:

tinent to the question; and complains of the Bishop, who "would fraudulently infinuate, fays he, that it is my opinion, that a man is not free to do if he will, and to abftain if he will; whereas, from the beginning, I have often declared, that it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only this, that he is not free to will, or, which is all one, he is not mafter of his future will;" which he elfewhere explains thus Put the cafe, a man has a will to day to do a certain action to-morrow, is he fure to have the fame will to-morrow, when he is to do it? Is he free to day to chufe tomorrow's will? this is that now in question. Hence it appears, that tho' he denies the natural liberty of the will, or that the will has a liberty of it felf to will, but fuppofes it is neceffitated by preceding caufes; yet he affirms, that man has a power of doing whatsoever he will, in which he agrees not with us, but with the Arminians; as is more fully manifeft, from what he obferves concerning the covenant made with man, do this, and thou shalt live. 'Tis plain, fays he, That if a man do this, he fhall live; and he may do this if he will: in this the Bishop and I disagree not. This, therefore,

* The questions concerning liberty, neceffity and chance, clearly stated and debated, p. 143.

y Ibid. p. 310.

Part III,

z Ib. p. 191.

is not the question; but whether the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a man's own election:" whereas, on the other hand, we believe that man has no power to do any thing that is fpiritually good, and that if he had a will to keep the law of God, he is not able to do it; we affirm with the Apostle, That tho' to will is prefent with us, but how to perform that which is good we find not.

3. The learned author himself I attend to, has fuch an obfervation as this: ""Tis no great difference, fays he, betwixt the opinion of these men and that of Mr. Hobbs ; that the one deftroys the liberty of all our actions, and theirs only deftroys our liberty in fpiritual and moral actions." This obfervation implies, that there is a difference, tho' it fuppofes no great difference between our opinion and that of Mr. Hobbs. The difference muft appear confiderable to every one that obferves, that as the cafe is here ftated, the one only deftroys our liberty in fpiritual and moral actions, the other deftroys the liberty of all our actions. We fay, that the moral liberty of the will is only loft by the fall, but that the natural liberty of it continues, and is even preserved in all thofe actions, in which man appears to be a flave to his finful lufts and pleasures.

7

a Rom, vii, 18. b Whitby, p 362. Ed. 2. 354,

We

We suppose that man has a liberty of will in things of a natural and civil, but not in things of a moral and fpiritual kind.

4. Our opinion is, that the will of man is moved and determined by the fpecial influence of the grace of God, to that which is fpiritually good; as it is moved and determined, whilft the man is in a natural eftate, by the influence of corrupt nature, to that which is evil. Mr. Hobbs will not allow, that the will is determined by special influence from the firft caufe: "That fenfelefs word influence, fays he, I never ufed;" nor will he allow, that the will is moved at all; and ftill lefs, by any thing infused; whereas we fuppofe, that grace is infused into the foul, and by this the will is moved and determined to that which is fpiritually good: his words are thefe; " And because nothing can move, that is not it felf moved, it is untruly faid, that either the will, or any thing else, is moved by it felf, by the understanding, by the fenfitive paffions, or by acts or habits, or that acts or habits are infufed by God; for infufion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies."

5. The neceffity we contend for, that the will of man lies under, is only a neceffity of obligation to the will of God, and a neceffity of immutability and infallibility with

The questions concerning liberty, neceffity and chance, clearly ftated and debated, p. 190, 235. N 2

ibid. p. 246. respect

refpect to the decrees of God, which have their neceffary, unchangeable, and certain event, and a neceffity of influence by the power of the grace of God, to that which is fpiritually good; and by the ftrength and prevalence of corruption, to that which is evil; all which is confiftent with the natural liberty of the will: but then we fay, it is free, not only from a neceffity of co-action or force, but also from a phyfical neceffity, or a neceffity of nature; fuch as that by which the fun, moon and stars, move in their course, fire burns, light things afcend upwards, and heavy bodies move downwards; whereas Mr. Hobbs affirms, That "every man is moved to defire that which is good to him, and to avoid that which is evil to him, especially, the greatest of natural evils, death; and that by a certain neceffity of Nature, no less than that by which a ftone is moved downwards." And elfewhere he expreffes himself thus: My meaning is, that the election I shall have of any thing hereafter, is now as neceffary, as that the fire that now is, and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown

e

* Fertur enim unus quifque ad appetitionem ejus quod fibi bonum & ad fugam ejus quod fibi malum eft, maxime autem maximi malorum naturalium, quae eft mors; idque neceffitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapis deorfum. Hobbs's de Cive. c. i.Sect. 7. p. 11. Ed. Amfterd. 1657.

f The questions concerning liberty, neceffity and chance, clearly flated and debated, p. 232.

into it hereafter; or, to ufe his (the Bishop's) own terms, the will hath no more power to fufpend its willing, than the burning of the fire to fufpend its burning; or rather, more properly, the man hath no more power to fufpend his will, than the fire to fufpend its burning."

6. Mr. Hobbs's opinion, makes God the cause of all finful actions, as well as good; and this is not only a confequence deduced from his principles by his opposers, but is what is allowed by himself; tho' he will not admit that it follows, that God is the author of them. "Author, he says, is he which owneth an action, or giveth a warrant to it: do I fay, adds he, that any man hath in the fcripture (which is all the warrant we have from God for any action whatfoever) a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other fin? does the opinion of neceffity infer that there is fuch a warrant in the fcripture? Perhaps he (the Bishop) will fay no; but that this opinion makes him the cause of fin. But does not the Bishop think him the caufe of all actions? and are not fins of commiffion actions? is murder no action? and does not God himself fay, non eft malum in civitate quod ego non feci? And was not murder one of thefe evils?

The queftions concerning liberty, neceffity and chance, clearly ftated and debated, p. 175. N 3

Whe