CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-6 Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is
within the bounds of the law may be a perplexing
question when his client is contemplating a course of
conduct having legal consequences that vary according
to the client's intent, motive, or desires at the time of
the action. Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client
in developing evidence relevant to the state of mind of
the client at a particular time. He may properly assist
his client in the development and preservation of evi-
dence of existing motive, intent, or desire; obviously, he
may not do anything furthering the creation or preserva-
tion of false evidence. In many cases a lawyer may not
be certain as to the state of mind of his client, and in
those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in
favor of his client.

EC 7-7 In certain areas of legal representation not
affecting the merits of the cause or substantially preju-
dicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to
make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if
made within the framework of the law, such decisions
are binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil
cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will ac-
cept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his
right to plead an affirmative defense. A defense lawyer
in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully
on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be
desirable and as to the prospects of success on appeal,
but it is for the client to decide what plea should be
entered and whether an appeal should be taken.
EC 7-8 A lawyer should exert his best efforts to in-
sure that decisions of his client are made only after the
client has been informed of relevant considerations. A
lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if
the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to his
client need not be confined to purely legal considera-
tions.10 A lawyer should advise his client of the pos-
sible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should
bring to bear upon this decision-making process the full-
ness of his experience as well as his objective view-
point.18 In assisting his client to reach a proper de-
cision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out
those factors which may lead to a decision that is
morally just as well as legally permissible. He may
emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that
might result from assertion of legally permissible posi-
tions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego
legally available objectives or methods because of non-
legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for him-
self. In the event that the client in a non-adjudicatory
matter insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary
to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not pro-
hibited by Disciplinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw
from the employment.20

EC 7-9 In the exercise of his professional judgment
on those decisions which are for his determination in
the handling of a legal matter," a lawyer should always
act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client. However, when an action in the best interest
of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his
client for permission to forego such action.

EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.

EC 7-11 The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or the nature of a particular proceeding. Examples include the representation of an illiterate or an incompetent, service as a public prosecutor or other government lawyer, and appearances before administrative and legislative bodies.

EC 7-12 Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If

25

the client is capable of understanding the matter in
question or of contributing to the advancement of his
interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified
from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain
from him all possible aid. If the disability of a client
and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer
to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should con-
sider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care
to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But
obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any
decision which the law requires his client to perform or
make, either acting for himself if competent, or by a
duly constituted representative if legally incompetent.
EC 7-13 The responsibility of a public prosecutor
differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty
exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sover-
eign and therefore should use restraint in the discre-
tionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the
selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the
prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may
make decisions normally made by an individual client,
and those affecting the public interest should be fair to
all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused
is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.
With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor
has responsibilities different from those of a lawyer
in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely
disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known
to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish-
ment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally
avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it
will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discretionary
power relative to litigation should refrain from institut-
ing or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A
government lawyer not having such discretionary power
who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy sub-
mitted to him should so advise his superiors and recom-
mend the avoidance of unfair litigation. A government
lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has
the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full
and fair record, and he should not use his position or
the economic power of the government to harass parties
or to bring about unjust settlements or results.
EC 7-15 The nature and purpose of proceedings be-
fore administrative agencies vary widely. The proceed-
ings may be legislative or quasi-judicial, or a combina-
tion of both. They may be ex parte in character, in
which event they may originate either at the instance of
the agency or upon motion of an interested party. The
scope of an inquiry may be purely investigative or it
may be truly adversary looking toward the adjudica-
tion of specific rights of a party or of classes of parties.
The foregoing are but examples of some of the types of
proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. A
lawyer appearing before an administrative agency, re-
gardless of the nature of the proceeding it is conduct-
ing, has the continuing duty to advance the cause of
his client within the bounds of the law. Where the
applicable rules of the agency impose specific obliga-
tions upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply therewith,
unless the lawyer has a legitimate basis for challenging
the validity thereof. In all appearances before admin-
istrative agencies, a lawyer should identify himself, his
client if identity of his client is not privileged," and the
representative nature of his appearance. It is not im-
proper, however, for a lawyer to seek from an agency
information available to the public without identifying
his client.

EC 7-16 The primary business of a legislative body is
to enact laws rather than to adjudicate controversies,
although on occasion the activities of a legislative body
may take on the characteristics of an adversary pro-
ceeding, particularly in investigative and impeachment
matters. The role of a lawyer supporting or opposing
proposed legislation normally is quite different from
his role in representing a person under investigation or
on trial by a legislative body. When a lawyer appears
in connection with proposed legislation, he seeks to
affect the lawmaking process, but when he appears on
behalf of a client in investigatory or impeachment pro-
ceedings, he is concerned with the protection of the
rights of his client. In either event, he should identify
himself and his client, if identity of his client is not

26

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

privileged, and should comply with applicable laws and legislative rules.28

EC 7-17 The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client. While a lawyer must act always with circumspection in order that his conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then handling, he may take positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual views of any client.

EC 7-18 The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant to law or rule of court or unless he has the consent of the lawyer for that person.*

If one is not represented by counsel, a lawyer representing another may have to deal directly with the unrepresented person; in such an instance, a lawyer should not undertake to give advice to the person who is attempting to represent himself," except that he may advise him to obtain a lawyer.

Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice EC 7-19 Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed by the rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adversary presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known;22 the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments. The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.*

EC 7-20

has done so; but, having made such disclosure, he may challenge its soundness in whole or in part."

EC 7-24 In order to bring about just and informed decisions, evidentiary and procedural rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of relevant evidence and argument and the exclusion of all other considerations. The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject for argument to the trier of fact." It is improper as to factual matters because admissible evidence possessed by a lawyer should be presented only as sworn testimony. It is improper as to all other matters because, were the rule otherwise, the silence of a lawyer on a given occasion could be construed unfavorably to his client. However, a lawyer may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to any of the foregoing matters.

EC 7-25 Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions and are part of the framework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take steps in good faith and within the framework of the law to test the validity of rules, he is not justified in consciously violating such rules and he should be diligent in his efforts to guard against his unintentional violation of them." As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable law and rules; a lawyer should not make any prefatory statement before a tribunal in regard to the purported facts of the case on trial unless he believes that his statement will be supported by admissible evidence; a lawyer should not ask a witness a question solely for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him; and a lawyer should not by subterfuge put before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider. EC 7-26 The law and Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, false, or perjured testimony or eviA lawyer who knowingly" participates in introduction of such testimony or evidence is subject to discipline. A lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured.

dence."3 In order to function properly, our adjudicative process requires an informed, impartial tribunal capable of administering justice promptly and efficiently according to procedures that command public confidence and respect.38 Not only must there be competent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues, but a tribunal must be aided by rules appropriate to an effective and dignified process. The procedures under which tribunals operate in our adversary system have been prescribed largely by legislative enactments, court rules and decisions, and administrative rules. Through the years certain concepts of proper professional conduct have become rules of law applicable to the adversary adjudicative process. Many of these concepts are the bases for standards of professional conduct set forth in the Disciplinary Rules.

EC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment of private civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that process; further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system.

EC 7-22 Respect for judicial rulings is essential to the proper administration of justice; however, a litigant or his lawyer may, in good faith and within the framework of the law, take steps to test the correctness of a ruling of a tribunal.

EC 7-23 The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client. Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence unless his adversary

EC 7-27 Because it interferes with the proper admin-
istration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evi-
dence that he or his client has a legal obligation to re-
veal or produce. In like manner, a lawyer should not
advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave
the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making
him unavailable as a witness therein.i

EC 7-28 Witnesses should always testify truthfully"
and should be free from any financial inducements that
might tempt them to do otherwise. A lawyer should
not pay or agree to pay a non-expert witness an amount
in excess of reimbursement for expenses and financial
loss incident to his being a witness; however, a lawyer
may pay or agree to pay an expert witness a reasonable
fee for his services as an expert. But in no event should
a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any
witness. A lawyer should exercise reasonable diligence
to see that his client and lay associates conform to these
standards."
EC 7-29

To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process, veniremen and jurors should be protected against extraneous influences.50 When impartiality is present, public confidence in the judicial system is enhanced. There should be no extrajudicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or with jurors during trial by or on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case. Furthermore, a lawyer who is not connected with the case should not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a venireman or a juror about the case. After the trial, communication by a lawyer with jurors is permitted so long as he refrains from asking questions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in future cases. Were a lawyer to be prohibited from communicating after trial with a juror, he could not ascertain if the verdict might be subject to legal challenge, in which event the invalidity of a verdict might go undetected. When an extrajudicial commu

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

nication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law, it
should be made considerately and with deference to the
personal feelings of the juror.

EC 7-30 Vexatious or harassing investigations of veni-
remen or jurors seriously impair the effectiveness of our
jury system. For this reason, a lawyer or anyone on his
behalf who conducts an investigation of veniremen or
jurors should act with circumspection and restraint.
EC 7-31 Communications with or investigations of
members of families of veniremen or jurors by a lawyer
or by anyone on his behalf are subject to the restrictions
imposed upon the lawyer with respect to his communica-
tions with or investigations of veniremen and jurors.
EC 7-32 Because of his duty to aid in preserving the
integrity of the jury system, a lawyer who learns of im-
proper conduct by or towards a venireman, a juror, or
a member of the family of either should make a prompt
report to the court regarding such conduct.

EC 7-33 A goal of our legal system is that each party
shall have his case, criminal or civil, adjudicated by an
impartial tribunal. The attainment of this goal may be
defeated by dissemination of news or comments which
tend to influence judge or jury. Such news or com-
ments may prevent prospective jurors from being im-
partial at the outset of the trial and may also interfere
with the obligation of jurors to base their verdict solely
upon the evidence admitted in the trial. The release
by a lawyer of out-of-court statements regarding an an-
ticipated or pending trial may improperly affect the im-
partiality of the tribunal. For these reasons, standards
for permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with
respect to trial publicity have been established.

EC 7-34 The impartiality of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by the receipt of gifts or loans. A lawyer, therefore, is never justified in making a gift or a loan to a judge, a hearing officer, or an official or employee of a tribunal.

EC 7-35 All litigants and lawyers should have access to tribunals on an equal basis. Generally, in adversary proceedings a lawyer should not communicate with a judge relative to a matter pending before, or which is to be brought before, a tribunal over which he presides in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appearance of granting undue advantage to one party,59 For example, a lawyer should not communicate with a

27

tribunal by a writing unless a copy thereof is promptly delivered to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. Ordinarily an oral communication by a lawyer with a judge or hearing officer should be made only upon adequate notice to opposing counsel, or, if there is none, to the opposing party. A lawyer should not condone or lend himself to private importunities by another with a judge or hearing officer on behalf of himself or his client.

EC 7-36 Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings. While maintaining his independence, a lawyer should be respectful, courteous, and above-board in his relations with a judge or hearing offcer before whom he appears. He shoud avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or convenience of judge or jury and should avoid any other conduct calculated to gain special consideration.

A

EC 7-37 In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers. lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our legal system.

EC 7-38 A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so. A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments.

EC 7-39 In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the obligation of lawyers to represent their clients zealously within the framework of the law.

DISCIPLINARY

DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means permitted
by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as
provided by DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not
violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by ac-
ceding to reasonable requests of opposing coun-
sel which do not prejudice the rights of his
client, by being punctual in fulfilling all profes-
sional commitments, by avoiding offensive tac-
tics, or by treating with courtesy and considera-
tion all persons involved in the legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment en-
tered into with a client for professional services,
but he may withdraw as permitted under DR
2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.

(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course
of the professional relationship, except as re-
quired under DR 7-102 (B).

(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional
judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or
position of his client.

(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he
believes to be unlawful, even though there is
some support for an argument that the conduct
is legal.

DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of
the L Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of
his client when he knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass
or maliciously injure another.

(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is

RULES

unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. (3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.

(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.70

(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.

(6) Participate in the creation or preservation_of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.

(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.

(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. (B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:

(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal."1

(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated
a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal
the fraud to the tribunal.TM

DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor
or Other Government Lawyer."
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer
shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal
charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause.
(B) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in
criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to
counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action. (H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding and relates to:

(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transac-
tion involved.

(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of
a party, witness, or prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results
of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of a party to submit to such.

(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, de-
fenses, or positions of an interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere
with a fair hearing.

(1) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not pre-
clude a lawyer from replying to charges of miscon-
duct publicly made against him or from participat-
ing in the proceedings of legislative, administrative,
or other investigative bodies.

(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associates from making an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited from making under DR 7-107.

DR 7-108 Communication with or Investigation of

Jurors.

(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the case.

(B) During the trial of a case:

(1) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with any member of the jury.

(2) A lawyer who is not connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a juror concerning the case. (C) DR 7-108 (A) and (B) do not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with veniremen or jurors in the course of official proceedings. (D) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected,

the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service.$7 (E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial support or otherwise, another to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of either a venireman or a juror.

(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to communications with or investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a juror. (G) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror or a member of his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge. DR 7-109 Contact with Witnesses.

(A) A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.

(B) A lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness therein.

(C) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:

(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in
attending or testifying.

(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his
loss of time in attending or testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services
of an expert witness.

DR 7-110 Contact with Officials."1
(A) A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value
to a judge, official, or employee of a tribunal.
(B) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not com-
municate, or cause another to communicate, as to
the merits of the cause with a judge or an official
before whom the proceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the
writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse
party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing coun-
sel or to the adverse party if he is not repre-
sented by a lawyer.

NOTES

1. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932).

2. Cf. ABA CANON 4.

"At times . . . [the tax lawyer] will be wise to discard some arguments and he should exercise discretion to emphasize the arguments which in his judgment are most likely to be persuasive. But this process involves legal judgment rather than moral attitudes. The tax lawyer should put aside private disagreements with Congressional and Treasury policies. His own notions of policy, and his personal view of what the law should be, are irrelevant. The job entrusted to him by his client is to use all his learning and ability to protect his client's rights, not to help in the process of promoting a better tax system. The tax lawyer need not accept his client's economic and social opinions, but the client is paying for technical attention and undivided concentration upon his affairs. He is equally entitled to performance unfettered by his attorney's economic and Social predilections." Paul, The Lawver as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412, 418 (1953).

3. See ABA CANONS 15 and 32.

ABA Canon 5, although only speaking of one accused of crime, imposes a similar obligation on the lawyer: "[T]he lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law."

"Any persuasion or pressure on the advocate which deters him from planning and carrying out the litigation on the basis of what, within the framework of the law, is best for my client's interest?' interferes with the obligation to represent the client fully within the law.

"This obligation, in its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process. Each attorney, as an advocate, acts for and seeks that which in his judgment is best for his client, within the bounds authoritatively established. The advocate

(4) As otherwise authorized by law.**

does not decide what is just in this case-he would be usurping the function of the judge and jury-he acts for and seeks for his client that which he is entitled to under the law. He can do no less and properly represent the client." Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 575, 584 (1961).

"The [Texas public opinion] survey indicates that distrust of the lawyer can be traced directly to certain factors. Foremost of these is a basic misunderstanding of the function of the lawyer as an advocate in an adversary system.

"Lawyers are accused of taking advantage of 'loopholes' and 'technicalities' to win. Persons who make this charge are unaware, or do not understand, that the lawyer is hired to win, and if he does not exercise every legitimate effort in his client's behalf, then he is betraying a sacred trust." Rochelle & Payne, The Struggle for Public Understanding, 25 TEXAS B.J. 109, 159 (1962).

"The importance of the attorney's undivided allegiance and faithful service to one accused of crime, irrespective of the attorney's personal opinion as to the guilt of his client, lies in Canon 5 of the American Bar Association Canon of Ethics.

"The difficulty lies, of course, in ascertaining whether the attorney has been guilty of an error of judgment, such as an election with respect to trial tactics, or has otherwise been actuated by his conscience or belief that his client should be convicted in any event. All too frequently courts are called upon to review actions of defense counsel which are, at the most, errors of judgment, not properly reviewable on habeas corpus unless the trial is a farce and a mockery of justice which requires the court to intervene. But when defense counsel, in a truly adverse proceeding, admits that his conscience would not permit him to adopt certain customary trial procedures, this extends beyond the realm of judgment and strongly suggests an invasion of constitutional rights." Johns v. Smyth. 176 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Va. 1959), modified. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123. 128, n. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F. 2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847, 13 L. Ed. 2d 51, 85 S. Ct. 87 (1964).