from Bristoe Station, his army advancing as the work progressed. His movements were regularly reported by our scouts, and it was known that he had advanced from Warrenton Junction a few days before the attack.

His approach toward the Rappahannock was announced on November 6, and about noon next day his infantry was discovered advancing to the bridge, while a large force moved in the direction of Kelly's Ford, where the first attack was made. At the latter point the ground on the north side of the Rappahannock commands that on the south, and preparations had been made only for such resistance to the passage of the river as would suffice to gain time for putting the troops in a position selected in rear of the ford, with a view to contest the advance of the enemy after crossing. In accordance with this intention, General Rodes had one regiment (the Second North Carolina) on picket along the river, the greater part of it being at Kelly's, with the Thirtieth North Carolina in reserve supporting a battery.

As soon as he perceived that the enemy was in force, he ordered his division to take the position referred to in rear of the ford. While it was getting into line the enemy's artillery opened upon the Second North Carolina and soon drove it to shelter, except a few companies near the ford, which continued to fire from the rifle-pits. The Thirtieth was advanced to the assistance of the Second, but in moving across the open ground was broken by the concentrated fire of the enemy's artillery, and took refuge behind some buildings at the river. The enemy, being unopposed except by the party in the rifle-pits, crossed at the rapids above the ford and captured the troops defending it, together with a large number of the Thirtieth North Carolina, who refused to leave the shelter of the houses. A pontoon bridge was then laid down, on which a large force crossed to the south bank.

General Rodes in the meantime had placed his division in position, the resistance of the Second North Carolina having delayed the enemy sufficiently for this purpose. The advance of the Thirtieth does not appear to have contributed to this result, which, as previously stated, was the object of contesting the passage. It was not intended to attack the enemy until he should have advanced from the river, where it was hoped that by holding in check the force at the bridge, we would be able to concentrate upon the other. With this view General Johnson's division was ordered to re-enforce General Rodes.

In the meantime a large force was displayed in our front at the bridge, upon receiving information of which General A. P. Hill was ordered to get his corps in readiness, and Anderson's division was advanced to the river on the left of the railroad. The artillery was also ordered to move to the front. General Early put his division in motion toward the bridge and hastened thither in person. The enemy's skirmishers advanced in strong force with heavy supports, and ours were slowly withdrawn into the trenches.

Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, under Colonel Godwin (General Hoke being absent with one regiment on detached service), re-enforced General Hays, whose brigade occupied the north bank. No other troops were sent over, the two brigades mentioned being sufficent to man the works; and though inferior to the enemy in numbers, the nature of the position was such that he could not attack with a front more extended than our own. The remainder of Early's

division was placed in supporting distance, one regiment being stationed in the rifle trenches on the south bank east of the railroad. A gun from the works on the left of the road was also ordered to be placed in the battery at this point, to command the approach by the railroad embankment on the opposite side, but the enemy's sharpshooters had advanced so near the river that the order was countermanded, the preparations already made being deemed sufficient.

The enemy placed three batteries on the hills from which our skirmishers had been forced to retire, and maintained an active fire, upon our position until dark, doing no damage, however, so far as has been reported. Our batteries replied from both sides of the river, but with so little effect that the two on the south bank were ordered to cease firing.

Light skirmishing took place along the line. It was not known whether this demonstration was intended as a serious attack or only to cover the movement of the force that had crossed at Kelly's Ford, but the lateness of the hour and the increasing darkness induced the belief that nothing would be attempted until morning. It was believed that our troops on the north side would be able to maintain their position if attacked, and that in any case they could withdraw under cover of the guns on the south, the location of the pontoon bridge being beyond the reach of a direct fire from any position occupied by the enemy.

As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his movements the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers against our rifle trenches, and succeeded in carrying them in the manner described in the reports of Generals Early and Hays. It would appear from these reports and the short duration of the firing, that the enemy was enabled to approach very near the works before being seen.

The valley in our front aided in concealing his advance from view and a strong wind effectually prevented any movement from being heard. It was essential to the maintenance of the position under these circumstances that sharpshooters should have been thrown forward to give early information of his approach, in order that hẹ might be subjected to a fire as long as possible, but it is not stated that this precaution was taken. The breaking of the enemy's first line and the surrender of part of it, as described in the reports, also contributed to divert attention from the approach of the second and third, and enable them to press into the works. No information of the attack was received on the south side of the river until too late for the artillery there stationed to aid in repelling it; and it does not appear that the result would have been affected, under the circumstances, by the presence of a large number of guns.

The artillery in the works at the south end of the bridge was relied upon to keep it open for the retreat of the troops, as it could sweep the crest of the opposite hill at a short range. The darkness of the night and the fear of injuring our own men who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using it. The bridge, however, seems to have remained accessible to the troops on the left up to the last moment, as Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, with a few men, crossed just before it was fired by order of General Early.

The suggestions above mentioned afford the only explanation I am able to give of this unfortunate affair, as the courage and good conduct of the troops engaged have been too often tried to admit of question.

The loss of this position made it necessary to abandon the design of

Scale of Miles.

Shop

Dam

NORMAN'S FORD.

Wheatley.

Shackleford

attacking the force that had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and the army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between Culpeper CourtHouse and the Rappahannock, where it remained during the succeeding day. The position not being regarded as favorable, it returned the night following to the south side of the Rapidan.

The loss of General Rodes at Kelly's Ford was 5 killed, 59 wounded, and 295 missing. General Early's loss, including that of the artillery, was 6 killed, 39 wounded, and 1,629 missing. Some reported as missing were probably killed or wounded, and left in the hands of the enemy, and others failed to report to their commands.

Among the wounded were Colonel Cox, of the Second North Carolina, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sillers, of the Thirtieth-the latter, it is feared, mortally.

I forward herewith the reports of Generals Rodes and Early, the latter inclosing those of General Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, of Hoke's brigade.

A map of the locality is also annexed.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

General S. COOPER,

R. E. LEE,

General.

Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

No. 42.

Return of Casualties in the Confederate forces, October 26-November 8, 1863.

Command.

SECOND CORPS.