tinguish things by different names, which have been afterwards found, by an accurate philosophical analysis, to be the same in reality. I shall leave, therefore, this verbal quibble, without any farther comment, to the candid consideration of my readers. More than enough has, I trust, been said in the first section of this chapter to expose its futility.1 I copy the following passage from the article Ame des Bêtes, in the second volume of a French work, entitled Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles, (published at Paris in the year 1804.) The coincidence between the opinions of the author, (the illustrious Cuvier,) and those which I have stated in the preceding chapter and in other parts of these Elements, gives me a confidence in some of my conclusions which I should not otherwise have felt; and encourages me in the belief, that the Theory of Helvetius, which, not many years ago, was so prevalent in France, is now gradually giving way, among cautious and impartial inquirers, to a philosophy less degrading to the dignity of human nature, and more favourable to human happi ness. "On ne peut donc nier qu'il n'y ait dans les bêtes, perception, mémoire, jugement et habitude; et l'habitude elle-même n'est autre chose qu'un jugement devenu si facile pour avoir été répété, que nous nous y conformons en action avant de nous étre aperçus que nous l'avons fait en esprit. Il nous paroit même qu'on aperçoit dans les bétes les mêmes facultés que dans les enfans; seulement l'enfant perfectionne son état, et il le perfectionne à mesure qu'il apprend à parler, c'est-à-dire à mesure qu'il forme de ses sensations particulières des idées générales, et qu'il apprend à exprimer des idées abstraites par des signes convenus. Ce n'est aussi que de cette époque que date en lui le souvenir distinct des faits. La mémoire historique a la même origine et le même instrument que le raisonnement; cet instrument, c'est le langage abstrait. Pourquoi l'animal n'est-il point susceptible du même perfectionnement que l'enfant ? pourquoi n'a t-il jamais ni langage abstrait, ni réflexion, ni mémoire détaillée des faits, ni suite de raisonnemens compliqués, ni transmission d'expériences acquises? ou, ce qui revient au même, pourquoi chaque individu voit-il son intelligence renfermée dans des bornes si étroites, et pourquoi est-il forcé de parcourir précisément le même cercle que les individus de la même espèce qui l'ont devancé? Nous verrons à l'article Animal que les grandes différences qui distinguent les espèces, suffisent bien pour expliquer les différences de leurs facultés; mais en est-il qui puisse rendre raison de l'énorme distance qui existe, quant à l'intelligence, entre l'homme et le plus parfait des animaux, tandis qu'il y en a si peu dans l'organisation?"-Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles, Art. Ame des Bétes. See Note I. APPENDIX ΤΟ PART THIRD,-CHAPTER SECOND. Some Account of JAMES MITCHELL, a boy born Deaf and Blind. From the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. VII. Part First.1 THE Memoir which I am about to submit to the consideration of the Royal Society, relates to the melancholy history of a boy who was born blind and deaf; and who, of consequence, has derived all his knowledge of things external from the senses of Touch, of Taste, and of Smell. It is now considerably more than a year since I first heard of this case from my very ingenious friend, Mr. Wardrop, 1 The connexion of the following Appendix with the preceding chapter may not at first be apparent to a superficial reader; but will at once be acknowledged by all who are able to perceive how strongly the minute details which it contains bear on some of the most interesting questions which relate to the characteristical endowments of the human mind. Solitary as Mitchell is in the midst of society, and confined in his intercourse with the material world within the narrowest conceivable limits, what a contrast does he exhibit to the most sagacious of the lower animals, though surrounded with all the arts of civilized man, and in the fullest posses sion of all the powers of external perception! Even in his childish occupations and pastimes, we may discern the rudiments of a rational and improvable nature; more particularly in that stock of knowledge, scanty as it is, which he has been led to acquire by the impulse of his own spontaneous and eager curiosity. Some of the occupations here described I might almost dignify by the name of experiments. The attentive inquirer will discover in this memoir proofs of his possessing various other faculties and principles not to be found in any of the lower animals; a sense of the ludicrous, for instance, or, at least, a susceptibility of surgeon in London; a gentleman whose scientific attainments and professional skill it is unnecessary for me to mention to this audience. The information which he then communicated to me was extremely general; but more than sufficient to excite all my curiosity. "I have at present," says he, "a patient under my care, whose case is, I believe, unique. It is a boy fourteen years old, who was born blind and deaf, and of course dumb. His senses of touch and smell have a wonderful degree of acuteness; for by these alone he has acquired a very accurate knowledge of external things, and is able to know readily his old acquaintances from strangers. The powers of his mind are vigorous. He is evidently capable of reflexion and reasoning, and is warmly attached to his parents. He has a most delicate palate, and partakes only of the most simple food. I have couched one of his eyes successfully; and he is much amused with the visible world, though he mistrusts information gained by that avenue. One day I got him a new and gaudy suit of clothes, which delighted him beyond description. It was the most interesting scene of sensual gratification I ever beheld."1 The first idea which struck me on receiving this intelligence was, that so extraordinary a combination of circumstances might perhaps afford a favourable opportunity of verifying or of correcting, in an unequivocal manner, some of those details in Cheselden's celebrated narrative, about which considerable doubts have been lately entertained, in consequence of their dis the emotion of laughter; an emotion of which Milton has justly said Smiles from reason flow, To brutes denied." But, above all, a capacity of carrying on intercourse with other rational beings by means of conventional signs. How far the culture of his intellectual powers might have been carried by the improvement and extension of these rudiments of language, it is difficult to conjecture. The substance of this Appendix might, I am sensible, have been introduced here in an abridged form; but as the value of the particulars contained in it depends entirely upon their authenticity and accuracy, it appeared to me more proper to reprint it literally as it was at first written. The reader will thus be enabled to judge for himself of the evidence on which every fact rests, which I have thought it of importance to record. 1 This letter was dated October 4, 1810. agreement with the results of Mr. Ware's experience. A repetition of such observations and experiments as Cheselden made, would, I imagined, be greatly facilitated by the total deafness of the patient in question; the judgments which a blind man is enabled to form of distances (at least of small 1 Mr. Ware's paper here alluded to, is to be found in the Philosophical Transactions for 1801. The argument which it has been supposed to afford against Cheselden (founded on the case of Master W.) has always appeared to me to prove nothing, in consequence of its aiming to prove too much. Of this patient, (a boy who was restored to sight at seven years of age, after he had been blind from very early infancy,) we are told, that two days after the operation, the handkerchief which was tied over his eyes having slipped upward, he distinguished the table, by the side of which his mother was sitting. "It was about a yard and a half from him; and he observed, that it was covered with a green cloth, (which was really the case,) and that it was a little farther off than he was able to reach." Mr. Ware afterwards informs us, that "he held a letter before his patient, at the distance of about twelve inches, when he told him, after a short hesitation, that it was a piece of paper; that it was square, which he knew by its corners, and that it was longer in one direction than it was in the other."-"I then," says he, "showed him a small oblong band-box, covered with red leather; which he said was red, and square, and pointed at once to its four corners. The observation, however, which appeared to me most remarkable, was that which related to a white stonemug; which he first called a white bason, but, soon after, recollecting himself, said it was a mug, because it had a handle." Of the correctness and fidelity of this statement, I have not the slightest doubt. But the only inference which can, with certainty, be deduced from it is, that the patient saw too well before the operation, to make his perceptions afterwards of any value for deciding the point in question. If he was able to recognise a green cloth, and a piece of white paper, the very moment that the bandage was removed, the degree of sight which he possessed previous to Mr. Ware's acquaintance with him, must have been such as to furnish him with a variety of sensations, quite sufficient to serve as materials for an imperfect visual language;—a language, if not accurately significant of compara tive distances from the eye, at least fully adequate to convey, through the channel of that organ, the intimation of distance in general, or of what Berkeley calls ou'ness;—perhaps, also, some indistinct perception of diversities of visible figure. The slightest, and to us the most evanescent shades of difference in these sensations, will, we may be assured, become in the case of such an individual, signs of all the various changes in the state of surrounding objects, with which they have any con nexion. Having mentioned, on this occasion, the name of Mr. Ware, I think it but justice to him to add, that he does not appear to me to be himself disposed to push his argument againt Cheselden so far as has been apprehended by some later writers. In the following passages he not only seems to admit the truth of that optical principle which he has been generally understood to controvert, but distances) by the ear, approaching, in point of accuracy, very nearly to those which we are accustomed to form by means of the eye. I had once occasion to witness the precision with which Mr. Gough of Kendal (by far the most intelligent and ingenious person, born blind, whom I have happened to meet with) guessed at the dimensions of a large room, a few minutes after he had entered it. The error he committed was a mere trifle; not exceeding what might have been expected from the practised eye of a joiner or of an architect. It is not every operator, however dexterous in his own art, who can be expected to attend sufficiently to these collateral circumstances, or to be fully aware of the difficulty which a blind person, suddenly put in possession of a new sense, must experience, when he attempts to distinguish, in his estimates of distances, the perceptions of the eye from those of the ear or of the nostrils. Something of the same kind, indeed, or at least strikingly analogous to it, happens every moment to ourselves, in even points at the same explanation which I have already suggested, of the apparent inconsistency between his own experience and that of his predeces sor. "I beg leave," says he, "to add further, that on making inquiries of two children, between seven and eight years of age, now under my care, both of whom have been blind from birth, and on whom no operation has yet been performed, I find that the knowledge they have of colours, limited as it is, is sufficient to enable them to tell whether coloured objects be brought nearer to, or carried farther from them; for instance, whether they are at the distance of two inches or four inches from their eyes. sight and feeling have no other connection but that which is formed by experience; and, therefore, that the ideas derived from feeling, can have no power to direct the judgment, with respect either to the distance or form of visible objects. It should be recollected, however, that persons who have cataracts in their eyes, are not, in strictness of speech, blind, though they are deprived of all useful sight. The instances I have adduced prove, that the knowledge they have of colours is sufficient to give them some idea of distance, even in their darkest state. When, therefore, their sight is cleared by the removal of the opaque crystalline which intercepted the light, and the colour of objects is thereby made to appear stronger, will it be difficult or unphilosophical to conceive, that their ideas of distance will be strengthened, and so far extended, as to give them a knowledge even of the outline and figure of those objects with the colour of which they were previously acquainted?" |