition is being issued to the men to-night, and all will breakfast and be under arms before daylight. Respectfully, &c., TH. J. WOOD, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, GENERAL: One of my scouts who went out yesterday afternoon and has just returned reports that from the best information he has been able to gain the bulk of the enemy's force is about La Fayette and in the vicinity. He says it is commonly understood that the enemy is not going to leave this region of country without a fight, and that great confidence is reposed in the strength of Pigeon Mountain for either offensive or defensive operations. He reports that it is said Buckner's force is at Shields' Gap, and that it is commonly said he is to attack and take Gordon's Mills. He says that Buckner's force is reported at 10,000 and that Bragg's whole force is reported at 50,000. He says Bragg, Polk, and Hill are reported to be in the neighborhood of La Fayette. I send this information direct to department headquarters because they are nearer to me than corps headquarters are. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, TH. J. WOOD, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding. HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, Col. C. G. HARKER, Gordon's Mills, September 16, 1863. Commanding Third Brigade : COLONEL: I am directed by the commanding general of the division to address to you the following inquiries, and to request an answer to them during this forenoon: First. Is or not the position at the junction of the Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad with the Chattanooga and Trenton Railroad (being the position in which the division was first halted in Lookout Valley, Sunday, the 6th instant) entirely open, capable of being attacked on all sides, in front, on both flanks, and in rear simultaneously, and hence a most injudicious and dangerous position in which an inferior force in numbers should receive an attack from a superior force? Second. Did or not all the information gained during the afternoon of Sunday and during the earlier part of Sunday evening (the information being derived from citizens, from a prisoner captured by our pickets, inferentially from the activity of the enemy's signal operations during this time, and especially from our own pickets) go to show conclusively that we were in the immediate proximity of a large hostile force, and indicated clearly the extreme probability of an attack in force by the enemy early the next morning? Third. In view of the facts referred to in question second, was or was not, in your opinion, the change of position 14 miles to the rear during the night of Sunday, whereby a very strong and defensible position was gained, eminently proper and judicious? Fourth. In your opinion was the purpose for which the division was sent into Lookout Valley, namely, to reconnoiter and threaten the enemy, at all interfered with by the change of position; but, on the other hand, was not the purpose advanced by the change, inasmuch as the command gained a strong position from which it could not be forced by a sudden and violent assault, and being thus able to maintain itself could fully effect the object of its being sent into Lookout Valley? Fifth. Considering the extreme proximity of a vastly preponderating force of the enemy, and the strong probability of an attack at any time, and considering also the extreme probability of Colonel Harker becoming severely engaged with a superior force in his reconnaissance, and the propriety of having the power of drawing him off successfully, were or not the precautions taken for getting the batteries and Buell's brigade strongly posted before Harker's brigade was launched on the reconnaissance absolutely demanded, and were they or not made with all possible expedition-in short, was or not the reconnaissance made at the earliest moment compatible with the safety of the command and the assurance of the success of the reconnaissance? Sixth. In your judgment was or not everything accomplished by the reconnaissance that could have been achieved if it had moved at an earlier hour of the morning of the 7th? I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, M. P. BESTOW, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General. HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST DIV., 21ST ARMY CORPS, Capt. M. P. BESTOW, Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Div., Twenty-first Army Corps: SIR: In answer to certain questions propounded by the general commanding the First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, in regard to the position, movements, &c., of this division of the 6th and 7th instant, I have the honor very respectfully to submit the following answers: Answer to question 1. I regard the position refer junction of the railroad-as entirely untenable against a superior force, and capable of being turned on both flanks, and from the nature of the country the rear was in danger. Answer to question 2. From the information of Sunday evening, the 6th instant, and from the isolated and untenable position of our troops (which must have been known by the enemy, as he could observe our number and position from his signal station), I believed at the time that an attack on Monday morning was quite probable. Answer to question 3. In regard to the change of position, I re |