The Admissible Contents of ExperienceKatherine Hawley, Fiona Macpherson Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content.
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Contents
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal | |
Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures | |
Experience and Content | |
FIONA MACPHERSON | |
Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? | |
Conscious Reference | |
What Are the Contents of Experiences? | |
AspectSwitching and Visual Phenomenal | |
The Existential Thesis | |
The Singular When Filled Thesis | |
Kaplanianism | |
The Multiple Contents Thesis | |
The Existential Thesis Revisited | |
Still More on Existential Contents | |
Consequences for Strong Intentionalism | |
A New Intentionalist Proposal | |
The Visual Experience of Causation | |
in Experience? | |
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience | |
Conclusion | |
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Common terms and phrases
accuracy conception accuracy-conditions admissible contents appears appears-looks conception argue aspect-switching associative agnosia basking shark beliefs involving categorical perception causal perception causal relations causal thesis characteristic of launching claim that experiences cognitive colour colour constancy content view contents of experiences debate disjunctivists epistemic example existential existential content experience characteristic experiences have contents experiential properties explain fact false Firth of Clyde hallucination identity conception illusion intentionalism intentionalist introspection knowledge argument lemon looks F low-level Michotte Michotte’s non-conceptual content objective look one’s Oxford particular perceptual consciousness perceptual content perceptual experience perceptual phenomenality phenomenal character phenomenal content phenomenally look phenomenology philosophers picture pine tree plausible present propositional attitude propositional content qualia question reason representational content representationalism seems sense sensorily entertaining sensory sentence shape Siegel singular contents speech perception stimuli supervenience Suppose Susanna Siegel theory things thought tomato Travis true twin earth veridical visual experience represents