fides. Here it is neceffary to diftribute or divide a difficulty into all its cafes, in order to gain a perfect knowledge of the fubject you contemplate.

It might be obferved here, that logicians have fometimes given a mark or fign to diftinguish when it is an integral whole, that is divided into its parts or members, or when it is a genus, an univerfal whole, that is dif tributed into its fpecies and individuals. The rule they give is this: whenfoever the whole idea can be directly and properly affirmed of each part, as a bird is an animal, a fish is an animal; Bucephalus is a horfe; Peter is a man; then it is a diftribution of a genus into its fpecies, or a fpecies into its individuals: but when the whole cannot be thus directly affirmed concerning every part, then it is a divifion of an integral into its feveral fpecies or members; as we cannot say the head, the breast, the hand, or the foot is an animal, but we fay, the head is a part of the animal, and the foot is another part.

This rule may hold true generally in corporeal beings, or perhaps in all fubftances: but when we fay the fear of God is wifdom, and fo is human civility: criticifim is true learning, and fo is philofophy: to execute a murderer is juftice, and to fave and defend the innocent is juftice too: in these cafes it is not fo eafily determined, whether an integral whole be divided into its parts, or an univerfal into its species: for the fear of God may be called either one part, of one kind of wifdom: criticism is one part, or one kind of learning; and the execution of a murderer may be called a fpecies of justice as well as part of it. Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to determine this controverly.

TH

SECT. XI.

Of an orderly Conception of Things.

THE laft rule to direct our conceptions is that we fhould rank and place them in a proper method and juft order. This is of neceffary ufe to prevent L

confufion; for as a trader who never places his goods in his fhop or warehouse in a regular order, nor keeps the accounts of his buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft method, is in utmost danger of plunging all his affairs into confufion and ruin; fo a ftudent who is in the fearch of truth, or an author or teacher who communicates knowledge to others, will very much obstruct his defign, and confound his own mind or the mind of his hearers, unless he range his ideas in just order

If we would therefore become fuccefsful learners or teachers, we must not conceive of things in a confused heap, but difpofe our ideas in fome certain method, which may be moft eafy and useful both for the underftanding and memory; and be fure as much as may be to follow the nature of things, for which many rules might be given, viz.

1. Conceive as much as you can of the effentials of any fubject, before you confider its accidentals.

2. Survey firft the general parts and properties of any fubject, before you extend your thoughts to difcourfe of the particular kind or fpecies of it.

3. Contemplate things firft in their own fimple natures, and afterwards view them in compofition with other things; unless it be your prefent purpose to take a compound being to pieces, in order to find out or to fhew the nature of it by fearching and difcovering of what fimples it is compofed.

4. Confider the abfolute modes or affections of any being as it is in itself, before you proceed to confider it relatively, or to furvey the various relations in which it ftands to other beings, &c.

Note, Thefe rules chiefly belong to the method of inftruction which the learned call fynthetic..

But in the regulation of our ideas their is feldom an abfolute neceffity that we fhould place them in this or the other particular method: it is poffible in fome cases that many methods may be equally good, that is, may equally aflift the understanding and the memory to frame a method exquifitely accurate, according to the ftrict nature of things, and to maintain this accuracy from the beginning to the end of a treatife, is a moft

rare and difficult thing, if not impoffible. But a larger account of method would be very improper in this place, left we anticipate what belongs to the fourth part of logic.

SECT. XII.

The five Rules of Conception examplified. ·

T may be ufeful here to give a fpecimen of the five fpecial rules to direct our conceptions, which have been the fubject of this long chapter, and reprefent them practically in one view.

Suppofe the theme of our difcourfe were the paffions of the mind.

it To gain a clear and diftinct idea of paflion, wel muit define both the name and the thing.

To begin with the definition of the name we are not here to understand the word paffion in its vulgar and most limited fenfe, as it fignifies merely anger or fury; nor do we take it in its most extenfive philofophical fenfe, for the fuftaining the action of an agent; but in the more limited philofophical fenfe, paffions fignify the various affections of the mind, fuch as admiration, love or hatred; this is the definition of the name.

We proceed to the definition of the thing, paffion is defined a fenfation of fome special commotion in animal nature, occafioned by the mind's perception of fome object fuited to excite that commotion.* Here

* Since this was written, I have published a fhort treatise of the paffions, wherein I have fo far varied from this definition as to call them fenfible commotions of our whole nature, both foul and body, occafioned by the mind's perception of the objects, &c. I made this alteration in the defcription of the paffions in that book, chiefly to include in a more explicite manner the paffions of defire and averfion which are acts of volition rather than fenfations. Yet fince fome. commotions of animal nature attend all the paffions, and fince there is always a fenfation of these commotions, I fhall not change the defi nition I have written here: for this will agree to all the paffions whether they include any act of volition or not; nor indeed is the matter of any great importance. Nov. 17, 1728.

the genus or general nature of paffion is a fenfation of fome fpecial commotion in animal nature; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirst, pain, &c. The effential difference of it is, that this commotion arises from a thought or perception of the mind, and hereby it is diftinguished from hunger, thirft, or pain.

2dly, We must conceive of it completely, or furvey the feveral parts that compofe it. Thefe are (1.) The mind's perception of fome object. (2.) The confequent ruffle or fpecial commotions of the nerves, and blood, and animal fpirits. And (3.) The fenfation of this inward commotion.

3dly, We must confider it comprehenfively in its various properties. The most effential attributes that make up its nature has been already mentioned under the foregoing heads. Some of the most confiderable properties that remain are thefe, viz. That paffion belongs to all mankind in greater or leffer degrees it is not conftantly prefent with us, but upon fome certain occafions: it is appointed by our Creator for various ufeful ends and purposes, viz. to give us vigour in the pursuit of what is good and agreeable to us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful: it is very proper for our state of trial in this world: It is not utterly to be rooted out of our nature, but to be moderated and governed according to rules of virtue and religion, c.

4thly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds. of it, which is called an extenfive conception of it. If the object which the mind perceives be very uncommon, it excites the paffion of admiration: if the object appear agreeable it raifes love: if the agreeable object be abfent and attainable it is desirable: if likely to be obtained, it excites hope: if unattainable defpair : if it be present and poffeffed, it is the paffion of joy: if loft, it excites forrow; if the object be difagreeable it causes. in general hatred or averfion; if it be abfent and yet we are in danger of it, it raifes our fear; if it be prefent, it is forrow and fadnefs, &'c.

5thly, All these things and many more which go to compofe a treatife on this fubject must be placed in their proper order: a flight fpecimen of which is exhibited in this fhort account of paffion, and which that

admirable author Defcartes has treated of at large; though, for want of fufficient experiments and obferva tions in natural philofophy, there are fome few miftakes in his account of animal nature.

SECT. XIII.

An Illuftration of these five Rules by Similitudes.

THU

HUS we have brought the first part of logic to a conclufion and it may not be improper here to reprefent its excellencies (fo far as we have gone) by general hints of its chief defign and ufe, as well as by a various comparison of it to thofe inftruments which mankind have invented for their feveral conveniences and improvements.

The defign of logic is not to furnish us with the perceiving faculty, but only to direct and affift us in the ufe of it: it doth not give us the objects of our ideas,, but only cafts fuch a light on thofe objects which nature furnishes us with, that they may be the more clearly and distinctly known: it doth not add new parts or properties to things, but it difcovers the various parts, properties, relations and dependencies of one thing upon another, and by ranking all things under general and special heads, it renders the nature, or any of the properties, powers, and ufes of a thing more eafy to be found out, when we feek in what rank of beings it lies, and wherein it agrees with, and wherein it differs from others

If any comparisons would illuftrate this, it may be thus reprefented.

When logic affifts us to attain a clear and distinct conception of the nature of things by definition, it is like thofe glaffes whereby we behold fuch objects diftinctly, as by reafon of their smallness or their great diftance appear in confufion to the naked eye: fo the telefcope difcovers to us diftant wonders in the heavens,