but a higher advancement, and a farther affistance of our rational powers, that is defigned by and expected from this artificial logic.

In order to attain this, we must inquire what are the principal operations of the mind which are put forth in the exercife of our reafon; and we fhall find them to be these four, viz. Perception, judgment, argumentation, and difpofition.

Now the art of logic is compofed of thofe obfervations and rules, which men have made about these four operations of the mind, perception, judgment, reasoning, and difpofition, in order to aflift and improve them.

I. PERCEPTION, conception, or apprehenfion, is the mere fimple contemplation of things offered to our mind, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So we conceive or think of a horse, a tree, high, fwift, flow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, &c. The form under which these things appear to the mind, or the refult of our conception or apprehenfion, is called an idea.

II. JUDGMENT is that operation of the mind, whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation or negation; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So this tree is high; that horfe is not fwift; the mind of man is a thinking being; mere matter has no thought belonging to it; God is juft; good men are often miferable in this world; a righteous governor will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good; which fentences are the effect of judgment and are called Propofitions.

III. ARGUMENTATION or reafoning is that operation the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one propofition from two or more propofitions premised: or it is the drawing a conclufion, which before was either unknown, or dark or doubtful, from fome propofitions which are more known and evident. So when we have judged that matter cannot think, and

that the mind of man doth think, we then infer and conclude that therefore the mind of man is not matter.

So we judge that a juft governor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge alfo that God is a juft governor; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good.

This argumentation inay be carried on farther; thus, God will one time or another make a difference between the good and the evil; but there is little or no difference made in this world: Therefore there must be another world wherein this difference fhall be made.

These inferences or conclufions are the effects of reafoning; and the three propofitions taken all together are called a fyllogifm or argument.

IV. DISPOSITION is that operation of the mind, whereby we put the ideas, propofitions, and arguments, which we have formed concerning one fubject, into fuch an order as is fitteft to gain the cleareft knowledge of it, to retain it longeft, and to explain it to others in the best manner; or, in fhort, it is the ranging of our thoughts in fuch order as is best for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation. is called method. This very defcription of the four operations of the mind, and their effects in this order is an inftance or example of method.

Now, as the art of logic affifts our conception, fo it gives us a large and comprehenfive view of the fubjects we inquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reafoning, fo it fecures us from miftakes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of things; and as it furnishes us with method, fo it makes our knowledge of things both eafy and regular, and guards our thoughts from confufion.

Logic is divided into four parts, according to these four operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we fhall treat of it in this order.

ま

THE

FIRST PART

OF

LOGI C.

THE

Of PERCEPTION and IDEAS.

HE first part of logic contains observations and precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception, or conception; and fince all our knowledge, how wide and large foever it is founded upon our conceptions and ideas, here we fhall confider,

grow,

1. The general nature of them.

2. The objects of our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of these ideas.

3. The feveral divifions of them.

4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expreffed.

5. General directions about our ideas.

6. Special rules to direct our conceptions.

F"

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

IRST, the nature of conception or perception* fhall just be mentioned, though this may feem to belong to another science rather than logic.

Perception is that act of the mind (or, as fome philofophers call it, rather a paffion or impreffion), whereby the mind becomes confcious of any thing, as when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat; when I fee a horse, a tree, or a man; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am confcious of these things, and this is called perception. If I ftudy, meditate, wifh, or fear, I am confcious of these inward acts alfo, and my mind perceives its own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.

An idea is generally defined a reprefentation of a thing in the mind; it is a reprefentation of fomething that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious of. That notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is called the idea of a horfe, a tree, or a man.

That notion of hunger, cold, found, colour, thought, or wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of hunger, cold, found, with, &c.

It is not the outward object or thing which is perceived, viz. the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very perception or fenfe and feeling, viz. of hunger or cold,

c. which is called the idea; but it is the thing as it exifts in the mind by way of conception or reprefentation that is properly called the idea, whether the object be prefent or abfent.

As a horse, a man, and a tree, are the outward objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or

The words Conception and Perception are often used promifcuoufly, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a learner with too many diftinctions; but if I were to diftinguish them, I would fay perception is the confciousness of an object when prefent; conception is the forming an idea of the object whether prefent or abfent.