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I fay, as to these rules laid down, and which are objected to us, I have already confidered them, and replied to them, fo far as they concern the argument before us. What now remains, is only to fubjoin some arguments, proving that liberty does not confift in an indifference to good and evil; and that it is confiftent with fome kind of receffity, and a determination to one, and a vindication of them.

I. God is a moft free agent, and liberty in him is in its utmost perfection, and yet does not lie in an indifference to good and evil; he has no freedom to that which is evil, he cannot commit iniquity, he cannot lie, or deny himself, his will is determined only to that which is good; he can do no other, he is the author of all good, and of that only; and what he does, he does freely, and yet neceffarily. It is faid ", that this argument is vain, "fince he is in no state of trial, nor can he be tempted to do evil." I reply, neither is man in a ftate of trial, as has been before fhewn; he may be, indeed, and is tempted to do evil; and there is a propenfity in his nature, nay, he is only determined to it before a principle of grace is wrought in him; which fhews that the liberty of his will lies in a determination

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to one. Moreover, fince God cannot be tempted to evil, nor is it poffible that he fhould ever commit it, it follows, that true、 liberty does not confift in an indifference to good and evil.

II. The human nature of Chrift, or the Man Chrift Jefus, who as he was born without fin, and lived without it all his days on earth; fo was impeccable, could not fin. He lay under fome kind of neceffity, from the purpose of God, the command of God, the covenant between God and him, as well as from the purity of his nature, to fulfil all righteousnefs; and yet he did it most freely and voluntarily, which proves that the liberty of man's will, in its greatest perfection, which is fo in the Man Chrift Jefus, does not lie in equilibrio, in an indifference to good and evil; but is confiftent with fome kind of neceffity, and with a determination to that which is good only. The objection to the former argument can have no force here, for tho' Chrift was not in a ftate of trial, as men in common are not; yet he was liable to be tempted, and was tempted to evil, tho' he had no inclination to it, nor was it poffible that he should be prevailed upon to commit it.

III. The good Angels, holy and elect, who are confirmed in the ftate in which

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they are, and by the confirming grace of God are become impeccable, cannot fin, or fall from that happy ftate; yet perform their whole obedience to God, do his will and work chearfully and willingly. The freedom of their wills is not loft, nor in the least curtailed by their impeccability, confirmed state, and determination to that which is only good. To fay, "there was a time when they were not confirmed in goodness as now they are, and have loft that liberty ad utrumvis, they then had*, is more than can be proved; fince, for ought we know, they might be confirmed in goodnefs from the original of their creation; and the reason why they fell not when others of the fame fpecies of creatures did, might be because they were thus confirmed, and the reft left to the weakness and mutability of creatures. I have, indeed, in the First Part of this work, allowed the good angels to have been in a state of probation, antecedent to their confirmation, which I am now tempted to retract; but fince we know fo little of angels, I chufe to be in fufpence about it. When it is urged', that being thus confirmed, they are not in a state of trial; it must be replied, as before, nor is man. When it is faid, that they are not under any temptation to d

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more than can be made good. But, fuppofing it true, as it is certain, that there is no propenfity in them to fin, nor can they, by any temptation, be induced to it, it ferves but to confirm what is contended for, that liberty does not confift in an indifference to good and evil. When it is further afferted, that their actions are not now rewardable, it is nothing to the purpose, fince this no ways affects the liberty of their actions; tho' I fee not why their actions, which are taken notice of with commendation, may not be rewarded now by the grace of God.

IV. The devils and damned spirits have no inclination to, nor capacity of, doing that which is good, but are wholly determined to that which is evil; and yet do all they do freely and voluntarily. It is true, they are not in a state of trial, no more are men. But to fay, they are not fubject to any farther punishment for the evil they do, is not confiftent with the juftice of God, and the dreadful expectation of the devils themselves, who are not as yet in full tor

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V. The liberty of the will of ma every ftate he has been, is, or fhall be i not in an indifference to good and evi

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his ftate of innocence, as he was made after the image, and in the likeness of God, fo the biafs of his foul was only to that which is good, which he performed willingly, in obedience to the will of God. In his fallen ftate, he is averfe to all that is fpiritually good, and is a flave to his finful lufts and pleasures, is wholly fet upon them, and given up to them; and yet ferves and obeys them with the utmost willingness and freedom. In his regenerate ftate, there is, indeed, an inclination both to good and evil; but this arifes from two different principles in the regenerate man. The new man, or principle of grace, is inclined, bent and determined to that which is good only; and yet freely ferves the law of God. The old man, or corrupt nature, is inclined, bent and determined to that which is evil only; and yet freely ferves the law of fin. In the ftate of glorification, the faints will be impeccable, cannot fin, can only do that which is good; and yet what they do, or will do, is and will be done with the utmost freedom and liberty of their wills. Whence it follows, that the liberty of man's will does not lie in an indifference or indetermination to good or evil; but is confiftent both with fome kind of neceffity, and a determination

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