ABELARD, a Nominalist, i. 182, seq.;

various authors quoted concerning,
482, 483.

Abstraction, on, in general, i. 22, 23,
159-251; general or appellative, or
generic terms founded upon, 22, 23,
159, seq., see Primum Cognitum;
utility of, 23; errors from, ib.; classi-
fication supposes abstraction, 161;
abstraction the characteristic of a
rational nature, 162; it is therefore
subservient to reasoning, 162, seq.;
but also to a poetical imagination,
163; abstraction possible without
generalization, 164, 165; what are
the objects of our thoughts when we
employ general terms, 165, seq.; his-
tory of the various opinions of philo-
sophers upon this point-Platonists,
Peripatetics, Stoics, &c., 166, seq.;
opposing doctrines of the Realists and
Nominalists, 171, seq.; author coin-
cides with the Nominalists in holding
that the word itself is alone general,
173, seq.; and with them also coincide
Hobbes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume,
Campbell, &c., 185, seq.; how far is
language necessary to thought? 175-
182; subdivision of the Nominalists
into Nominalists strictly, and Concep-
tualists, 189, seq.; to the Conceptual-
ists Locke and Reid are to be referred,
190, seq.; errors into which we are
led by the influence of language upon
thought, 193; illustrated from Prin-
cipal Campbell, 193, seq.; from Hume,
ib.; from Leibnitz, 197; in particular
from inversion, and the free collocation

of the ancient tongues, 196; the pur-
poses to which abstraction and gener-
alization are conducive, 198-205; is
our expectation of the constancy of
nature connected herewith? 198, seq.;
does every kind of reasoning involve
the employment of general terms, ib.;
difference between the speculations of
the philosopher and of the vulgar, 203,
seq.; errors to which we are liable in
speculation and in practice, in conse-
quence of a rash application of general-
ized principles, 206-212; the truth of
our generalized principles depends
upon the accuracy of our previous study
of singulars, 206, seq.; mistakes of the
various schools of philosophy in this
respect, 207, seq.; how much the pro-
gress of reason and of society is af
fected by the proper or improper em-
ployment of general propositions, 209,
seq.; differences of intellectual char-
acter from different habits of abstrac-
tion and generalization, 212-219;
viz., habits of men of business, and
habits of men of speculation, 213, seq.;
and the opposite extremes of habits of
abstraction and habits of detail, 217,
seq.; proper combination of these
habits, 219; in particular, use and
abuse of general principles in politics,

as to the province of Imagination,
431; limits it to objects of sight, ib.;
as to sympathetic imitation and the
game of bowls, iii. 130; as to Instinct,
275; as to the parental instinct of
brutes, 277; his opinions in regard
to instinct vague and inconsistent,
278.

Agesilaus, his saying in regard to educa-
tion, iii. 163.

Akenside, quoted as to the effect of
Opinion in moral actions, i. 341;
noticed as observing that the Second-
ary Qualities of Matter, and specially
Colour, as apprehended by the mind,
do not exist in bodies, 496, (N.B. But
a reference to the Dissertation, p. 583,
omitted, where an error of memory
is
acknowledged as to this observation,
which ought to have been referred to
Addison, not to Akenside,) quoted, iii.
223; biographical notice of, 374.
Albinus, quoted as to Final Causes, ii.
344.

Alembert, see D'Alembert.

Algebra, the symbols of, as illustrating

the nature of General Terms, i. 22,
178-182, 203, seq., ii. 88; as an instru-
ment of thought, 82; the algebraic
calculus vaguely and inaccurately
styled the Analytic method, ii. 283.
Alison, referred to as founding taste on
Association, i. 321.

Alliteration, as connected with Associa
tion, i. 262, 277.

American anonymous authors quoted,
iii. 17, 18.

Analogy, as a principle of Association, i.
263, seq.; evidence of, what and how
it differs from that of Experience, on,
in general, ii. 171-179, 284-298;
argues from similar to similar, as Ex-
perience from same to same, 172; how
connected with our expectation of
natural events, 176, seq.; in language,
178; how it differs from Resemblance,
287, 288; is a resemblance of relations
not merely of objects, ib.; Buffon and
Cuvier quoted in illustration, 392,
393; analogy and unity of design are
often nearly synonymous, 289; the
anatomical knowledge of the ancients
from reasoning, 297; analogy rests
ultimately on the evidence of experi-
ence, 301; word analogy in mathe-
matics, how used, 320, 321; that be-
tween galvanism and electricity, 321,

397.

Analysis and Synthesis, (Geometrical,)

i. 84, seq., ii. 263-271, also 272-283;
mathematicians often use the terms
Analysis and Synthesis vaguely to de-
note as contrasted, the algebraic cal-
culus and ostensive geometry, 283.
Analysis and Synthesis, (Philosophical,)
ii. 249, seq., 263, 272-283.
Ancient philosophers, their method of
reasoning, i. 207, seq.

Antoninus, quoted on the influence of
Association and Phantasy, i. 341.
Aquinas, (St. Thomas,) a Realist, i. 183,
et alibi.

Aristides, quoted as to high and low in
musical notation, i. 498.

Aristotle, opinions of his school in refer-
ence to Universals, i. 169, seq.; his
doctrine of the principles of Associa-
tion, 261; notices the connexion be-
tween genius and melancholy, 459 ;
quoted as to the first principles of
Reasoning, ii. 46; as to first truths,
&c., 59; as to the errors arising from
Language, the instrument of thought,
99; probably suggested that Mathe-
matical evidence is resolvable into
identical propositions, 123, 124; his
doctrine, that "in mathematical quan-
tities equality is identity," 125, 377;
quoted as to the Syllogism, 189, 192;
as at once asserting that demonstra-
tion is only of eternal truths, and that
demonstration is founded on induction
from sense, 194, see also 195; on his
assertion that Definitions are the first
principles of all demonstration, 195,
196; his authority during the schol-
astic ages vouched by Bayle, 203;
quoted as to presence of mind, 221;
his Organon an imperishable monu-
ment to the powers of his mind, 223;
his originality in regard to logic is
not to be doubted; did not borrow it
from the Indian Brahmins, 224-229;
on this point the statement in the
book of Sophisms is decisive, 227,
228; quoted as to Causation and scien-
tific knowledge, 232; his division of
Causes into Efficient, Material, For-
mal, and Final, an error, 233, 234; the
nature of his Observation or Expe-
rience, that it did not include ex-
periment, 243, 244; quoted as to the
nature of his Induction as opposed to
that of Bacon, 257; a text of his
quoted, in which he employs the term
sophistical, 260; his division of Quan-
tity, 378; quoted as to children at
first calling all men and women fathers

and mothers, 382; quoted and repre-
hended for an expression in the sup
posititious treatise imputed to him, Of
the World, 388; quoted as to the
love of Imitation, iii. 118; his char-
acter as a critic by Pope, 235; quoted
as to his calling instinct the imitation
of human life, 276; as to the human
Hand, 281, 288, 289.
Armstrong, quoted as to the remedy for

a too enthusiastic imagination, i. 458.
Arnauld, (Anthony,) quoted to shew
what is meant by Reason, ii. 13.
Arrian, quoted as to the Brahmins, iii.
104.

Art, what, how distinguished from In-
stinct, i. 36, iii. 251; implies intelli-
gence, perception of an end, and the
choice of means, iii. 267.
Arthur, (Professor,) adduced as to the
arrangement of ancient and modern
languages, iii. 52.

Association of Ideas, on, in general, i.
23-25, 252-347; influence of custom
and habit in forming, 23, 25, 258;
some regulative circumstances, 24,
253, seq.; influence of the will in de-
termining, 24, 25; importance of
Association in morals, 25; influence
of contrast as an associating prin-
ciple, 254, 264, seq.; of perceived
objects in Association, 255, 256; As-
sociation of Ideas not an unexception-
able denomination of the fact, 257,
seq.; relation of Association to Habit,
258, 259; Habit may be resolved
into Association, as well as Associa-
tion into Habit, ib.; sometimes im-
properly called Imagination, 259, 499;
Hobbes calls the train of thought
series imaginationum, ib.; by older
English writers expressed by Phan-
tasy or Fancy, 260; principles of As-
sociation, in general, 261-266; these
principles according to Aristotle, 261;
according to Hume, ib.; distinction of
these principles into two classes, viz.
the obvious and the recondite, 263;
distinction of philosophical and poeti-
cal associations, 263, seq.; alliteration
as an associative principle, 262, 277;
difference in different individuals in
regard to the facility of Association,
265; of the power exercised by the
mind over the train of thought, 266,
seq.; this train depends on causes
operating in a manner inexplicable by
us, 266; this power principally found-
ed on our habits of thinking influen-

cing the laws of Association, 268, seq.;
illustrated especially in regard to Wit,
270-274; to Rhyme, 274-278; to Poe-
tical Fancy, 278-282; to Invention
in the Arts and Sciences, 282-289;
Dreaming as connected with Associa-
tion, 289-305; three questions to be ex-
plained, 289, seq.; the mental train in
sleep subject to the general laws of As-
sociation, 295-299; the mental train
during sleep supposes also the suspen-
sion of the will, 299-305; states of Som-
nambulism and Madness as subject to
the same influence, 304; influence of
Association on the intellectual and
active powers, in general, 305-347;
more especially in relation to our spe-
culative conclusions, 305-321; Asso-
ciation of ideas, not necessarily con-
nected, becomes by habit intimate or
even indissoluble, as between Colour
and Extension, 306, 496; Space and
Time, 306; certain notes of music
and high or low, ib.; Sensations and
Perceptions, 307; the term Associa-
tive is improperly applied to all na-
tural and necessary conjunctions, and
should be limited to what is fortuitous
and habitual, 499; errors founded in,
308, seq.; as that events synchron-
ously occurring are naturally con-
nected, 309; hence many popular
superstitions, 310; that what are ac-
cidentally associated are necessarily
related, 311, seq.; hence a large class
of prejudices, 313; importance of phi-
losophy for their cure, 314, seq.; in-
fluence of this principle in giving to
errors the appearance of truths, 316,
seq.; in relation to our judgments in
matters of taste, 321-334, 339; in re-
gard to dress, 323, seq.; to fashions,
325, seq.; Association renders objects
of taste pleasing in two ways, ib.; its
influence on language noted, ib.; on
literature, 327, seq.; on statuary and
painting, 328, seq.; on poetry and
poetical diction, 329-334; on our
moral judgments, 334-341; on our
happiness, 340; Association of ideas
resembled to Attraction in physics by
Hume, 336; applied to explain all
our moral principles, and in general
all our intellectual pleasures and
pains, and by what philosophers, 336,
seq.; in opposition to this view,
342, seq., 346, seq.; how it contri-
butes to the enjoyment of objects of
beauty and sublimity, 339, seq.; As-