it, what are the evils which attend the neglect of it, what are the rewards of the practice of it both here and hereafter.

If the fubject be hiftorical or a matter of fact, we may then inquire whether the action was done at all whether it was done in fuch a manner, or by fuch perfons as is reported; at what time it was done; in what place; by what motive, and for what defign; what is the evidence of the fact; who are the witneffes; what is their character and credibility; what figns there areof such a fact; what concurrent teftimonies which may either fupport the truth of it, or render it doubtful.

In order to make due inquiries into all these and many other particulars which go towards the complete and comprehenfive idea of any being, the science of ontology is exceeding neceffary. This is what was wont to be called the first part of metaphyfics in the peripatetic schools. It treats of being in its most general. nature, and of all its affections and relations. I confefs the old popish schoolmen have mingled a number of ufelefs fubtilties with this feience; they have exhausted their own fpirits, and the fpirits of their readers in many laborious and intricate trifles, and fome of their writings have been fruitful of names without ideas, which hath done much injury to the facred study of divinity. Upon this account many of the moderns have moft unjustly abandoned the whole fcience at once, and thrown abundance of contempt and raillery upon the very name of metaphyfics; but this contempt and cenfure is very unreafonable, for this fcience feparated: from fome Ariftotelian fooleries and fcholaftic fub tilties, is so neceffary to a distinct conception,, folid judgment, and juft reasoning on many subjects, that fometimes it is introduced as a part of logic, and not without reafon. And those who utterly defpife and ridicule it, either betray their own ignorance, or will be: fuppofed to make their wit and banter a refuge and excufe for their own lazinefs. Yet thus much I would. add, that the late writers of ontology are generally the beft on this account, because they have left out much of the ancient jargon. See the brief fcheme of ontology in the philofophical effays by I. W

Here let it be noted that it is neither useful, neceffary, or poffible to run through all the modes, circumftances, and relations of every subject we take in hand; but in ontology we enumerate a great variety of them, that fo a judicious mind may choose what are thofe circumstances, relations and properties of any fubject, which are molt neceflary to the prefent defign of him that speaks or writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove the point.

As we arrive at the complete knowledge of an idea in all its parts, by that act of the mind which is called divifion, fo we come to a comprehenfive conception of a thing in its feveral properties and relations, by that act of the mind which is called abftraction, that is, we confider each fingle relation or property of the fubject alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw and separate it in our minds both from the fubject itself, as well as from other properties and relations, in order to make a fuller obfervation of it.

This act of abftraction is faid to be two-fold, either precifive or negative.

Precifive abftraction is when we confider thofe things apart which cannot really exift apart as when we confider a mode, without confidering its fubftance and subject, or one effential mode without another. Negative abítraction is when we confider one thing feparate from another, which may also exist without it; as when we conceive of a fubject without conceiving of its acciden tal modes or relations; or when we conceive of one accident without thinking of another. If I think of reading or writing, without the exprefs idea of fome man, this is precifive abftraction; or if I think of the attraction of iron, without the exprefs idea of forne particular magnetic body. But when I think of a needle, without an idea of its tharpnefs, this is negative abftraction; and it is the fame when I think of its fharpnefs without confidering its length.

SECT. X.

Of the extenfive Conception of Things, and of Diftribution.

A

S the completenefs of an idea, refers to the feveral parts that compofe it, and the comprehenfion of an idea includes various properties, fo the extenfion of an idea denotes the various forts or kinds of beings to which the fame idea belongs; and if we would be fully acquainted with a fubject we muft obferve.

If

This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, viz. Conceive of things in all their extenfion, that is, we must fearch out the various fpecies or special natures which are contained under it as a genus or general nature. we would know the nature of an animal perfectly, we muft take cognizance of beafts, birds, fishes and infects, as well as men, all which are contained under the general nature and name of animal.

As an integral whole is diftinguifhed into its feveral parts by divifion, fo the word diftribution is moft properly ufed when we diftinguifh an univerfal whole into its feveral kinds of fpecies; and perhaps it had been better if this word had been always confined to this fignification, though it must be confeffed, that we frequently fpeak of the divifion of an idea into its feveral kinds, as well as into feveral parts.

The rules of a good diftribution are much the fame with thofe which we have before applied to divifion, which may be juft repeated again in the briefeft manner, in order to give examples to them.

I. Rule. Each part fingly taken must contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively or together, mußt contain neither more nor less than the whole; or as logicians fometimes exprefs it, the parts of the divifion ought to exhauft the whole thing which is divided. So medicine is juftly diftributed into prophylactic, or the art of perferving health; and therapeutic, or the art of reftoring health: for there is no other fort of medicine

befides these two. But men are not well diftributed into tall or fhort, for there are some of a middle ftature. II. Rule. In all diftributions we should first confider .the larger and more immediate kinds of fpecies, or ranks of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more minute and remote. A genus fhould not at once be divided into individuals, or even into the loweft fpecies, if there be a species fuperior. Thus it would be very improper to divide animal into trout, lobster, eel, dog, bear, eagle, dove, worm and butterfly, for these are inferior kinds; whereas animal ought firft to be distributed into man, beast, bird, fish, infect; and then beast, fhould be diftributed into dog, bear, &c. bird into eagle, dove, &c. fish into trout, eel, lobster, &c.

It is irregular alfo to join any inferior fpecies in the farne rank or order with the fuperior; as if we would distinguish animals into birds, bears and oysters, &c. It would be a ridiculous diftribution.

;

III. Rule. The feveral parts of a diftribution ought to be oppofite; that is, one fpecies or class of beings in the fame rank of divifion ought not to contain or include another fo men ought not to be divided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and the tall, for poor men may be both learned and tall, and fo may the rich.

But it will be objected, are not animated bodies rightly diftributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are usually called) sensitive? now the fenfitive contains the vegetative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants. I anfwer, that in this and all fuch diftributions, the word vegetative fignifies merely vegetative and in this fenfe vegetative will be fufficiently oppofite to animal, for it cannot be faid of an animal that it contains mere vegetation in the idea of it.

IV. Rule. Let not fubdivifions be too numerous without neceffity; therefore I think quantity is better diftinguished at once into a line, a furface, and a folid, than to fay as Ramus does, that quantity is either a line, or a thing lined; and a thing lined is either a surface or a folid.

V. Rule. Diftribute every fubject according to the special defign you have in view, fo far as is necessary or useful to your prefent inquiry. Thus a politician diftributes man

kind according to their civil characters into the rulers and the ruled and a phyfician divides them into the fick or the healthy; but a divine diftributes them into Turks, Heathens, Jews, or Chriftians.

Here note, that it is a very useless thing to diftribute any idea into fuch kinds or members as have no different properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide right angles into fuch whofe legs are equal, and whofe legs are unequal, for as to the mere right angle they have no different properties.

VI. Rule. In all your diftributions obferve the nature of things with great exactnefs; and do not affect any parti cular form of diftribution, as fome perfons have done, by dividing every genus into two fpecies, or into three fpecies; whereas nature is infinitely various, and human affairs and human fciences have as great a variety, nor is there any one form of diftribution that will exactly fuit with all fubjects.

Note, it is to this doctrine of diftribution of a genus into its feveral fpecies, we must also refer the diftribution of a caufe according to its several effects, as fome medicines are heating, fome are cooling; or an effect, when it is diftinguished by its causes, as faith is either built upon divine teftimony or human. It is to this head we refer particular artificial bodies, when they are diftinguished according to the matter they are made of, as a ftatue is either of brass, of marble, or wood, &c. and any other beings, when they are diftinguished according to their end and defign, as the furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. To this head also we refer subjects when they are divided according to their modes or accidents; as men are either merry or grave, or fad; and modes, when they are divided by their fubjects, as distempers belong to the fluids, or to the folid parts of the anima!.

It is alfo to this place we reduce the propofals of a dfficulty under its various cafes, whether it be in fpeculation or practice; as to fhew the reafon of fun-beams burning wood, whether it be done by a convex glass or a concave, or to fhew the conftruction and menfuration of triangles, whether you have two angles and a fde given, or two fides and an angle, or only three