patterns of our ideas, fo our own fenfations of hunger, cold, &c. are also inward archetypes or patterns of our ideas; but the notions or pictures of these things, as they are confidered or conceived in the mind, are precifely the ideas that we have to do with in logic. To fee a horse, or to feel cold, is one thing: to think of and converfe about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.

Among all these ideas, fuch as reprefent bodies are generally called images, efpecially if the idea of the the fhape be included. Thofe inward representations which we have of fpirit, thought, love, hatred, caufe, effect, are more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, and carry nothing of fhape or fenfe in them. But I fhall have occafion to speak more particularly of the original, and the diftinction of ideas, in the third chapter. I proceed therefore now to confider the objects of our ideas.

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CHAP. II.

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.

Of Being in General.

HE object of perception is that which is reprefented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, according to which the idea is formed; and thus judgment, propofitions, reafons, and long difcourfes, may all become the objects of perception; but in this place we fpeak chiefly of the first and more fimple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propofitions or difcourfes.

Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or not-being; for not-being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a

real being. But let us firft treat of beings, and that in the largest extent of the word.

A being is confidered as poffible, or as actual.

When it is confidered as poflible, it is faid to have an effence or nature. Such were all things before their creation. When it is confidered as actual, then it is faid to have existence alfo. Such are all things which are created, and God himself the creator.

Effence, therefore, is but the very nature of any being, whether it be actually existing or no. A role in winter has an effence, in fummer it has existence also.

Note, There is but one being which includes exiftence in the very effence of it, and that is God, who therefore actually exifts by natural and eternal necefCity; but the actual existence of every creature is very diftinct from its effence, for it may be or may not be, as God pleases.

Again, every being is confidered either as fubfifting in and by itself, and then it is called a fubftance; or it fubfifts in and by another, and then it is called a mode or manner of being. Though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the fame perfect. fenfe as a fubftance is: and fome modes have evidently more of real entity or being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. These things will furnish us matter for larger difcourfe in the following fections.

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SECT. II.

Of Subftances, and their various Kinds.

SUBSTANCE is a being which can fubfift by itfelf, without dependence upon any other created being. The notion of fubfifting by itself gives occafion to logicians to call it a fubitance. horfe, a houfe, wood, ftone, water, fire, a fpirit, a

So a

body, an angel, are called fubftances, because they depend on nothing but God for their existence.

It has been usual alfo in the defcription of fubftance to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents; a body is the fubftance or fubject, its fhape is the mode.

But left we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, that when a fubftance is faid to fubfift without dependence upon another created being, all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly deftroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our creator, though its prefent particular form, nature, and properties may be altered and deftroyed by many inferior causes; a horse may die and turn to duft; wood may be turned into fire, fmoke, and afhes; a house into rubbish, and water into ice or vapour; but the fubftance or matter of which they are made still remains, though the forms and fhapes of it are altered. A body may ceafe to be a horse or a house, but it is a body ftill; and in this sense it dedepends only upon God for its existence.

Among fubftances, fome are thinking or conscious beings, or having a power of thought, fuch as the mind of man, God, angels. Some are extended, and folid or impenetrable; that is, they have dimenfions of length, breadth, and depth, and have alfo a power of refiftance, or exclude every thing of the fame kind from being in the fame place. This is the proper character of matter or body.

As for the idea of space, whether it be void or full, that is, a vacuum or a plenum, whether it be interfperfed among all bodies, or may be fuppofed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too hard to be difputed in this place what the nature of it is. It has been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind; whether it be the immenfity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-exiftent beings; whether it be the manner of our conception of the diftances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first

effay among the Philofophical Essays by I. W. published 1733.

Now, if we feclude space out of our confideration, there will remain but two forts of fubftances in the world, that is, matter and mind; or, as we otherwife call them, body and fpirit; at least we have no ideas of any other fubftance but these*.

* Because men have different ideas and notions of fubftance, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the margin,

Some philofophers fuppofe that our acquaintance with matter or mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that there is a fort of unknown being, which is the fubftance or the subject by which these properties of folid extenfion and of cogitation are fupported, and in which these properties inhere or exift. But perhaps this notion arifes only from our turning the mere abstracted or logical notion of fubftance or self-fubfifting into the notion of a diftinct, phyfical, or natural being, without any neceffity. Solid extenfion feems to me be the very fubftance of matter, or of all bodies; and a power of thinking, which is always in act, feems to be the very fubftance of all spirits; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power; nor is there any need to feek for any other fecret and unknown being or abstracted fubftance entirely diftinct from thefe, in order to fupport the feveral modes or properties of matter or mind; for these two ideas are fufficient for that purpose; therefore I rather think these are fubftances.

It must be confeffed, when we say, spirit is a thinking substance, and matter is an extended folid fubftance, we are fometimes ready to imagine, that extenfion and folidity are but mere modes and properties of a certain unknown fubftance or fubject which fupports them, and which we call body; and that a power of thinking is but a mere mode, and property of fome unknown fubstance or fubject which fupports it, and which we call fpirit; but I rather take this to be a mere mistake which we are led into by the grammatical form and use of words; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by fubstances and modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by fubstantives and adjectives, help to delude us into the fuppofition.

However, that I may not be wanting to any of my readers, I would let them know Mr Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age, and it is this: That our idea of any particular fubstance is only fuch a combination of fimple ideas as reprefents that thing as fubfisting by itself, in which the fuppofed or confufed idea of fubstance (fuch as it is) is always ready to offer itself. It is a conjunction of ideas co-existing in fuch a caufe of their union, and makes the whole fubject fubfist by itself, though the caufe of their union be unknown; and our general idea of fubstance arifes from the felf-fubfistence of this collection of ideas."

Now if this notion or fubstance rest here, and be confidered merely as an unknown caufe of the union of properties, it is much more

Among fubftances, fome are called fimple, fome are compound, whether the words be taken in a philofophical or a vulgar fenfe.

Simple fubitances, in a philofophical fenfe, are either fpirits which have no manner of compofition in them, and in this fenfe God is called a fimple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded elements are fuch fubftances as cannot be refolved or reduced into two or more fubftances of dif ferent kinds.

:

The various fects of philofophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The Peripateticks, or followers of Ariftotle, made fire, air, earth, and water, to be the four elements of which all earthly things were compounded; and they fuppofed the heavens to be a quinteffence, or a fifth fort of body, diftinct from all thefe; but fince experimental philofophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemifts make fpirit, falt, fulphur, water, and earth, to be their five elements, because they can reduce all terreftrial things. to these five. This feems to come nearer the truth, though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In fhort, our modern philofophers gener

eafy to be admitted; but if we proceed to support a fort of real, fubstantial, distinct being, different from folid quantity or extenfion in bodies, and different from a power of thinking in fpirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needlefs, fcholastical notion into the real nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence.

Mr Locke, in his Effay of Human Understanding, Book II. chap. 22. 2. Seems to ridicule this common idea of fubstance, which men have generally supposed to be a fort of fubstratum, distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the fupport of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. chap. 3. § 6. He feems to fuppofe there may be fome fuch unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of matter and of mind, viz. extenfion, folidity, and cogitation; for he fuppofes it poffible for God to add cogitation to that fubstance which is corporeal, and thus to caufe matter to think. If this be true, then fpirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal beings or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the foul. But I leave thefe debates to the philofophers of the age, and will not be too pofitive in my opinion of this abstrufe fubject. See more of this argument in Philofophical Effays, before cited, Effay 2d.

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