be used both to find out the true meaning of God in his word, and to derive juft inferences from what God has written, as well as to judge of the credentials whereby divine teftimony is diftinguished from mere human teftimony, or from imposture.

As divine revelation can never contradict right reafon, (for they are two great lights given us by our creator for our conduct) fo reafon ought by no means to affume to itself a power to contradict divine revelation.

Though revelation be not contrary to reafon, yet there are four claffes wherein matters of revelation may be faid to raise above, or go beyond our reason.

1. When revelation afferts two things of which we have clear ideas, to be joined, whofe connection or agreement is not difcoverable by reafon; as when fcripture informs us, that the dead fhall rife, that the earth fhall be burnt up, and the man Chrift Jefus shall return from heaven, none of these things could ever be found out or proved by reason.

2. When revelation affirms any propofition, while reafon has no clear and diftinct ideas of the fubject, or of the predicate; as God created all things by Jefus Chrift by the Urim and Thummim God gave forth divine oracles. The predicate of each of thefe propofi tions is to us an obfcure idea, for we know not what was the peculiar agency of Jefus Chrift when God the father created the world by him; nor have we any clear and certain conception what the Urim and Thummim were, nor how God gave answers to his people by them.

3. When revelation, in plain and exprefs language, declare fome doctrine which our reason at present knows not with evidence and certainty how or in what fenfe to reconcile fome of its own principles; as, that the child Jefus is the mighty God, Ifa. ix. 6. which propofition carries a feeming oppofition to the unity and fpirituality of the godhead, which are principles of reason.

4 When two propofitions or doctrines are plainly afferted by divine revelation, which our reafon at prefent knows not how or in what sense with evidence and certainty to reconcile with one another; as, the

Father is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet, Christ is over all, God bleffed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.

Now divine revelation having declared all these propofitions, reafon is bound to receive them, because it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfiftent or impoflible, though the ideas of them may be obfcure, though we ourselves fee not the rational connection of them, and though we know not certainly how to reconcile them. In thefe cafes reason muft fubmit to faith: that is, we are bound to believe what God afferts, and wait till he thall clear up that which feems dark and difficult, and till the mysteries of faith fhall be farther explained to us, either in this world, or in the world to come, and reafon itself dictates this fubmiffion.

*

VII. Direct. It is very useful to have fome general principles of truth fettled in the mind, whofe evidence is great and obvious, that they may be always ready at hand to affift us in judging of the great variety of things which occur. Thefe may be called firft nations, or fundamental principles; for though many of them are deduced from each other, yet most or all of them may be called principles when compared with a thousand other judgments which we form under the regulation and influence of thefe primary propofitions.

Every art and fcience, as well as the affairs of civil life and religion, have peculiar principles of this kind belonging to them. There are metaphyfical, phyfical, mathematical, political, economical, medicinal, theological, moral, and prudentical principles of judgment. It would be too tedious to give a fpecimen of them all in this place. Those which are most of universal use to us both as men and as chriftians, may be found in the following chapter among the rules of judgment about particular objects.

VIII. Direct. Let the degrees of your affent to every propofition bear an exact proportion to the different degrees of evidence. Remember this is one of the greatest principles of wisdom that man can arrive at in this world, and the best human fecurity against dangerous mistakesin fpeculation or practice.

*See fomething more on this fubject, direct. II. preced. and chap. V. fect. 6.

In the nature of things, of which our knowledge is made up, there is infinite variety in their degrees of - evidence. And as God hath given our minds a power to fufpend their aflent till the evidence be plain, so we have a power to receive things which are proposed to Ius with a ftronger or weaker belief, in infinite variety of degrees proportionable to their evidence. I be

lieve, that the planets are inhabited, and I believe that the earth rolls among them yearly round the fun; but I do not believe both thefe propofitions with an equal firmness of affent, because the arguments for the latter are drawn from mathematical obfervations; but the arguments for the former are but probable conjectures and moral reafonings. Yet neither do I believe either of these propofitions fo firmly, as I do that the earth is about twenty-four thousand miles round, because the mathematical proof of this is much eafier, plainer and ftronger. And yet farther, when I fay that the earth. was created by the power of God, I have still a more infallible affurance of this than of all the reft, because reafon and scripture join to affure me of it.

IX. Direct. Keep your mind always open to receive truth and never fet limits to your improvements. Be always ready to hear what may be objected even against your favourite opinions, and those which have had longeft poffeffion of your affent. And if there fhould be any new and uncontroulable evidence brought against these old or beloved fentiments, do not wink your eyes faft against the light, but part with any thing for the fake of truth: Remember when you overcome an error, you gain truth; the victory is on your fide, and the advantages is all your own,

I confefs thofe grand principles of belief and practice which univerfally influence our conduct both with regard to this life and the life to come, fhould be fuppofed to be well fettled in the firft years of our studies, fuch as, the existence and providence of God, the truth of christianity, the authority of fcripture, the general rules of morality, &c. We thould avoid a light fluttering genius, ever ready to change our foundations, and tobe carried about with every kind of doctrine. To guard againft which inconveniences, we fhould labour with

earnest diligence and fervent prayer, that our most fundamental and important points of belief and practice may be established upon juft grounds of reafon and fcripture when we come to years of discretion, and fit to judge for ourselves in fuch important points. Yet

fince it is poffible that the folly or prejudices of younger years may have established perfons in fome mistaken fentiments, even in very important matters, we should always hold ourselves ready to receive any new advan tage toward the direction or improvement even of our eftablished principles, as well as opinions of leffer mo

ment.

CHAP. V.

SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDING OF PARTICULAR OBJECTS.

IT

T would be endlefs to run through all thofe particular objects concerning which we have occafon to pafs a judgment at one time or another. Things of the most frequent occurrence, of the wideft extent, and of the greatest importance, are the objects and exercifes of sense, of reafon and fpeculation, the matters of morality, religion, and prudence, of human and divine teftimony, together with the effays of reafoning upon things pat and future. Special rules relating to all thefe will be the fubject of the following fections.

SECT. I.

Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the Objects of

THO

Senfe.

HOUGH our fenfes are fometimes liable to be deceived, yet when they are rightly disposed, and

fitly exercised about their proper objects, with the juft afliitance of reason, they give us fufficient evidence of truth.

This may be proved from an argument drawn from the wisdom, goodness, and faithfulness of God our creator. It was he gave us our fenfes, and he would not make us of fuch a conftitution as to be liable to perpetual deception and unavoidable error in using these faculties of fenfe in the best manner we are capable of, about these very things which are the proper objects of them.

This may be proved alfo by the ill confequences that would follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we could have no certainty of the dictates of our fenfes, we could never be fure of any of the common affairs and occurrences of life. Men could not tranfact any of their civil or moral concerns with any certainty or juftice: nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move with fafety. Our fenfes direct us in all these.

Again, the matters of religion depend in fome measure upon the certainty of the dictates of fenfe; for faith comes by hearing; and it is to our senses that God appeals in working miracles to prove his own. revelation. Now, if when our eyes and ears, and other organs of fenfe are rightly difpofed and exercised about their proper objects, they were always liable to be deceived, there could be no knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revelation by vifions, voices or miracles.

Our fenfes will difcover things near us and round about us, which are neceffary for our prefent ftate, with fufficient exactness, and things distant alfo, as far as they relate to our neceflary use of them.

Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for the ufe of our fenfes in the judgment of all the common affairs of life, or even of miraculous and divine operations, than the vulgar part of mankind are fufficiently acquainted with by nature, and by their own daily obfervations.

But if we would express these rules in a more exact manner, how to judge by the dictates of our fenfes, they fhould be reprefented thus: