reprefentation of the original of abftracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a diftinct species.

Note. THOUGH we have divided ideas in this chapter into three forts, viz. Senfible, fpiritual, and abftracted, yet it may not be amifs juft to take notice here, that as man may be called a compound fubftance, being made up of body and mind, and the modes which arife from this compofition are called mixed modes, fuch as fenfation, paflion, difcourfe, &c. So the ideas of this fubftance or being called man, and of thefe mixed modes may be called mixed ideas, for they are not properly and ftrictly fpiritual, fenfible, or abstracted. See a much larger account of every part of this chapter in the Philofophical Eflays by I. W. Ellay 3, 4, &c.

SECT. II.

Of fimple and complex, compound and collective Ideas.

I

DEAS, confidered in their nature, are either fimple or complex.

A Gmple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be divided or diftinguished by the mind of man into two or more ideas; fuch are a multitude of our fenfations, as the idea of fweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, foft, motion, reft, and perhaps extenfion and duration; such are also many of our spiritual ideas; fuch as thought, will, wifh, knowledge, &c.

A complex idea is made by joining two or more fimple ideas together; as a fquare, a triangle, a cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, falfehood, abody, a man, a horse, an angle, a heavy body, a swift horse, c. Every thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more ideas is called complex.

Complex ideas are often confidered as fingle and diftinct beings, though they may be made up of feveral fimple ideas; fo a body, a fpirit, a house, a tree, a

flower; but when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined together, which are wont to be confidered as diftinct fingle beings, this is called a compound idea, whether thefe united ideas be fimple or complex. So a man is compounded of body and spirit, fo mithridate is a compound medicine, because it is rnade of many different ingredients. This I have fhewn under the doctrine of fubftances. And modes alfo may be compounded; harmony is a compound idea, made up of different founds united; fo feveral different virtues must be united to make up the compounded idea or character either of a hero or a faint.

But when many ideas of the fame kind are joined together, and united in one name, or under one view, it is called a collective idea; fo an army, or a parliament, is a collection of men; a dictionary, or nomenclature, is a collection of words; a flock is a collection of fheep; a foreft or grove a collection of trees; a heap is a collection of fand, or corn, or duft, &c. a city is collection of houfes ; a nofegay is a collection of flowers; a month or a year is a collection of days; and a thoufand is a collection of units.

The precife difference between a compound and collective idea is this, that a compound idea unites things of a different kind, but a collective idea things of the fame kind; though this distinction in fome cafes is not accurately obferved, and cuftom oftentimes ufes the word compound for collective.

SECT. III.

Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and imaginary.

IDE

DEAS, according to their objects, may first be divided into particular or univerfal.

A particular idea is that which represents one thing only.

Sometimes the one thing is reprefented in a loose

and indeterminate manner, as when we fay fome man, any man, one man, another man; fome horse, any horse: one city, or another, which is called by the fchools individuum vagum.

Sometimes the particular idea reprefents one thing in a determinate manner, and then it is called a fingular idea; fuch is Bucephalus, or Alexander's horse, Cicero the orator, Peter the apoftle, the palace of Versailles, this book, that river, the new foreft, or the city of London. That idea, which reprefents one particular determinate thing to me, is called a singular idea, whether it be fimple, or complex, or compound.

The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea itfelf, is fometimes called an individual; fo Peter is an individual man, London is an individual city, So this book, one horse, another horfe, are all individuals; though the word individuals is more ufually limited to one fingular, certain, and determined object.

An univerfal idea is that which represents a common nature agreeing to several particular things; fo a horse, a man, or a book, are called univerfal ideas, because they agree to all horses, men, or books.

And I think it not amifs to intimate, in this place, that these universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind which is called abftraction, that is, a withdrawing fome part of an idea from other parts of it; for when fingular ideas are first let into the mind by fenfation or reflection, then, in order to make them univerfal, we leave out or drop all thofe peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes, or circumftances, which belong merely to any particular individual being, and by which it differs from other beings; and we only contemplate those properties of it wherein it. agrees with other beings.

Though it must be confeffed, that the name of abftracted ideas is fometimes attributed to univerfal ideas, both fenfible or fpiritual, yet this abstraction is not fo great, as when we drop out of our idea every fenfible or fpiritual reprefentation, and retain nothing but the moft general and abfolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations to one another, without any regard to their particular natures, whether they be fen

fible or fpiritual. And it is to this kind of conceptions we more properly give the name of abftracted ideas, as in the first fection of this chapter.

An univerfal idea is either general or special.

A general idea is called by the schools a genus; and it is one common nature agreeing to feveral other common natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees to horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which are also common ideas; fo fifh is a genus, because it agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are common natures alfo..

A fpecial idea is called by the fchools a fpecies; it is one common nature that agrees to feveral fingular individual beings; fo horfe is a fpecial idea, or a fpecies, because it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and Snowball. City is a special idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristol.

Note. ft, SOME of thefe univerfals are genufes, if compared with natures more common. So bird is a genus, if compared with eagle, fparrow, raven, which are alfo common natures; but it is a fpecies, if compared with the more general nature, animal. The fame be faid of fish, beast, &c.

This fort of univerfal ideas, which may either be confidered as a genus or a fpecies, is called fubaltern; but the highest genus, which is never a fpecies, is called the most general; and the loweft fpecies, which is never a genus, is called the most fpecial.

It may be observed here also, that, that general nature or property wherein one thing agrees with most other things, is called its more remote genus; fo subftance is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees not only to all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimate, as fun, ftars, clouds, metals, ftones, air, water, &c. But animal is the proximate or neareft genus of bird, because it agrees to feweft other things. Those general natures which ftands between the nearest and most remote are called intermediate. Note. 2dly, In univerfal ideas it is proper to confider their comprehenfion and their extenfion*.

* The word extenfion here is taken in a mere logical fense, and not in a phyfical and mathematical fenfe.

The comprehenfion of an idea regards all the effential modes and properties of it: fo body in its comprehenfion takes in folidity, figure, quantity, mobility, &c. So a bowl in its comprehenfion includes roundnefs, volubility, &c.

The extension of an univerfal idea regards all the particular kinds and fingle beings that are contained. under it. So a body in its extenfion includes fun, moon, ftar, wood, iron, plant, animal, &c. which are feveral fpecies, or individuals, under the general name of body. So a bowl, in its extenfion, includes a wooden bowl, a brafs bowl, a white and black bowl, a heavy bowl, &c. and all kinds of bowls, together with all the particular individual bowls in the world.

Note. THE Comprehenfion of an idea is sometimes taken in fo large a fenfe, as not only to include the effential attributes, but all the properties, modes, and relations whatsoever, that belong to any being, as will appear, Chap. VI.

This account of genus and fpecies is part of that famous doctrine of univerfals, which is taught in the fchools, with divers other formalities belonging to it; for it is in this place that they introduce difference, which is the primary effential mode, and property, or the fecondary effential mode, and accident, or the accidental mode; and these they call the five predicables, becaufe every thing that is affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus, the fpecies, the difference, fome property, fome accident; but what farther is neceffary to be faid concerning the fe things will be mentioned when we treat of definition.

Having finifhed the doctine of univerfal and particular ideas, I fhould take notice of another divifion of them, which alfo hath refpect to their objects; and that is, they are either real or imaginary.

Real ideas are fuch as have a juft foundation in nature, and have real objects, or examplars, which did, or do, or may actually exift, according to the prefent state and nature of things; fuch are all our ideas of long, broad, fwift, flow, wood, iron, men, horfes, thoughts,