ties in the prefent ftate. It is therefore of great fervice to the true improvement of the mind, to diftinguish well between knowables, and unknowables.

As far as things are knowable by us, it is of excellent ufe to accuftom ourselves to clear and diftinct ideas. Now among many other occafions of the darknefs and mistakes of our minds, there are these two things which moft remarkably bring confufion into our ideas.

1. That from our infancy we have had the ideas of things fo far connected with the ideas of words, that we often mistake words for things, we mingle and confound one with the other..

2. From our youngest years we have been ever ready to confider things not fo much in their own natures, as in their various refpects to ourselves, and chiefly to our fenfes; and we have alfo joined and mingled the ideas of fome things, with many other ideas, to which they are not a-kin in their own natures.

In order therefore to a clear and diftinct knowledge of things, we must unclothe them of all these relations and mixtures, that we may contemplate them naked, and in their own natures, and diftinguish the fubject that we have in view from all other fubjects whatfoever now to perform this well, we must here confider the definition of words, and the definition of things..

I

SECT. II.

Of the Definition of Words or Names.

F we conceive of things as angels and unbodied fpirits do without involving them in thofe clouds which words and language throw upon them, we should feldom be in danger of fuch mistakes as are perpetually committed by us in the prefent ftate; and indeed it would be of unknown advantage to us to accustom

ourfelves to form ideas of things without words, that we might know them in their own proper natures. But fince we muft ufe words, both to learn and to communicate moft of our notions, we fhould do it with just rules of caution I have already declared in part, how often and by what means our words become the occafions of errors in our conceptions of things. To remedy fuch inconveniencies, we muft get exact definition of the words we make ufe of, that is, we must determine precifely the fenfe of our words, which is called the definition of the name.

Now a definition of the name being only a declaration in what fenfe the word is used, or what idea or object we mean by it, this may be expreffed by any one or more of the properties, effects or circumstances of that object which do fufficiently diftinguish it from other objects as if I were to tell what I mean by the word air, I may fay it is that thin matter which we breathe in and breathe out continually; or it is that fluid body in which the birds fly a little above the earth; or it is that invifible matter which fills all places near the earth, or which immediately encompaffes the globe of earth and water. So if I would tell what I mean by light, I would fay it is that medium whereby we fee the colours and fhapes of things; or it is that which diftinguishes the day from the night. If I were afked what I mean by religion, I would anfwer, it is, a collection of all our duties to God, if taken in a strict and limited fenfe; but if taken in a large fenfe, it is, a collection of all our duties both to God and man. These are called the definitions of the name.

Note, in defining the name, there is no neceffity that we fhould be acquainted with the intimate effence or nature of the thing; for any manner of defcription that will but fufficiently acquaint another perfon what we mean by fuch a word, is a fufficient definition for the name. And on this account, a fynonymous word, or a mere negation of the contrary, a tranflation of the word into another tongue, or a grammatical explication of it, is fometimes fufficient for this purpofe; as if one would know what I mean by a fphere, I tell

him it is a globe, if he afk what is a triangle, it is that which has three, angles; or an oval is that which has the fhape of an egg. Dark is that which has no light; afthma is a difficulty of breathing; a diaphoretic medicine, or a fudorific, is fomething that will provoke sweating; and an infolvent is a man that cannot pay his debts.

Since it is the defign of logic, not only to affift us in learning but in teaching alfo, it is neceffary that we fhould be furnished with fome particular directions relating to the definitions of names, both in teaching and. learning.

SECT. III.

Directions concerning the Definitions of Names.

Direct I.

HAV

AVE a care of making ufe of mere words, instead of ideas, that is, fuch words as have no meaning, no definition belonging to them do not always imagine that there are ideas wherefoever there are names: for though mankind hath fo many millions of ideas more than they have names, yet fo foolish and lavish are we, that too often we use fome words in mere wafte, and have no ideas for them; or at leaft, our ideas are fo exceedingly fhattered and confused, broken and blended, various and unfettled, that they can fignify nothing toward the improvement of the understanding. You will find a great deal of reason for this remark, if you read the popish schoolmen, or the myftic divines.

Never reft satisfied therefore with mere words which have not ideas belonging to them, or at least no fettled and determinate ideas. Deal not in fuch empty ware, whether you are a learner or a teacher; for hereby fome perfons have made themselves rich in words, and learned in their own efteem: whereas in reality their understandings have been poor, and they knew nothing.

But this fort of chief apostles St Pet. ii. 18.

Let me give, for inftance, fome of those writers or talkers who deal much in the words nature, fate, luck, chance, perfection, power, life, fortune, inftinct, &c. and that even in the most calm and inftructive parts of their difcourfe; though neither they themselves nor their hearers, have any fettled meaning under those words; and thus they build up their reasonings, and infer what they please, with an ambition of the name of learning, or of fublime elevations in religion; whereas in truth they do but amuse themselves and their admirers with fwelling words of vanity, understanding neither what they fay, nor whereof they affirm. talk was reproved of old by the two Peter and St Paul, 1 Tim. i. 7. and When pretenders to philofophy or good fenfe grow fond of this fort of learning, they dazzle and confound their weak hearers, but fall under the neglect of the wife. The Epicureans are guilty of this fault, when they afcribe the formation of this world to chance: the Ariftotelians, when they fay, nature abhors a vacuum : the Stoics when they talk of fate, which is fuperior to. the gods and the gamefters when they curfe their illluck, or hope for the favours of fortune. Whereas, if they would tell us, that by the word nature they mean the properties of any being, or the order of things eftablifhed at the creation; that by the word fate they intend the decrees of God, or the neceffary connection and influence of fecond caufes and effects; if by the word luck or chance they fignify the abfolute negation. of any determinate caufe, or only their ignorance of any such cause, we should know how to converse with them, and to affent to, or diffent from their opinions. But while they flutter in the dark, and make a noise with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk to the wind, and can never profit.

I would make this inatter a little plainer ftill by inftances borrowed from the Peripatetic philofophy, which was taught once in all the schools. The profeffor fancies he has affigned the true reafon, why all heavy bodies tend downward, why amber will draw feathers or straws, and the loadstone draw iron, when he teils you, that this is done by certain gravitating and

attractive qualities, which proceed from the fubftantial forms of those various bodies. He imagines that he has explained why the loadftone's north pole fhall repel the north end of a magnetic needle, and attract the fouth, when he affirms, that this is done by its fympathy, with one end of it, and its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in truth, all these names of fympathy, antipathy, fubftantial forms and qualities, when they are put up for the causes of these effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true caufe of natural appearances; and in this fenfe they are mere words without ideas.

This will evidently appear, if one afk me, why a concave mirror or convex glass will burn wood in the funbeams, or why a wedge will cleave it? and I should tell him, it is by an uftorious quality in the mirror or glafs, and by a cleaving power in the wedge, arifing from a certain unknown fubftantial form in them, whence they derive thefe qualities; or if he fhould ask me, why a clock ftrikes, and points to the hour? and I fhould fay, it is by an indicating form ar fonorific quality; whereas I ought to tell him how the funbeams are collected and united by a burning glass; whence the mechanical force of a wedge is derived; and what are the wheels and fprings, the pointer and hammer, and bell, whereby a clock gives notice of the time, both to the eye and the ear. But thefe uftorious and cleaving powers, fonorous and indicating forms and qualities, do either teach the enquirer nothing at all but what he knew before, or they are mere words without ideast.

*Note, Some writers call that the fouth pole of a loadstone which attracts the fouth-end of the needle; but I chufe to follow those who call it the north pole.

It may be objected here. "And what does the modern philofopher with all his detail of mathematical numbers, and diagrams, do more than this toward the folution of thefe difficulties? does he not defcribe gravity by a certain unknown force, whereby bodies tend downward to the centre; hath he found the certain and mechanical reafons of attraction, magnetism," &c. I anfwer, that the moderns have found a thousand things by applying mathematics to natural philofophy, which the ancients were ignorant of; and when they use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction, &c. they ufe them only to fignify, that there are fuch effects and fuch caufes, with a

H