sociation and Imagination contrasted,
498.
Attention, as an intellectual operation,
i. 21; on, in general, 120-143; are
sensible phænomena which we have
not attended to, unperceived or only
unrecollected? 120, seq.; dependence
of Memory upon attention, 122, seq.,
352; importance of attention in ge-
neral, 123, seq.; attention in relation
to Custom and Habit, 124, seq.; diffi-
culty in regard to the operation of the
Will in respect of our habitual actions,
125-139; Attention as distinguished
by Reid from Consciousness, 134;
difference between men of speculation
and men of practice in regard to, 138,
seq.; can we at the same moment at-
tend to more than a single object, 140-
143; voluntary and involuntary, the
distinction vague, 143; illustrated by
the example of the American calcu-
lating boy, ii. 376.
Atterbury, (Bishop,) quoted, iii. 11.
Augustin, as to the Homo sum," &c.
of Terence, iii. 170.
Axioms, not the first principles from
which, even in Mathematics, its more
recondite truths are deduced, ii. 26;
not mere equations, 28, 29; what
Euclid calls axioms are propositions
of various kinds, 32, 369, 370; the
name improperly applied by Bacon
and Sir Isaac Newton to general pro-
positions gained by induction, 34,
236; Axioms and Principles contrast-
ed, 38-40, 46, 47.
BABBAGE, (Mr.) ii. 396.
Bacon, first person who recognised that
the proper object of physics and philo-
sophy in general was not Causes, but
constant conjunctions, ii. 231; quoted
thereto, i. 5 or 6, ii. 236, 238; quoted
as to the influence of Language
upon thought, 9; as to the slow pro-
gress of past, and the hope of more
rapid progress in future philosophy,
9, 10; as to the definition of Art, 36,
iii. 251; his merits as to the proper
object of philosophical speculation, 50,
seq., 52, seq.; on renunciation of
judice, 68; on prevalent errors in
philosophy, 80; quoted, 82; influ-
ence of, 83; quoted on jugglers, 133;
as to practical skill and speculative
wisdom, 219; on theory in politics,
223; as to Time, the great political
innovator, 229; how the understand-
ings of men are equalized by a regu
lated method, 245, 288; quoted in
favour of political progress, 247; as
to sleep and dreaming, 291; as to
Association, 316, 320; in regard to
the dependence of Memory upon At-
tention, 352; in regard to the effect
of system upon Memory, 370; as to
the selection of objects to be remem-
bered, 417; as to the saying, "speak-
ing makes a ready man," 429; no-
ticed as inadequate in his theory of
Causation, 478; quoted as to the uni-
formity of certain cycles in the sea-
sons, ii. 167; as to the utility of
Logic, 203, 204; as to the dependence
of Syllogism upon words, 206; cor-
rects the error of the ancients in
regard to the object of Physics, which
is not necessary but constant conjunc-
tion, 231; his notion in regard to the
relation of Cause and Effect; not, how-
ever, peculiarly correct, 234, 235; his
misapplication of the term axiom, 236;
held by Hume to have been ignorant
of Mathematics,— -as only pointing out
at a distance the road to true philoso-
phy, and as inferior to Galileo and to
Kepler, ib.; how far this is true, ib.; his
saying that Knowledge is Power,"
241; quoted, as to the absence of ex-
periment in the philosophy of the
ancients, 244; as to Analysis and
Synthesis, 249; used many old words
in new significations, and quoted to
that effect, 254, seq.; quoted as to the
employment of the term form, 255,
256; does not coincide with Plato in
regard to the proper object of science,
256; quoted as to his Induction and
its method in contrast to that of Aris-
totle, 256, 258, 261, 262; as to Analy
sis, 274; as to the total symmetry of
science, 298; as to experimentu luci-
fera, &c., 302; as to the use of Hypo-
thesis, 305, 306; as to the omission
of a merely rumoured experience, 327;
as to his apparent rejection of an in-
quiry into Final Causes, 335-339;
defence of, 337, seq.; quoted as to the
slow progress of evolution of the
sciences, 364; as to Final Causes and
their abuse, 399; as to sympathetic
imitation, iii. 147; as to the force of
custom in education, 165; as to the
effect of mathematical study, 203;
alleged as to the latitude in the use
of the word Poet, 222.
Bailly, quoted on the sagacity and in-
stincts of the lower animals, i. 200,
iii. 292, seq.; in the case of Leibnitz,
as to the effect of writing in strength-
ening the memory, 369; as to Attrac
tion in the mouths of the ancients,
and in general in regard to the import
of words and their change of meaning,
ii. 254; as to the simplicity of nature,
300; as to the probability of an hypo-
thesis from its simplicity, 312; as to
the connexion of the Irish Ogham
with the Persepolitan characters, iii.
69; as to Animal Magnetism, 150.
Balfour, (Dr.) quoted as to the acquaint-
ance with Aristotle's logic in the
East, ii. 226.
Barclay, (Apologist for the Quakers,)
quoted, iii. 154, 169.
Barrow, quoted for a statement of Cause
and Effect, i. 476; controverted as to
the nature of geometrical principles,
Definitions, Axioms, Postulates, &c.,
ii. 121, 122; quoted as to equality
and identity in Mathematics, 127,
128, seq.; as to mathematical super-
position, 149, 150; as to Common
Sense, 374.
Batteux, (Abbé,) adduced as to the power
of arrangement in language, iii. 45, 46.
Baxter, (Andrew,) his opinion in regard
to dreams, i. 301; quoted as to Final
Causes, ii. 342; his strictures upon
Maclaurin, 387; his coincidence with
Malebranche, 388.
Bayer, quoted as to the derivation of
Indian science and language from the
Greeks of Bactriana, iii. 80, 81, 99-
101.
Bayle, quoted to show the legitimacy
of the "appeal to Common Sense"
against the logical sophistry by which
the general Leliefs of mankind are
assailed, ii. 57, 58; on the authority
of Aristotle during the middle ages,
203, 224; as to the scholastic sub-
tlety and love of disputation shown
by the Irish, 211, see also 58; as to
the knowledge of the books of Aristotle
in the East, 226; as to the faculties
of brutes, iii. 250.
Beattie, shows that Hume's enumeration
of the principles of Association was
anticipated by Aristotle, i. 261;
quoted as to high and low in musical
notation, 498; as to the meaning of
the term Reason, ii. 50, 64; not a
plagiarist, 63; his doctrine of Com-
mon Sense, 64, 65; his statement of
the argument from Common Sense
contrasted with that of Reid, 66, 67;
his explanation of a passage in Horace
rejected, iii. 50; noticed as an ex-
ample of the incompatibility of poe-
tical and metaphysical thinking, 232.
Beddoes, (Dr.) noticed for his attempted
reduction of Mathematical evidence
to Experiment and Observation, ii.
142, seq.
Bergmann, quoted as to the mode of
reforming the language of Chemistry,
i. 347.
Berkeley, his theory of the non-exist-
ence of Matter, i. 19; quoted as to
Habit, 127; a Nominalist, 185, seq.,
et pluries, ii. 91, seq.; his theory of
Cause and Effect quoted, 477; his
interview with Clarke, ii. 53; noticed
as maintaining that his Idealism was
conformable to the "Common Sense"
of mankind, 55, 56; quoted as to the
true object of Physics. 239; as to the
errors arising from the language of
Psychology being borrowed from the
language of Physics, 315.
Berlin Essayist, quoted as to equality or
Identity in Mathematics, ii. 128, seq.
Bernouilli, (Daniel,) noticed in illustra-
tion of the illogical application of
mathematical principles, iii. 204.
Biffin, (Miss,) intelligent, though born
without extremities, iii. 285.
Blacklock, (Dr.) referred to as to the
pleasure proposed by Poetry, i. 446.
Blair, quoted as to the power of arrange-
ment in language, iii. 45.
Blane, (Sir Gilbert,) referred to in re-
gard to Sympathetic Imitation, iii.
149.
Bodily frame, (our,) accommodated to
our intellectual faculties, i. 17, iii.
Body, notions of, merely relative, i. 17.
Boileau, quoted, iii. 224.
Bopp, (Francis,) adduced as to the San-
scrit, iii. 80.
Bos, (Abbé de,) adduced, iii. 9.
Boscovich, mistakes the proper object
of physical philosophy, i. 50; his dy-
namical theory of matter referred to,
107, 108, 110, 343, ii. 233; thinks it
curious that Extension should have
three dimensions, and Duration only
one, 306; quoted as to Observation
and Experiment, i. 6, ii. 243; in
favour of Hypothesis, 305, 395.
Boswell, quoted as to the connexion of
imagination and memory, iii. 230.
Boufflers, (M. de,) quoted as to sympa-
thetic imitation in women, iii. 124.
Bourne, (Vincent,) quoted, in illustra-
tion of poetical fancy, i. 279.
Boyle, (the Hon. Mr.) quoted, i. 312; in
favour of Final Causes, ii. 340, seq.,
345, 346; as to the mechanical skill
displayed in the universe, and cen-
sured, ii. 387, 388.
Braidwood, (teacher of the deaf and
dumb,) adduced, iii. 16.
Brain, our extremely limited knowledge
of its functions as acknowledged by
Cuvier, iii. 387, 388.
Breadthless lines, the author maintains
cannot be perceived or conceived, i.
163, 164; ii. 84.
Brosses, (the President de,) referred to
as to the formation of language, iii.
34; as to the common meaning of
certain sounds in all languages,
72, 73.
Broussonet, his case quoted, as illustrat-
ing partial failures of memory, i. 359.
Brown, (Dr. Thomas,) noticed with
commendation, i. 491; as an instance
of the incompatibility of poetical and
metaphysical thinking, iii. 231; stric-
tures on his philosophy, 375-377.
Brown, (Rev. David,) quoted as to the
Sanscrit, iii. 79.
Browne, (Bishop,) quoted, as to the
theory of Causation, ii. 389.
Brucker, his account of Ideas in the
Platonic and Aristotelic schools, i.
170; quoted touching the Nominalist
controversy, 189; touching Plato's
doctrine of Ideas, 481; as to the
Universals, of Stilpo and the Megaric
sect, ib.; as to Roscelinus, the Nomi-
nalists, &c., 481, 482; as to the ap-
plication of the term Association only
to conjunctions, fortuitous and habi-
tual, 499; as to the ultra-nominalism
of Hobbes, ii. 152.
Brutes, held by the Cartesians to be
mere machines, i. 37, iii. 279, seq.; by
modern materialists to be only less per-
fectly organized than man, ib.; Brutes
and men, see Men and brutes.
Buchanan, (Dr. Francis,) quoted as to
the Brahmins, &c., iii. 105; as to the
low antiquity of Brahminic manu-
scripts, 113.
Buchanan, (George,) his Franciscanus
quoted, iii. 85.
Buckinger, intelligent, yet born without
extremities, iii. 284.
Buffier, praised for the precision of his
employment of the term Idea, i. 167;
as to the conditions of a legitimate
employment of the argument from
Common Sense, ii. 61; not fairly ap-
preciated in France, 63; his English
translator praised and dispraised, 65,
66; on his saying "that there is one
species of madman who makes an ex
cellent logician," 209, 210; quoted as
to the ground of our belief, 1° of
other existences besides self, 2o of
the reality of design, wisdom, truth,
&c. 404.
Buffon, quoted as to the necessity of
Ideas in Perception, i. 106; as to
analogy and resemblance, ii. 392; as
to the Imitation which he calls me-
chanical, iii. 117, 118; as to corpo-
real sympathy in eloquence, 158, 159;
agrees with Helvetius as to intelli
gence being the result of organiza-
tion, 282; quoted as to the two kinds
of perfectibility in man and brutes, 297.
Burke, quoted as to the use and abuse
of abstract principles in politics, i.
216; as to the study of Law, 426; its
good and evil influences, ii, 207; as
to the mode in which the pleasurable,
the end proposed by Poetry, is effected,
i. 444, seq.; his opinion on this con-
troverted by the author, 447, seq.;
quoted as to Definition, ii. 119; as to
Sympathetic Imitation, iii. 117; as to
the connexion of bodily movement
and mental affection, 140; on one dis
advantage of metaphysical studies,
Bussy, (Rabutin, Comte de,) quoted as to
the remedy of time, ii. 110; iii. 190.
Butler, (Bishop,) quoted as to the plan of
study, i. 409; as to his theory of Cause
and Effect, 476; as to the effect of
Imagination in the formation of moral
habits, 503, 504.
CABANIS, quoted as against Final
Causes, ii. 344; as to Sympathetic
Imitation, iii. 144; adduced as to the
difference between the sexes, 239.
Cæsar, quoted as to the effect of writing
in weakening the memory, i. 25, 363.
Cambridge: Mathematical studies
scarcely known in that university till
towards the middle of the 17th cen-
tury, ii. 237.
Camerarius, (the younger,) quoted for the
case of Schweiker, intelligent though
born without extremities, ii 285
Camisards, iii. 153, 169.
Campanella, alleged in relation to the
Law of Sympathetic Imitation, iii.
140, 373.
Campbell, (Principal,) a Nominalist, i.
186, ii. 96, et pluries; on errors in
reasoning from language as an in-
strument of thought, 193, seq.; shews
that Hume's enumeration of the prin-
ciples of Association is incomplete
and vague, 261; quoted as to Wit,
270; as to the meaning of the word
Reason, ii. 11; as to the nature of
Mathematical Axioms, 26, seq.; his
doctrine criticised, 28, seq.; quoted
as to the value of analogical evidence,
297; as to the relative advantages of
ancient and modern tongues, iii. 43,
51; as to the visual perception of
distance by the brutes, 253.
Cartes, (Des,) see Descartes.
Cause, distinction of Metaphysical or
Efficient, and of Physical causes, i. 97,
ii. 230, seq.; common prejudice that
physical events are linked, and per-
ceived to be linked, together as causes
and effects, i. 97; Hume's disproof
of this prejudice, 97, 98; quotations
in regard to the opinions in antiquity
touching Causation, i. 5 or 6, ii. 232.
Cause and Effect, as a principle of As-
sociation, i. 263; theory of, as anti-
cipating Hume, stated by Barrow,
Butler, Berkeley, Locke, Malebranche,
Hobbes, to say nothing of Bacon and
Descartes, 476-479; by Bishop
Browne, Glanvill, Le Clerc, ii. 389,
390; subsequent statements by Clarke,
Price, Reid, Waring, Ferguson, Robi-
son, Gregory, (Dr. James,) ii. 418-
424; that a connexion among physical
events must be for ever beyond our
observation, was clearly shown by
Hume, 479; that our belief of the ex-
istence of Efficient Causes is a natural
or ultimate principle, ii. 45; causes
and effects in the operations of nature
mean only signs and the things sig-
nified, 247; Prévost's opinion in re-
gard to the word “force ou energie”
(power) in Causation, 415.
Celtic language, attempts at its deriva-
tion, iii. 67, seq.
Cervantes, quoted in regard to transla-
tions, i. 280.
"Chain of Causes and Effects," this lan-
guage reprehended, i. 99, 479, ii. 232,
235, 386-389.
Character, (intellectual,) varieties of,
from different habits of abstraction
and generalization, i. 212-219; iii.
185-249.
Charron, quoted as to the reasoning
power of brutes, ii. 175, iii. 272, 295.
Chemistry, new nomenclature of, refer-
red to, as illustrating the utility of a
reform in the language of other
branches of science, i. 83, 197, 347.
Chenevix, (Richard,) quoted in illustra-
tion of the proper order of procedure
in studying mental philosophy, i. 345.
Cheselden, quoted as to the case of
cataract treated by him, iii. 302, 303,
305, 309.
Chesterfield, his sayings as to Wit, i.
273, 285; adduced, iii. 15.
Cheyne, adduced as an instance of the
absurd reasoning of mathematicians,
iii. 205.
Chillingworth, his character, ii. 209.
Cibber, (Colley,) quoted as to mimicry,
iii. 142.
Cicero, quoted as to the meaning of the
term Cause, i. 6, ii. 232; in regard to
Association, i. 253, 255; as to our easy
recollection of objects of interest or
affection, 354; as to the failure of
memory in old age, 360, 361; as to
topical memory, 412; as to his theory
of memory, 501; as to the universal
consent of mankind, ii. 60; as to the
Platonic year, 167; as to the true
utility of logic, 228; as to the utili-
tarian system of morals, 355; as to
the phrase sensus communis, 374; as
to the necessity of a multitude for
eloquence, iii. 158; as to the human
hand, 282; as to the difference be-
tween man and brutes, 298; as to the
word facetum, 378.
Clarendon, (Earl of,) quoted for his cha-
racter of Chillingworth, ii. 209.
Clarke, (Dr. Samuel,) his theoretical
expressions touching Memory refer-
red to, i. 503; his interview with
Berkeley, ii. 53; alleged as an autho-
rity for the word law as expressive of
a general fact of nature, 159; quotations
from, in regard to Causation, 418, 419.
Classification, process of, founded on
Abstraction, i. 22, 23, 161.
Claudian, quoted as to the application
of the term law to a general physical
fact, ii. 162.
Clavius, quoted as to the Platonic year,
ii. 167.
Clerc, (John Le,) quoted as to the
theory of Causation, ii. 390.
Clericus, see Clerc.
Colebrooke, (H. J.) quoted as to San-
scrit, iii. 87, 93.
Colour and Extension, (see Extension ;)
Reid's speculation in regard to, i.
496; appears to the author incon-
sistent, ib.
Common Sense, principles of, on, in ge-
neral, i. 28; objections to the expres-
sion, ii. 49, 68; the expression "Com-
mon Sense" employed, besides Reid,
by Berkeley, 56; by Hume, 57; by
Bayle, 58; by Buffier, 61; by Bent-
ley, 67; for the use of the same term
and in what senses by Cicero, 374;
by Horace, ib.; by Phædrus, ib.; by
Juvenal, ib.; by Barrow and Shaftes-
bury, ib.; by the Schoolmen, 375;
by Hobbes, ib.; by Sir John Davis,
ib.; Reid's doctrine of, 66, seq.
Conception, as an intellectual operation
is to Mr. Stewart the simple repre-
sentation of past sensations and per-
ceptions, i. 21, 144, 145; the objects
of some senses more easily conceived
than those of others, 21, 146-148;
does it imply belief in the existence
of its object, 22, 301; is intimately
connected with the body, 22; on, in
general, 144-158; discriminated from
the other powers, 144; from Memory,
144, 350; implies no idea of time, ib.;
how it differs from the Simple Appre-
hension of the Schoolmen and of
Reid, 144, seq.; how from Imagina-
tion, 145, 146, 431; these faculties,
however, very nearly allied, 149; this
faculty may be greatly improved by
use, 147; great differences between
man and man in the conception of
colours, 147, 148; a talent for de-
scription dependent on the energy of
conception, 148; is conception at-
tended with any belief in the exist-
ence of its object? 149; Reid says
no, ib.; the affirmative maintained,
but with diffidence, by Stewart, 149-
158; Reid quoted in favour of our
author's opinion, 151; to the same
effect Reid's doctrine of Perception ap-
plied, 153-158; tragic representations
produce a momentary belief in the
reality of the distresses exhibited,
157; analogous illusions, 157, 158;
a general conception (representation)
impossible, ii. 83.
Conceptualists, see Abstraction.
Condillac, quoted as to the origin of
appellative names, i. 160, ii. 381; on
the Razor of the Nominalists, 180; a
Nominalist, 186; quoted as to our
sensations of the Secondary Qualities
which he connects with objects by the
principles of an habitual Association,
497; his assertion restricted-" The
art of reasoning is only a language
well constituted," ii. 101; charged as
confounding two classes of Definitions,
119; quoted as holding that the evi-
dence of all reasoning lies in the
perception of identity, 130, seq., com-
pare, 201; quoted and criticised as to
Analysis and Synthesis, 278-283.
Condorcet, quoted as to the improve-
ment in the acquirement of Mathe-
matics and Physics, i. 211, 488;
as to the political progress of society,
236; his subsequent extravagance
noticed, 488; quoted and criticised
as to his addition of Calculation to
Observation and Experiment, as an
instrument in the study of nature, ii.
242; quoted as to the difference of
the sexes, iii. 238.
Consciousness, on, i. 13; how it affords
us a knowledge of our own existence
and personal identity, ib.; necessary
for every act of mind, 134; distin-
guished from Attention, ib.; from Re-
flection, 122, 123.
Contingent and Necessary Truths, dif-
ference of, ii. 319.
Contrariety or Contrast, as a principle
of Association, i. 263, seq.
Cook, (Captain,) quoted as to the origin
of appellatives, i. 160.
Copleston, (Bishop,) his anonymous
pamphlet quoted, as to the utility of
Logic, ii. 203.
Court de Gebelin, see Gebelin.
Crawford, (Mr. Quintin,) adduced or
quoted as to the Brahimins, iii. 87,
102, 103.
Cretins, iii. 247, 248, 326.
Crowds, contagious sympathy among,
iii. 157, seq.; 169, seq;
Crying and Laughing, their connexion,
iii. 237.
Cudworth, quoted as to the meaning of
the word wisdom, and as recording the
relative opinions of Plato and Aris-
totle, ii. 18; a Conceptualist, if not a
Realist, 90; quoted as to Bacon's re-
jection of Final Causes, 337, 338.
Cullen, (Dr.) his saying quoted,—
"There are more false facts current in
the world than false theories," ii. 327.
Cuvier, (Fred.,) his opposition to the au-
|