And I think when man is divided into body and foul, it properly comes under this part of the doctrine of integral divifion, as well as when the mere body i. divided into head, trunk, and limbs: this divifion is fometimes called partition.

When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther divided in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is called a fubdivifion; as when a year is divided into months, each month into days, and each day into hours, which may also be farther fubdivided into minutes and feconds.

It is neceffary in order to the full explication of any being, to confider each part, and the properties of it, diftinct by itself, as well as in its relation to the whole: for there are many properties that belong to the feveral parts of a being, which cannot properly be afcribed to the whole, though thefe properties may fit each part for its proper ftation, and as it ftands in that relation to the whole complex being as in a house, the doorsare moveable, the rooms iquare, the cielings white, the windows tranfparent, yet the houfe is neither moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor transparent.

The fpecial rules of a good divifion are these.

I. Rule. Each part fingly taken must contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither more nor less than the whole. Therefore in difcourfing of a tree you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect divifion, becaufe the root and the branches are needful to make up the whole. So logic would be ill divided into apprehenfion, judgment, and reasoning; for method is a confiderable part of the art which teaches us to use our reafon right, and should by no means be omitted.

Upon this account, in every divifion wherein we defign a perfect exactnefs, it is neceffary to examine the whole idea with diligence, left we omit any part of it through want of care; though in some cafes it is not poflible, and in others it is not neceffary, that we should. defcend to the minutest parts.

II. Rule. In all divifions we should first confider the larger and more immediate parts of the subject, and not dir

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vide it at once into the more minute and remote parts. would by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first int ftreets, and lanes, and fields, but it must be first divided into provinces or counties, then those counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c. and towns into streets and lanes.

III. Rule. The feveral parts of a divifion ought to be oppofite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous divifion of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains are contained in the head.

Yet here it must be noted, that fometimes the subjects of any treatife, or the objects of any particular fcience may be properly and neceffarily fo divided, that the fecond may include the firft, and the third may include the firit and fecond, without offending against this rule, becaufe in the fecond or following parts of the fcience or difcourfe, these objects are not confidered in the fame manner as in the firft; as for instance, geometry divides its objects into lines, furfaces and folids now though a line be contained in a furface, or a folid, yet it is not confidered in a furface, separate and alone, or as a mere line, as it is in the first part of geometry, which treats of lines. So logic is rightly divided into conception, judgment, reafoning, and method. For though ideas or conceptions are contained in the following parts of logic, yet they are not there treated of as feparate ideas, which are the proper fubje& of the first part.

IV. Rule. Let not fubdivifions be too numerous without neceffity; for it is better many times to diftinguish more parts at once if the fubject will bear it, than to mince the difcourfe by exceffive dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable therefore in a treatife of geography to fay, that in a city we will confider its walls, its gates, its buildings, its ftreets, and lanes, than to divide it formally first into the encompatling and encompaffed parts; the encompaffing parts are the walls and gates; the encompaffed part includes the ways and the buildings; the ways are the streets and lanes; buildings confift of th: foundations and the fuperftructure, &c.

Too great a number of fubdivifions has been affect

ed by fome perfons in fermons, treatifes, inftructions, &c. under pretence of greater accuracy: but this fort of fubtilties hath often given great confufion to the understanding, and fometimes more difficulty to the memory. In thefe cafes it is only a good judgment can

determine what fubdivifions are needful.

V. Rule.. Divide every fubject according to the fpecial defign you have in vier. One and the fame idea or fubject may be divided in very different manners, according to the different purposes we have in difcourfing of it. So if a printer were to confider the feveral parts of a book, he must divide it into fheets, the fheets into pages, the pages into. lines, and the lines into letters. But a grammarian divides a book into periods, fentences and words, or parts of fpeech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A logician confiders. a book as divided into chapters, fections, arguments, propofitions, ideas; and with the help of ontology, he divides the propofitions into fubject, object, property, relation, action, paffion, cause, effect, "&c. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician to divide a book into fheets, pages, and lines; or for a printer to divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into», propofitions, ideas, properties or causes.

VI. Rule. In all your divifions obferve with greatest exactness the nature of things. And here I am conftrained to make a fubdivifion of this rule into two very ne-ceflary particulars.

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(1.) Let the parts of your divifion be fuch as are properly diftinguithed in nature. Do not divide asunder thofe parts of the idea which are intimately, united: in nature, nor unite those things into one part which nature, has evidently disjoined this would be very improper in treating of an animal body, to divide it into the fuperior and inferior halves: for it would be hard to fay how much belongs by nature to the inferior half, and how much to the fuperior. Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal into the righthand parts and left-hand parts, which would bring greater confufion. This would be as unnatural as a. man who should cleave a hafel-nut in halves through. the hufk, the shell, and the kernel, at once, and say a nut is divided into thefe two parts; whereas naturę

leads plainly to the threefold diftinction of husk, fhell, and kernel.

(2.) Do not affect duplicities nor triplicities, nor any certain number of parts in your divifion of things; for we know of no fuch certain rumber of parts which God the creator has obferved in forming all the varie ties of his creatures, nor is there any uniform deteranined number of parts in the various fubjects of human art or science; yet fome perfons have difturbed the order of nature, and abused their readers by an affectation of dichotomies, trichotomies, fevens, twelves, &c. Let the nature of the subject, confidered together with the design which you have in view, always determine the number of parts into which you divide it.

After all it must be confeffed that an intimate know ledge of things, and a judicious obfervation will affift in the business of divifion, as well as of definition, bete ter than too nice and curious an attention to the mers formalities of logical writers, without a real acquaintance with things.

SECT. IX..

Of a comprehenfive Conception of Things, and of Ab fraction.

TH

HE third rule to direct our conception requires. us to conceive of things comprehenfively. And. we muft furvey an object in all its parts to obtain a complete idea of it, fo we muft confider it in all its modes, attributes, properties, and relations, in order to obtain a comprehenfive conception of it.

The comprehenfion of an idea, as it was explained under the doctrine of univerfals, includes only the ef fential modes or attributes of that idea; but in this place the word is taken in a larger fenfe, and implies. alfo the various occafional properties, accidental modes and relations.

The neceffity of this rule is founded upon the fame

reafon as the former, viz. That our minds are narrow and fcanty in their capacities, and as they are not able to confider all the parts of a complex idea at once, so neither can they at once contemplate all the different attributes and circumftances of it: we must therefore confider things fucceffively and gradually in their various appearances and circumftances: as our natural eye cannot at once behold the fix fides of a dye or cube, nor take cognizance of all the points that are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the fides fucceffively, and thus furvey and number the points that are marked on each fide, that we may know the whole.

In order to a comprehenfive view of any idea we must first confider, whether the object of it has an exiftence as well as an effence; whether it be a simple or complex idea; whether it be a fubftance or a mode: if it be a substance, then we must enquire what are the effential modes of it, which are neceflary to its nature, and what are those properties or accidents of it, which belong to it occafionally, or as it is placed in fome particular circumftances: we muft view it in its internal and abfolute modes, and obferve it in those various external relations in which it ftands to other beings: we must confider it in its powers and capacities either to do or fuffer: we must trace it up to its various caufes, whether fupreme or fubordinate. We must defcend to the variety of its effects, and take notice of its feveral ends and defigns which are to be attained by it. We must conceive of it as it is either an object or 2. subject; what are the things that are a-kin to it, and what are the oppofites or contraries of it; for many things are to be known both by their contrary and their kindred ideas.

If the thing we difcourfe of be a mere mode, we muft inquire whether it belongs to fpirits or bodies whether it be a phyfical or moral mode: if moral, then we must confider its relation to God, to ourselves, to our neighbours; its reference to this life, or the life to come. If it be a virtue, we muit feek what are the principles of it, what are the rules of it, what are the tendencies of it, and what are the falle virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real vices that oppofe