in the immediate prospect of a railway here;-it being nearly impossible to convey to him a sense of his danger, without his experiencing it, our means of communication are so very limited. Could he once be made aware of his danger, there would be little cause for fear of his exposing himself, he is generally so cautious in his movements; but as his mind is still sufficiently active to impel him to ascer tain the object of any new work, we must do what we can to protect him, and look to a higher power to aid our weak endeavours, which the past gives every encouragement to do, from his very wonderful preservation from serious injury hitherto."
Lieut. Mitchell writes,-"As to James's present state, I may mention, that he is now (July 1854) about fifty-nine years of age; that he is stout and healthy; gives little or no trouble, further than satisfying his necessary wants; his conduct most affectionate to his sister; and, apparently, he is at all times happy and contented. The only change in him for several years back, is such as might be expected from advancing years; he does not now take such long walks as formerly, and does not go so often from home. This may arise, however, in some measure, from many of his kind friends in the district of country around Nairn being, of late years, removed by death. He is not so easily irritated as in his younger days. The sight of that eye which was operated on in 1809, is now quite gone; but he still sees a little with the other. He is as fond as ever of smoking tobacco, a habit which, I find, he acquired in London, at the time his eye was conched, although it was afterwards confirmed when he came to reside at Nairn in 1811. He is now very fond of it; and so systematic in all his habits, that he has his regular number of smokes at home every day, in addition to what he may get from his numerous acquaintances in the town,-sometimes more than may be good for him, but which my sister cannot at all times prevent." Lieut. Mitchell adds, "There is a short account of my brother in Chambers's Miscellany, No. 11, by a gentleman who saw him in 1832."— Ed.]
OUTLINES, ETC., FROM THE COMMENCEMENT TO PAGE 38 OF VOL. I. ELEMENTS, ETC., FROM PAGE 39 OF VOL. I. THROUGH VOLS. II. AND III.
ABELARD, a Nominalist, i. 182, seq.;
various authors quoted concerning, 482, 483.
Abstraction, on, in general, i. 22, 23, 159-251; general or appellative, or generic terms founded upon, 22, 23, 159, seq., see Primum Cognitum; utility of, 23; errors from, ib.; classi- fication supposes abstraction, 161; abstraction the characteristic of a rational nature, 162; it is therefore subservient to reasoning, 162, seq.; but also to a poetical imagination, 163; abstraction possible without generalization, 164, 165; what are the objects of our thoughts when we employ general terms, 165, seq.; his- tory of the various opinions of philo- sophers upon this point-Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, &c., 166, seq.; opposing doctrines of the Realists and Nominalists, 171, seq.; author coin- cides with the Nominalists in holding that the word itself is alone general, 173, seq.; and with them also coincide Hobbes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Campbell, &c., 185, seq.; how far is language necessary to thought? 175- 182; subdivision of the Nominalists into Nominalists strictly, and Concep- tualists, 189, seq.; to the Conceptual- ists Locke and Reid are to be referred, 190, seq.; errors into which we are led by the influence of language upon thought, 193; illustrated from Prin- cipal Campbell, 193, seq.; from Hume, ib.; from Leibnitz, 197; in particular from inversion, and the free collocation
of the ancient tongues, 196; the pur- poses to which abstraction and gener- alization are conducive, 198-205; is our expectation of the constancy of nature connected herewith? 198, seq.; does every kind of reasoning involve the employment of general terms, ib.; difference between the speculations of the philosopher and of the vulgar, 203, seq.; errors to which we are liable in speculation and in practice, in conse- quence of a rash application of general- ized principles, 206-212; the truth of our generalized principles depends upon the accuracy of our previous study of singulars, 206, seq.; mistakes of the various schools of philosophy in this respect, 207, seq.; how much the pro- gress of reason and of society is af fected by the proper or improper em- ployment of general propositions, 209, seq.; differences of intellectual char- acter from different habits of abstrac- tion and generalization, 212-219; viz., habits of men of business, and habits of men of speculation, 213, seq.; and the opposite extremes of habits of abstraction and habits of detail, 217, seq.; proper combination of these habits, 219; in particular, use and abuse of general principles in politics,
as to the province of Imagination, 431; limits it to objects of sight, ib.; as to sympathetic imitation and the game of bowls, iii. 130; as to Instinct, 275; as to the parental instinct of brutes, 277; his opinions in regard to instinct vague and inconsistent, 278.
Agesilaus, his saying in regard to educa- tion, iii. 163.
Akenside, quoted as to the effect of Opinion in moral actions, i. 341; noticed as observing that the Second- ary Qualities of Matter, and specially Colour, as apprehended by the mind, do not exist in bodies, 496, (N.B. But a reference to the Dissertation, p. 583, omitted, where an error of memory is acknowledged as to this observation, which ought to have been referred to Addison, not to Akenside,) quoted, iii. 223; biographical notice of, 374. Albinus, quoted as to Final Causes, ii. 344.
Alembert, see D'Alembert.
Algebra, the symbols of, as illustrating
the nature of General Terms, i. 22, 178-182, 203, seq., ii. 88; as an instru- ment of thought, 82; the algebraic calculus vaguely and inaccurately styled the Analytic method, ii. 283. Alison, referred to as founding taste on Association, i. 321.
Alliteration, as connected with Associa tion, i. 262, 277.
American anonymous authors quoted, iii. 17, 18.
Analogy, as a principle of Association, i. 263, seq.; evidence of, what and how it differs from that of Experience, on, in general, ii. 171-179, 284-298; argues from similar to similar, as Ex- perience from same to same, 172; how connected with our expectation of natural events, 176, seq.; in language, 178; how it differs from Resemblance, 287, 288; is a resemblance of relations not merely of objects, ib.; Buffon and Cuvier quoted in illustration, 392, 393; analogy and unity of design are often nearly synonymous, 289; the anatomical knowledge of the ancients from reasoning, 297; analogy rests ultimately on the evidence of experi- ence, 301; word analogy in mathe- matics, how used, 320, 321; that be- tween galvanism and electricity, 321,
Analysis and Synthesis, (Geometrical,)
i. 84, seq., ii. 263-271, also 272-283; mathematicians often use the terms Analysis and Synthesis vaguely to de- note as contrasted, the algebraic cal- culus and ostensive geometry, 283. Analysis and Synthesis, (Philosophical,) ii. 249, seq., 263, 272-283. Ancient philosophers, their method of reasoning, i. 207, seq.
Antoninus, quoted on the influence of Association and Phantasy, i. 341. Aquinas, (St. Thomas,) a Realist, i. 183, et alibi.
Aristides, quoted as to high and low in musical notation, i. 498.
Aristotle, opinions of his school in refer- ence to Universals, i. 169, seq.; his doctrine of the principles of Associa- tion, 261; notices the connexion be- tween genius and melancholy, 459 ; quoted as to the first principles of Reasoning, ii. 46; as to first truths, &c., 59; as to the errors arising from Language, the instrument of thought, 99; probably suggested that Mathe- matical evidence is resolvable into identical propositions, 123, 124; his doctrine, that "in mathematical quan- tities equality is identity," 125, 377; quoted as to the Syllogism, 189, 192; as at once asserting that demonstra- tion is only of eternal truths, and that demonstration is founded on induction from sense, 194, see also 195; on his assertion that Definitions are the first principles of all demonstration, 195, 196; his authority during the schol- astic ages vouched by Bayle, 203; quoted as to presence of mind, 221; his Organon an imperishable monu- ment to the powers of his mind, 223; his originality in regard to logic is not to be doubted; did not borrow it from the Indian Brahmins, 224-229; on this point the statement in the book of Sophisms is decisive, 227, 228; quoted as to Causation and scien- tific knowledge, 232; his division of Causes into Efficient, Material, For- mal, and Final, an error, 233, 234; the nature of his Observation or Expe- rience, that it did not include ex- periment, 243, 244; quoted as to the nature of his Induction as opposed to that of Bacon, 257; a text of his quoted, in which he employs the term sophistical, 260; his division of Quan- tity, 378; quoted as to children at first calling all men and women fathers
and mothers, 382; quoted and repre- hended for an expression in the sup posititious treatise imputed to him, Of the World, 388; quoted as to the love of Imitation, iii. 118; his char- acter as a critic by Pope, 235; quoted as to his calling instinct the imitation of human life, 276; as to the human Hand, 281, 288, 289. Armstrong, quoted as to the remedy for
a too enthusiastic imagination, i. 458. Arnauld, (Anthony,) quoted to shew what is meant by Reason, ii. 13. Arrian, quoted as to the Brahmins, iii. 104.
Art, what, how distinguished from In- stinct, i. 36, iii. 251; implies intelli- gence, perception of an end, and the choice of means, iii. 267. Arthur, (Professor,) adduced as to the arrangement of ancient and modern languages, iii. 52.
Association of Ideas, on, in general, i. 23-25, 252-347; influence of custom and habit in forming, 23, 25, 258; some regulative circumstances, 24, 253, seq.; influence of the will in de- termining, 24, 25; importance of Association in morals, 25; influence of contrast as an associating prin- ciple, 254, 264, seq.; of perceived objects in Association, 255, 256; As- sociation of Ideas not an unexception- able denomination of the fact, 257, seq.; relation of Association to Habit, 258, 259; Habit may be resolved into Association, as well as Associa- tion into Habit, ib.; sometimes im- properly called Imagination, 259, 499; Hobbes calls the train of thought series imaginationum, ib.; by older English writers expressed by Phan- tasy or Fancy, 260; principles of As- sociation, in general, 261-266; these principles according to Aristotle, 261; according to Hume, ib.; distinction of these principles into two classes, viz. the obvious and the recondite, 263; distinction of philosophical and poeti- cal associations, 263, seq.; alliteration as an associative principle, 262, 277; difference in different individuals in regard to the facility of Association, 265; of the power exercised by the mind over the train of thought, 266, seq.; this train depends on causes operating in a manner inexplicable by us, 266; this power principally found- ed on our habits of thinking influen-
cing the laws of Association, 268, seq.; illustrated especially in regard to Wit, 270-274; to Rhyme, 274-278; to Poe- tical Fancy, 278-282; to Invention in the Arts and Sciences, 282-289; Dreaming as connected with Associa- tion, 289-305; three questions to be ex- plained, 289, seq.; the mental train in sleep subject to the general laws of As- sociation, 295-299; the mental train during sleep supposes also the suspen- sion of the will, 299-305; states of Som- nambulism and Madness as subject to the same influence, 304; influence of Association on the intellectual and active powers, in general, 305-347; more especially in relation to our spe- culative conclusions, 305-321; Asso- ciation of ideas, not necessarily con- nected, becomes by habit intimate or even indissoluble, as between Colour and Extension, 306, 496; Space and Time, 306; certain notes of music and high or low, ib.; Sensations and Perceptions, 307; the term Associa- tive is improperly applied to all na- tural and necessary conjunctions, and should be limited to what is fortuitous and habitual, 499; errors founded in, 308, seq.; as that events synchron- ously occurring are naturally con- nected, 309; hence many popular superstitions, 310; that what are ac- cidentally associated are necessarily related, 311, seq.; hence a large class of prejudices, 313; importance of phi- losophy for their cure, 314, seq.; in- fluence of this principle in giving to errors the appearance of truths, 316, seq.; in relation to our judgments in matters of taste, 321-334, 339; in re- gard to dress, 323, seq.; to fashions, 325, seq.; Association renders objects of taste pleasing in two ways, ib.; its influence on language noted, ib.; on literature, 327, seq.; on statuary and painting, 328, seq.; on poetry and poetical diction, 329-334; on our moral judgments, 334-341; on our happiness, 340; Association of ideas resembled to Attraction in physics by Hume, 336; applied to explain all our moral principles, and in general all our intellectual pleasures and pains, and by what philosophers, 336, seq.; in opposition to this view, 342, seq., 346, seq.; how it contri- butes to the enjoyment of objects of beauty and sublimity, 339, seq.; As-
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