must almost inevitably come into an easy rapport with one another, highly convenient for the ready and agreeable discharge of their functions, but very perilous to public liberty, and unfavourable to the patient discrimination of the character of individual cases. No doubt it would be impossible to reserve every transgression of a bye-law or police regulation for a formal trial by jury. But none the less the jurisdiction in question demands to be jealously watched and rigidly circumscribed. As few offences as possible should be included under such jurisdiction; every protection to the accused in the way of favourable presumptions, and, if possible, of re-hearing before a differently constituted tribunal, should be afforded; the Judges should be known to be impartial, disinterested, and qualified for their office by good legal training; and the police should be carefully selected, strictly supervised, and made readily accountable for misconduct.

The topic of Criminal Punishments has already been treated in connection with Criminal Procedure.

SECURITIES FOR THE "LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT."

It is always held to be a valuable characteristic of the English Constitution that, under it, the maintenance of what is called the "Liberty of the Subject" is treated as a matter of peculiar consideration and consequence. The expression "Liberty of the Subject" does not, of course, mean that there is any member of the State who can do everything he likes, or is exempt from the control of the Laws. It means that the Laws are (if the true principles of the Constitution be observed), or are intended to be, made and executed in such a way that no individual person's freedom is impaired to a greater extent than is absolutely needed in order to secure the largest possible amount of freedom and benefit for all. The doctrine thus both discredits all laws which interfere with personal liberty without an adequate reason for such interference based on considerations of the

public good, and also discredits all methods of putting laws in force which expose individual citizens, however obscure or even undeserving of general moral sympathy, to arbitrary aggression on the part of the police or of the judicial administrators of law.

The chief safeguards of the Liberty of the Subject concern (I.) the mode of making laws; (II.) the judicial administration of laws, that is, the trial of accused persons; (III.) the general prevention of illegal imprisonment; and (IV.) the definition and circumscription of the duties of the police, especially in respect of subjecting suspected persons to a preliminary judicial examination.

I. The first class of safeguards is found in the existence and mode of composition of the House of Commons, the popular and representative branch of the Legislature. The infirmities of this safeguard are (1) that it is a most arduous, or even impossible, task to obtain a body of persons which shall do more than very roughly represent the desires and sentiments of even the majority of the persons in the community, let alone those of all persons; and (2) that the constant temptation besetting a popular body,-through its unwieldy size, its want of information, its consequent reliance on authorities the value of which it cannot gauge,-is to legislate in respect of public liberty as heedlessly and tyrannically as an aristocratic body or even a despotic autocrat.

II. The second class of safeguards includes the provision for Trial by Jury in the more important criminal cases. This institution has been already explained. The political value of it is that the ultimate judges of whether an accused person is "guilty" or "not guilty" are not appointed by the Executive Authority, but are chosen (subject to certain restrictions and exemptions) at random out of the body of the people; and that, inasmuch as they can be individually objected to or "challenged" by the accused (as well as by the prosecution) at the time of trial, with or without reason given, according to the quality of the offence charged and

the number challenged, the personal proclivities of particular persons who might be summoned as jurymen are provided against, and any attempt to "pack," or choose unfairly, a jury in order to secure a verdict in favour of the Executive is frustrated.

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To the same class of safeguards belongs the protection accorded to jurymen by which they cannot be made civilly or criminally responsible for their verdicts. The only relief against the consequences of an adverse verdict is in civil cases, when, if a very strong case can be made out for it, a new trial" is granted. To this same class also belongs the protection of the functions of jurymen against possible encroachment by Judges. Such a protection was emphatically accorded by Mr. Fox's Libel Act, the effect of which is to entitle a jury, on an indictment for criminal Libel, to find whether upon the whole evidence a prisoner is guilty or not guilty, without confining themselves (as it had been argued and even judicially decided that they must do) to the mere question of publication, the libellous quality of the matter published being absolutely determined by the Judge.

To this class of safeguards also belongs the independence of the Judges of the Superior Courts, secured by the clause of the Act of the reign of William III. by which the succession to the Crown was settled in the present reigning family, enacting that thereafter "judges' commissions should be made quamdiu se bene gesserint (during good behaviour), and their salaries ascertained and established; but, upon the address of both Houses of Parliament, it might be lawful to remove them." The Judges were thus taken out of the reach of temptations which either fears or hopes from the Crown might present, and up to that time had notoriously presented.

III. The third class of safeguards are those which provide against illegal imprisonment or confinement. These safeguards either take the form of securing that any one whose liberty is restrained shall have an opportunity (such as that

presented by the proceedings for obtaining the writ of Habeas Corpus, already described) of having the ground of his restraint judicially investigated; of being speedily brought to trial if accused; and of the executive being restricted as to the place of his imprisonment: or they take the form of securing compensation in a civil action for illegal detention. The general principle that "excessive bail must not be required" is an acknowledged, if not very available, safeguard for the same end. It would seem that every offence is "bailable," though the allowance and amount of bail demanded must depend upon the circumstances of the

case.

IV. The fourth class of safeguards concerns the definition and circumscription of the duties of the police, especially in respect of subjecting suspected persons to a preliminary judicial examination. There are three ways in which an accused person may be brought before Justices of the Peace sitting in Petty Sessions, with a view either to summary conviction or to committal for trial before a Superior Court. Either (1) the accused may be "summoned" and appear voluntarily in obedience to the summons; or (2) be brought up, whether with or without previous summons, by a policeman pursuant to a warrant or written document which states the name of the accused, the character of the offence, and the name of the policeman executing it, and which is signed by the Justice who grants it; or (3) the accused may be brought up by a policeman or other person without warrant. Which of these processes may be resorted to in a given case depends partly upon general principles of the Common Law, and partly upon the provisions of any special Act of Parliament (of which there are a vast number) directing the particular procedure applicable. Generally speaking a policeman is justified in arresting a suspected person without warrant, if he has reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has been committed; and any private person may similarly arrest a suspected person if a felony has actually

been committed. This means that if a private person were sued in such a case for malicious arrest or false imprisonment, the only sufficient defence would be proof of the fact that a felony had actually been committed, and that there was reasonable ground for suspecting the plaintiff. There are, however, a vast number of cases, under special Statutes, in which policemen and even private persons may make an arrest without warrant. Such cases are those of persons believed to be on the point of committing treason or felony (as by loitering about in a highway or yard for the purpose); of persons offending against certain municipal regulations for public health, locomotion, decency, and convenience; and of persons resisting a policeman in the execution of his duty.

The purpose of a warrant is to secure the responsible cooperation and assent of a judicial officer at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Thus the judicial officer (who for this purpose may be a Secretary of State) has to judge of the sufficiency of the grounds of suspicion before he grants the warrant; and in some cases he can only grant the warrant when the information on which it is founded is given on oath. It is on this principle that what is called a general warrant," that is, a warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or describing any person specially, or to apprehend all persons guilty of a crime therein specified, are illegal, and will not, like legal warrants, protect the officer who executes them.

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It is a common maxim that an "Englishman's house is his castle:" this means, however, no more than that an Englishman's house or private room cannot be forcibly entered by the police except for a few clearly defined purposes and for important public ends. Thus a policeman, in pursuit of one whom he believes to be a felon, may break open any doors which obstruct his course; or he may search anyone's premises for goods believed to be stolen, on procuring from a Justice of the Peace a search-warrant specifying the premises and the character of the goods; but no such