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If we obferve the following rules, we may arrive at fuch a certainty in many things of human teftimony, is that is it morally impoffible we should be deceived, that is, we may obtain a moral certainty.

1. Let us confider whether the thing reported be in itself poffible; if not, it can never be credible, whofoever relates it.

2. Confider farther whether it be probable, whether there are any concurring circumstances to prove it, befides the mere teftimony of the person that relates it. I confefs, if these laft conditions are wanting, the thing may be true, but then it ought to have the stronger testimony to fupport it.

3. Confider whether the perfons who relates it be capable of knowing the truth; whether he be a skilful judge in fuch matters, if it be bufinefs of art, and a nice appearance in nature, or fome curious experiment in philofophy. But if it be a mere occurrence in life, a plain, fenfible matter of fact, it is enough to inquire whether he who relates it were an eye or ear-witness, or whether he himself had it only by hear-fay, or can. trace it up to the original.

4. Confider whether the narrator be honeft and faithful, as well as fkilful; whether he hath no biass upon his mind, no peculiar gain or profit by believing or reporting it, no intereft or principle which might wrap his own belief afide from truth, or which might tempt him to prevaricate, to fpeak falfely, or to give a reprefentation a little different from the naked truth of things, In fhort, whether there be no occafion of fufpicion con-cerning his report.

5. Confider whether feveral perfons agree together in the report of this matter; and if so, then whether these perfons who joined together in their teftimony might not be fuppofed to combine together in a falfehood. Whether they are perfons of fufficient fkill, probity and credity. It might be alfo inquired, whether they are of different nations, fects, parties, opinions, or interefts. For the more divided they are in all these, the more likely is their report to be true, if they agree together in their account, or the fame thing; and efpecially if they perfift in it without wavering. U

6. Confider farther, whether the report were capable of being eafily refuted at firft if it had not been true; if fo, this confirms the teftimony.

7. Inquire yet again, whether there has been a conftant, uniform tradition and belief of this matter from the very first age or time when the thing was tranfacted, without any reasonable doubts or contradictions. Or,

8. If any part of it hath been doubted by any confiderable perfons, whether it has been fearched out and afterwards confirmed, by having all the fcruples and doubts removed. In either of these cafes the teftimony becomes more firm and credible.

9. Inquire on the other hand, whether there are any confiderable objections remaining against the belief of that propofition fo attefted. Whether there be any thing very improbable in the thing itself. Whether any concurrent circumftances feem to oppofe it. Whether any perfon or perfons give a pofitive and plain ter timony against it. Whether they are equally fkilful, and equally faithful as thofe who affert it. Whether there be as many or more in number; and whether they might have any fecret biafs or influence on them to contradict it.

10. Sometimes the entire filence of a thing may have fomething of weight towards the decifion of a doubtful point of hiftory, or a matter of human faith, viz. where the fact is pretended to be public, if the perfons who are filent about it were fkilful to obferve, and could not but know fuch an occurrence; if they were engaged by principle or by intereft to have declared it: if they had fair opportunity to fpeak of it: and these things may tend to make the matter fufpicious, if it be not very well attefted by pofitive proof.

11. Remember that in fome reports there are more marks of falfehood than of truth, and in others there are move marks of truth than falfehood. By a comparifon of all these things together and putting every argument on one fide and the other into the balance, we - muft form as good a judgment as we can which fide preponderates; and give a ftrong or feeble affent or diffent, or withhold our judgments entirely, according

to greater or leffer evidence, according to more plain or dubious marks of truth or falsehood.

12. Obferve, that in matters of human teftimony there is oftentimes a great mixture of truth and falfehood in the report itself: fome parts of the ftory may be perfectly true, and fome utterly falfe; and fome may have fuch a blended confusion of circumstances which are a little wrapt afide from the truth, and misreprefented, that there is need of good skill and accuracy to form a judgment concerning them, and determine. which part is true, and which is falfe.. The whole report is not to be believed, because fome parts are indubitable true, nor the whole to be rejected, because fome parts are as evident falfehoods.

We may draw two remarkable observations from this

fection.

Obferve. I. How certain is the truth of the Chriftian -religion, and particularly of the refurrection of Chrift, which is a matter of fact on which chriftianity is built; We have almost all the concurrent evidences that can be derived from human teftimony, joining to confirm this glorious truth. The fact is not impoflible; concursent circumstances caft a favourable afpect on it; it was foretold by one who wrought miracles, and therefore not unlikely, nor unexpected: the apoftles and first difciples were eye and ear-witneffes, for they converfed with their rifen Lord; they were the moft plain, honeft men in themselves: the temptations of worldly interests did rather difcourage their belief and report of it: they all agreed in this matter, though they were men of different characters; Pharifees and fishermen, and publicans, men of Judea and Galilee, and perhaps Heathens, who were early converted: the thing might eafily have been difproved, if it were falfe: it hath been conveyed by conítant tradition and writing down to our times; those who at firft doubted were afterwards convinced by certain proofs; nor have any pretended to give any proof of the contrary, but merely denied the fact with impudence in oppofition to all thefe evidences. Obferv. II How weak is the faith which is due to a multitude of things in ancient human history! For though many of thefe criteria, or marks of credibility,

are found plainly in the more general and public facts, yet as to a multitude of particular facts and circumftances, how deficient are they in fuch evidence as fhould demand our affent! Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all paft ages, and which was not a public fact, fo well attefted as the refurrection of Chrift.

SECT. VI.

Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of divin Teftimony.

S human teftimony acquaints us with matter of fact, both past and prefent, which lie beyond the reach of our own personal notice; fo divine teftimony is fuited to inform us both of the nature of things, as well as matters of fact, and of things future, as well as prefent or paft.

Whatfoever is dictated to us by God himself, or by men who are divinely infpired, must be believed with full affurance. Reafon demands us to believe whatfoever divine revelation dictates: for God is perfectly wife, and cannot be deceived; he is faithful and good, and will not deceive his creatures: and when reafon has found out the certain marks or credentials of divine teftimony to belong to any propofition, there remains then no farther inquiry to be made, but only to find out the true fenfe and meaning of that which God has revealed, for reafon itself demands the belief of it.

Now divine teftimony or revelation requires thefe following credentials.

1. That the propofitions or doctrines revealed be not inconfiftent with reafon; for intelligent creatures can never be bound to believe real inconfiftencies. Therefore we are fure the Popish doctrine of transubftantiation is not a matter of divine revelation, because

it is contrary to all our fenfes and our reafon, even in their proper exercifes.

God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of himself, and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfections. Now many of these perfections are discovered by the light of reafon, and whatfoever is inconfiftent. with these perfections cannot be a divine revelation.

But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a manner contrary to what reason would direct antecedent to that command.. So Abraham was commanded to offer up his fon a facrifice; the Ifraelites. were ordered to borrow of the Egyptians without paying them, and to plunder and flay the inhabitants of Canaan: becaufe God has a fovereign right to all things, and can with equity difpoffefs his creatures of life, and every thing which he has given them, and efpecially fuch finful creatures as mankind; and he can ap-. point whom he pleafes to be the inftruments of this. juft difpoffeffion or deprivation. So that thefe divinecommands are not really inconfiftent with right reafon :: for whatsoever is fo, cannot be believed where that inconfiftency appears.

2. Upon the fame account the whole doctrine of revelation must be consistent with itself; every part of it: must be confiftent with each other; and though in points of practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel former divine laws, yet in matters of belief no latter re-velation can be inconsistent with what has been hereto→ fore revealed..

3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by fome: divine and fupernatural appearances, fome extraordinary figns or tokens, vifions, voices, or miracles wrought, orprophecies fulfilled. There must be some demonftra-. tions of the prefence and power of God, fuperior to all the powers of nature, or the fettled connection which God, as creator, has established among his creatures in this visible world.

4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and wonder. ful appearances and operations brought to conteft with,, or to oppofe divine revelation, there muft, and always will be fuch a fuperiority on the fide of that.revelation