root and stalk.

So beafts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works of art, fometimes as well as of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of properties.

II.

ΤΗ

SECT. IV.

The farther Divifions of Mode.

HE fecond divifion of modes is into 'abfolute and relative. An abfolute mode is that which belongs to its fubject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever; but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl; for if there were nothing else exifting in the whole creation, à bowl might be round and imooth; but greatness and fmallness are relative modes: for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the comparifon of one being with others. A bowl of four inches diameter is very great compared with one of an inch and a half; but it is very fmall in comparison of another bowl, whofe diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the abfolute mode of a body, but fwiftness or flownefs are relative ideas; for the motion of a bowl on a bowling-green is swift, when compared with a fnail; and it is flow when compared with a cannonbullet.

These relative modes are largely treated of by fome logical and metaphyfical writers, under the name of relátion; and these relations themselves are farther fubdivided into fuch as arise from the nature of things, and fuch as arife merely from the operation of our mind. One fort are called real relations, the other mental; fo the likeness of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arifes from the real nature of things; for whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or no, one egg would be like another; but when we confider an egg as a noun substantive in grammar, or as figni

fied by the letters e, g, g, these are mental relations, and derive their very nature from the mind of man. 'These fort of relations are called by the fchools entia rationis, or fecond notions, which have no real being but by the operations of the mind.

III. THE third divifion of mode fhews us they are either intrinsical or extrinfical. Intrinfical modes are conceived to be in the subject or fubftance, as when we fay a globe is round, or fwift, rolling, or at rest; or when we fay a man is tall or learned, these are intrinsic modes; but extrinfic modes are fuch as arise from fomething that is not in the fubftance or fubject itself; but it is a manner of being which some substances attain, by reafon of fomething that is external or foreign to the fubject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or, this man is beloved or hated. Note. Such fort of modes as this laft example are called external denominations..

IV. THERE is a fourth divifion much akin to this, whereby modes are faid to be inherent or adherent; that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arifing from the joining of fome accidental fubftance to the chief fubject, which yet may be feparated from it; fo when bowl is wet, or a boy is cloathed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the cloaths are diftinct fubftances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy; but when we fay the bowl is fwift or round; when we fay the boy is ftrong : witty, thefe are proper or inherent modes, for they have a fort of inbeing in the fubftance itself, and do not arife from the addition of any other substance to it.

V. ACTION and paffion are modes or manners which belong to fubftances, and fhould not entirely be omitted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the fmith are both agents or fubjects of action; the one is the prime or fupreme, the other the fubordinate; the iron is the patient, or the fubject of paffion, in a philofophical fenfe, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this fenfe

of the words paffion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them*.

VI. THE fixth divifion of modes may be into phyfical, that is, natural, civil, moral, and fupernatural.. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honefty, and an infpired apoftle; his low ftature is a phyfical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, his honefty is a moral confideration, and his being infpired is fupernatural.

VII. MODES belong either to body or to spirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings; and these are shape, fize, fituation, or place, &c. Modes of fpirit belong to mind; fuch are knowledge, affent, diffent, doubting, reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been fometimes called mixed modes, or human modes; for these are only found in human nature, which is compounded both of body and fpirit: fuch are fenfation, imagination, paffion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther diftinguifhed. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies confidered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no; such are thefe before mentioned, viz. shape, fize, fituation, &c. Secondary qualities or modes are fuch ideas as we afcribe to bodies on account of the various impreffions which are made on the senses of men by them, and these are called fenfible qualities, which are very numerous; fuch are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c., fuch are all founds, as fharp, fhrill, loud, hoarfe; all taftes, as fweet, bitter, four; all fmells, whether pleafant, offenfive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or fuch as affect the touch or

Agent fignifies the deer, patient the sufferer, action is doing, paflion is fuffering: agent and action have retained their original and philofophical fenfe, though patient and pallion have acquired a very different meaning in common language.

feeling, viz. Heat, cold, &c. Thefe are properly called fecondary qualities; for though we are ready to conceive them as exifting in the very bodies themfelves which affect our fenfes, yet true philofophy has moft undeniably proved, that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature by the different impreffions that bodies make upon our fenfes by their primary modes, that is, by means of their different fhape, fize, motion, and pofition of those little invisible parts that compofe them. Thence it follows, that a fecondary quality, confidered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing elfe but a power and aptitude to produce fuch fenfations in us. See Locke's Effay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIII. I MIGHT add, in the laft place, that as modes belong to fubftances, fo there are some also that are but modes of other modes: for though they subfift in and by the fubftance, as the original fubject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to fome mode of that fubftance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swiftness or flowness of it, or its didirection to the north or fouth, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of man or of a beaft; but walking gracefully implies a manner or mode fuperadded to that action. All comparative and fuperlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as fwifter implies a greater measure of fwiftnefs.

It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copioufly treated of in general in the fcience called metaphylics, or more properly ontology; they are alfo treated of in particular in thofe fciences which have affumed them feverally as their proper fubjects.

SECT. V.

Of the ten Categories. Of Subftances modified.

W E have thus given an account of the two chief

objects of our ideas, viz. Subftances

and

modes, and their various kinds; and in these last sec-. tions, we have briefly comprized the greatest part of what is neceffary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten-predicaments or categories of Ariftotle, on which there are endless volumes of difcourfes formed by feveral of his followers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the names are these: Substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, paffion, where, when, fituation, and cloathing. It would be mere lofs of time to fhew how loofe, how injudicious, and even ridiculous is this ten-fold divifion of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve ufeful knowledge, fhould be fought in ontology, and in other fciences.

Befides fubftance and mode, fome of the moderns would have us confider the fubftance modified, as a diftinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be faid on this fubject than this, viz. There is fome difference between a substance when it is confidered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is diftinguifhed from them, and confidered naked without them.

A

these.

SECT. VI.

Of Not-Being

S being is divided into fubftance and mode, fo we may confider not being with regard to both